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PART VI.

THE HOPES OF IRELAND.

To write upon the subject of Ireland at all is disheartening enough, for the old reason that it is so easy to discover evils where the hope of remedy is so scant. To say the truth, after all that has come and gone, after all that has been said and vaunted about the altered and renovated state of Ireland, it is singular how little that is new can be said of her situation. No doubt the old material misery is greatly relieved. The loss of two millions and a half of her population has put the remainder more at ease. But as to the roots and sources of Irish discontent, we will ask any reader to take up Gustave de Beaumont's book upon Ireland, written a quarter of a century ago, and see how little change has taken place in the relations between the mass of the people of Ireland and the whole body of the laws and institutions by which they are governed,—relations pregnant now, as then, with disaffection and discontent.

The ordinary assumption at present in the minds of Englishmen with respect to Ireland we perceive to be of this kind,—that actual grievance she has none; that her physical wretchedness and her religious inequalities have alike been removed by wise English legislation: that her discontent arises simply from her perversity, and has its sources, *first*, in an old and decaying national tradition, which cannot live in the face of present realities, but is forced to feed upon the remembrance of times and things long gone by; *secondly*, in the efforts of interested agitators; and *thirdly*, and beyond all, in the religious animosities fostered by an Ultramontane prelacy and clergy. This it is, they say—this Ultramontanism, which is the really formidable element in Irish affairs; an aggressive and insidious principle, which sets Catholic

against Protestant, raises up the Pope against the Queen, and renders next to hopeless the prospect of governing Ireland on common principles of moderation and fair play.

Such is the tone which pervades the English press and public on the subject of Ireland. And this very tone, and the assumption which it embodies, and, above all, the language in which it is habitually expressed, form not the least of the causes of irritation to the minds of Catholics in Ireland. For every one who really knows Ireland, knows that such views as the above are a mere chimera; that the causes of the discontent which undoubtedly exists in Ireland lie in the present, not in the past; and that however Irishmen may sin, from time to time, by imprudence or weakness or violence,—in a word, by a defect of political talents,—justice is in the main with them, and injustice with their adversaries.

Given, five millions of people, profoundly and intensely Catholic, whom every endeavour to make less Catholic must end, as it has always ended, in making them more thoroughly so,—surely the very elements of the government of such a people should be based upon a hearty and complete recognition of that fact, and an acceptance of it in all its fullness and with all its legitimate consequences. The secret of all good government, the source of all loyalty and allegiance, is the conviction in the minds of the mass of the people, that the laws and institutions under which they live are but the higher expression of their own best aims and tendencies. Now we say, that up to this hour the English government in Ireland have never opened their eyes to see, or their hearts to admit, that Ireland is an incurably Catholic country. On the contrary, the legal theory that it is part and parcel of a Protestant state still vexatiously intrudes itself; and we do not believe that ever the secret hope has been abandoned by English statesmen, if not of protestantising Ireland, yet in some way, by some state means or machinery, of toning down its Catholicity to something of an easy, pliant, and manageable character.

Of the Protestant theory of the state, the Church Establishment is, of course, the foremost symbol and expression. We doubt if the full mischief of which that institution is the source has ever been accurately apprehended or gauged. To treat it as a mere financial grievance is very idle. Indeed, even as a financial question, it is amusing to read the arguments put forward on its behalf by its supporters. The Established Church, they say, is maintained by the tithe-rent-charge, which is paid by the landed proprietors, mostly Protestant; therefore you, the Catholics, have no reason to

complain. It is quite true, the tithe-rent-charge is paid by the landlords; but surely the mere hand that pays can make no difference. Formerly the farmer paid his tithes in kind, and then precisely the same argument was used. The farmer, it was said, in taking the land, made allowance for the tithes; it was therefore a deduction from the rent, and not really a burden on the farmers. And no doubt (the vexatious circumstances of collection apart) the argument, if it may be called so, was just as valid then as now. Those who use it lose sight of the fact, that the rent-charge which the landlords pay is no more the property of the landlords than the quit-rents of the Crown or the Woods and Forests.

It is a portion of the property of Ireland, destined originally to the spiritual uses of the people of Ireland, and by law perverted from that end. But, as we said, the financial question is of comparatively little moment. If it were a million a year, paid as a tribute, it might be classed among other annual millions for which Ireland gets small return. It is as an element of moral mischief, obstructing the growth of wholesome relations between the various classes of Irish society, that our quarrel with it is inveterate. Consider its influence upon the question of landlord and tenant.

If ever the principle, that what is worst in human affairs springs from the corruption or perversion of what is best, had a true application, it was to the means of working out in Ireland the institutions of England. And to feel the entire evil of the corruption, we must be sensible of the excellence of the thing itself. Take the whole English landed system, formed and bequeathed by the middle ages,—as an idea, what can be more admirable? Modern democratic writers are accustomed to speak of the system of landlord and tenant as a mere remnant of feudalism, having no roots in the necessities or ideas of modern life, and therefore certain in time to disappear and be supplanted by a system of peasant-proprietors. In our judgment, this is a deep mistake. Certain of the functions of the feudal aristocracy are, of course, obsolete; but the essence of the system is a benefit for all time. That there should exist, distributed throughout a nation, planted every where upon its soil, a body of men bound by their position to be men of superior stamp and cultivation, having charge of a definite portion of the community, guiding them, governing them, superintending their temporal interests, leading them to higher and more civilised ways,—and all this in concert and alliance with another body of men, also planted every where upon the land, charged with the moral and spiritual guidance of the people,—so long, we say, as the great

mass of mankind are, by the divine ordinance, tillers of the soil,—labourers of the body, not of the mind,—so long the excellence of such a social arrangement remains. A good landlord, fond and proud and careful of his tenantry, administering justice among them fairly and kindly, having interests and sympathies at one with theirs,—such a man is well worth his rent-roll. It is, of course, idle to overlook the imperfections in practice presented by every system, or to make poetry out of the facts—hard at best—of human life. But we speak of the idea to which the fact should tend to approximate; and it is because the fact in England has maintained a tolerable approximation to the idea, that the landed system there remains upon the whole so vital.

But consider a country parcelled out amongst an aristocracy not only destitute of all true sympathy with the people beneath them, but possessed by an inveterate dislike and contempt for them; with interests of their own incompatible with the interests of those over whom they are set; having by law the same high powers and privileges as a genuine aristocracy, and using them not for, but against the people, and to that end enacting and administering the whole body of the laws. Can a more frightful social system be imagined? The negative evil, the want of active sympathy and care, would be bad enough; but the positive tyranny which results is one in comparison with which all governmental tyranny is insignificant. The arm of government is distant, and often paralysed by the organs through which it acts; but here the spirit of oppression, barbed by contempt, confronts the peasant face to face, acts through the bailiff, the agent, the driver, is found on the bench at petty-sessions, and in the pitiless *habere* of the sheriff. And add to all this, a Church endowed by law, never standing the peasant's friend as between him and the landlord, but in close and intimate alliance with the latter to rob him of his sole remaining possession—his religious faith. We speak of the system in the time of its completeness. Of course there were at all times modifying circumstances; but on the whole, the institution tended towards the evil perfection of its ideal.

Such was the social system which England bestowed upon Ireland. And to do the Irish peasant justice, his logic never was at fault as to the real source of his sufferings. He went straight to the mark, and never thought of laying the oppression which he endured at any other door than that of the country by which it had been imposed and was sustained.

All the evils of Ireland, says M. de Beaumont, may be summed up in one word,—a bad aristocracy. And accord-

ingly he advises that every means (consistent with the just rights of property) should be taken to bring land into the market in small lots, so as to create, if possible, a body of peasant-proprietors. But this is a tedious business at best; and we cannot forego the hope of seeing the natural relations between landlord and tenant replace the unnatural ones which were the fruits of conquest and tyrannous laws. But here it is, we say, in this very point, that the Established Church fulfils its evil office. It is actually inspiriting the landlord to make war upon the religion of his tenantry. Without flocks of its own, its very *raison d'être*, the sole apology for its existence, lies in its being actively aggressive upon the Catholic religion. Year after year, hundreds of young men, Protestant ecclesiastics, are turned out of Trinity College, trained by the state and commissioned by the state. Commissioned to what? So far as they have consciences at all, they must feel, as they do feel and assert, that their mission is nothing more than a kind of apostolate among the heathen. So the landlord and the clergyman, still more the landlord's wife and the clergyman's wife and the ladies of the family, are in strict alliance to make some impression on the darkness of surrounding Popery, and regard the priest with profound and most undisguised hostility. A proselytising school is set up; a system of Bible-readers organised; very intelligible inducements, and threats still more intelligible, are brought to bear upon the tenants to send their children to the school, or to endure the intrusion of the Bible-reader. Then commences that sort of civil war in the district of which the details may be read in the Irish daily newspapers, and in the records of every petty-sessions and assizes,—details very despicable in themselves, but very serious in their results. It is natural for the priests, as the guardians of the people's faith, to be strongly roused, and to denounce the aggression and the aggressors in perhaps no very measured language. The position of the priest is, in fact, a very cruel one. Against material allurements and menaces his only arms are energetic appeals to the fidelity of his flock, and energetic denunciations of the backsliders; and upon this side lies the danger of awakening too much the indignation of an excitable people, lest it break out into illegal violence. Surely it is not matter of wonder that the result should be a perfect treasury of exasperation against the system which is the fruitful mother of all this mischief.

But, it is said, how is the law answerable for this? Every religion has a right to make proselytes; and Protestants, in seeking to convert the Irish peasantry to their own faith, are merely acting upon a principle by none more openly or ac-

tively avowed and asserted than by Catholics themselves. That, however, is not in the least the question. Protestants have, of course, the civil right to make converts; and, so far as they are sincere, have even a moral duty to do so, if the means be fair. Fair means are persuasion in all its forms; foul means are persecution in all its forms; and of all forms of persecution, we know of none more odious than that which wrings or purchases from the parent the assent to his children being brought up in a faith which he believes to be false—an assent which those who extort it know to be given against conscience, and in extorting which they are therefore (whatever be their sincerity in their own religious views) manifestly partakers in a grievous crime. Europe has been made to ring from end to end with the case of the Mortaras; but Europe has heard very little of the cases occurring in Ireland by the thousand, where the unhappy peasant had to choose between the eternal welfare of his children and their daily bread.

But again, it is objected, Suppose that Protestants of property do make unfair aggressions upon the faith of the people, how is that to be helped in a free country? Can the state prevent them without a degree of interference with private concerns which would be utterly intolerable? To that we answer, that in our view the root of the evil lies in the institutions of the state itself, in the theory of Protestant supremacy which it maintains in Ireland; and that, above all things, it is the Church Establishment which breeds, nourishes, and perpetuates the mischief. Is it not the Church *by law* established? The Protestants of Ireland have never got it out of their heads, and never will until that Establishment is totally swept away, that the law ought to favour those whose Church is the Church of the law. Since the state professes a religion, they think that, in common consistency, those who reject the religion of the state should be discountenanced by the state. Not the most ignorant Bible-reader that ever forced himself into the poor man's hut, with his foolish scraps of controversy, but feels and asserts a kind of swaggering superiority as the representative of the law-Church. He feels at his back the landlord, the magistracy, the police; and at the back of all, the whole might of England.

We might as well, our friends tell us, try to move Mount Atlas as to shake the Irish Church Establishment, in the present temper of the English parliament and people. Such we believe to be the lamentable fact. All we say is, that till it be otherwise, there is no reasonable chance of seeing the Irish a reconciled and quiescent people. Consider how it

presents itself. Here is an abuse, certainly the greatest that exists in any European country, an outrage upon plain justice and reason, unsupported by a shadow of fair argument, abandoned, so far as theory goes, by every statesman of mark, abhorred by the people of Ireland, and yet maintained because it accords with the prejudices, or serves the expedencies, of the people of England. If this be not tyranny, what is tyranny? Conceive for a moment five-sixths of the Romagnuoles to be Protestants; and that the Pope maintained there, against the will of the people, a highly-endowed Catholic Establishment, paid from the soil of the Romagna, and made it the pretext and the instrument for a continuous and vexatious, if not very successful, war upon the Protestant faith of the people. What a weapon the existence of such an institution would afford to the assailants of the Papal government! What wrath and scorn and reviling would be poured out by the London press upon this mockery of a Church! The Irish are a tolerably quick-sighted and logical people, and they accuse the English of having habitually two weights and two measures.

How a thoroughly Catholic people like the Irish, and a thoroughly Protestant people like the English, are to get on together, is a question which under the best circumstances, and with the wisest statesmen, would not be free from difficulty. Questions of foreign policy, such as that of the Pope just now, would from time to time arise; periods of religious excitement, in the one nation or the other, would from time to time occur, which might set them for a while by the ears. But because, in spite of all the sagacity of man, causes of irritation would occasionally ensue, is that a reason for deliberately keeping up a perpetual sore? Of the *internal* questions which at this day cause exasperation in Ireland, there is not one which, in our judgment, is not allied with, or even the offspring of, the all-central evil of the Established Church, and of the Protestant theory of the state. We have seen its evil fruits in the relation of landlord and tenant. Let us take, again, the question of education, upon which such strong feeling exists at present. However the matter may have been mystified, we believe that any one who candidly investigates the history of the education system in Ireland must be convinced, that the real causes of quarrel are in the main two: first, the suspicion of a design on the part of the governing body, not, indeed, to proselytise the Catholic children, but to have them as much as possible withdrawn from clerical influence and control; and secondly, the palpable endeavour, on the part of Protestant patrons who have enrolled themselves

under the national-education system, to draw in Catholic children to attend Protestant religious instruction. The manifest and essential difference between the attitude of the Protestants and that of the Catholics in all these struggles is this, that the latter stand purely on the defensive. They think but of their own flocks and people. No one has ever accused them of any designs upon the faith of young Protestants, or of the least attempt at interference with them. The utmost accusation that is brought against the Catholic clergy might be summed up in this sentence: You wish to have your Catholic people more Catholic than we in our wisdom think they ought to be.

Just so. We have no objection, say some of our antagonists, to your being Roman Catholics if you wish; but you must not be ultra-Catholic, or, as they choose to term it, Ultramontane. All this outcry about Ultramontanism has often made us smile. Those who are loudest in it have not, we need scarcely say, the least conception of the exact meaning of the term as employed amongst theologians, or of the shade of difference of opinion which it is used to define. What they do really mean by it is, the assertion of Catholicity as a living and governing principle at all. Every convent that is founded, every mission that is held, every confraternity that is formed, is in their eyes so much pure Ultramontanism. The moderate, rational, loyal old school of Catholicism, of which they profess to be enamoured, means, simply and purely, a Catholicism which confines itself to the very minimum of faith and practice. If a man goes to confession, hears Mass of a week-day, is a member of the Society of St. Vincent of Paul, and tries to lead a Christian life, he is a bigoted Ultramontane, or even a Jesuit: if he does none of these things, and especially if he has enlightened views about fast-days and the like, he is a liberal Christian. We could relate instances, only too ludicrous, in which this phrase of Ultramontanism was applied to the keeping, not to say of the ordinances of the Church, but of the very commandments of God.

Now, in this sense, Ultramontanism has happily developed itself very extensively in Ireland within the last ten years. The great religious advance that has been made is wonderful in itself, and is spoken of with the utmost wonder by those who remember the last generation. In the spread of religious orders, in the formation of religious societies, in the building of churches, and in the increase of religious observance among the laity, we doubt if any thing comparable to it could be pointed out in these later ages. Now surely here is a result in which any government with a true sense of its

position ought to rejoice. The more religious the people, the less need of the constable, is a literally simple axiom. But government ought especially to learn all that it owes to the great spread of religious societies among Catholic young men. The other day, some of the Protestant journals in Dublin denounced the Society of St. Vincent of Paul as *a secret society*, and attacked the government for having conferred the commission of the peace on the president of such a society. This secret society, which wickedly visits and relieves the poor, and the Catholic Young Men's Society, whose members almost as nefariously combine to promote their own mental and moral improvement, number their adherents by tens of thousands. Such societies fill up in the very best way the leisure-hours of a life of business, and satisfy the desire of union and concert for a common unselfish object, which amongst young men is especially strong. If it were not for them, how would that void be filled up, or that desire be satisfied? Of nothing do we feel more certain, than that if the cities of Ireland are not at this day *travaillées*, honeycombed by secret political societies directed to the utter overthrow of the government, it is solely owing to the active power of Catholic principles; and if Catholicity, as a presiding law, be ever destroyed or deadened in the breasts of the young men of Ireland, England will have to her own hand some small experience of that state of things which in continental cities she appears so much to rejoice in. And the same is true of country as of town. The Ribbon conspiracy, instead of being confined to ruffians at war with the priests, as they are at war with society, would be one enormous and almost universal confederacy against the landlords, if it were not for the proscription of secret societies by the Church, and the rigid refusal of the Sacraments to the members of any such society. In the total absence of any hold upon the affections or spontaneous goodwill of the people which the government has ever had or deserved to have, the only *moral* basis which society has in the greater part of Ireland is the Church. The rest is simple physical force. In the face of this, it is surely very conciliatory and very encouraging to find the English press, amongst them a journal like the *Saturday Review*, suggesting, as a mode of dealing with Ireland, that whenever an agrarian murder was committed, the priest should be hanged.

The simple outcome of all that we have been saying is this, that men should clear their heads of all this nonsense about Ultramontaniam; and seeing that, in spite of all that they can do, Ireland will be Catholic and not Protestant, be exceedingly glad that she is thoroughly and religiously Catho-

lie; that they should give up for ever any desire to foster that moderate Catholicism which is at bottom mere selfishness or shallowness, and recognise in the full development of the Catholic system the very best guarantee for the peace and good order of society.

Do we mean, then, that the Protestant Establishment should be supplanted by a Catholic one? We believe that there is not a Catholic in Ireland, priest or layman, who desires or dreams of such a thing. It would be necessarily the source of new evils worse than the old. No: let the very notion of a state-religion of any kind be abolished, and let the relation of government to the various religious denominations be one of perfect equality and fair play; recognising that all the religions in Ireland may, in their way, do immense service to the state; letting them decide for themselves as to the religious education of their people; and interfering, if at all, only in the spirit of justice, to prevent one denomination from trying by unfair means to seduce the children belonging to another. The English statesman who will take this plain view of the government of Ireland, and carry it into practical effect, will complete the imperfect work of 1829.

It is true the difficulties are enormous, and lie not alone in the prejudices of England, but in the apathy of Ireland. It is certainly singular how little is at present publicly made of such a grievance as the Church Establishment. The cause, however, is not hard to find. The strong excitement which possessed Ireland for so many years upon the subject of her legislative independence naturally overcame and absorbed all such topics, and at its close left her wearied out with agitation. The famine, and what followed the famine, and from many causes a growing distrust of the professions of politicians,—all have served to make the Irish people hopeless of ever achieving complete justice from parliament, have made them shrink from any further political agitation, and caused them to direct their energies rather towards the acquisition of wealth than any public object whatever. This mood, however, will certainly pass away. All great questions move more or less by fits and starts, and have their periods of utter depression, perhaps almost on the threshold of final success. This was to an eminent degree the case with Catholic Emancipation. And although for the present the chances of getting rid of the Church Establishment seem low enough, we feel convinced that the day is not far distant when the topic will become an engrossing one in Ireland, and when Irish public opinion will be thoroughly roused to the necessity of a great and prolonged effort to sweep away that abuse, the enforced

maintenance of which, beyond all other things, prevents the social elements in that island from gravitating to their natural and normal position.

THE STATES OF THE CHURCH.

THE Catholic Church, while she is militant on earth, is compelled to wage an incessant conflict, both for the preservation of the purity of her doctrines and for her own liberty in proclaiming them. The political disputes are a part and a consequence of the dogmatic controversy, and the mission of the Church resides in both alike. All modern history is filled with this double contest; on the one hand with her successive victories over new forms of error, and on the other with her gradual emancipation from every earthly influence. The latter aspect of ecclesiastical history is chiefly exhibited in the vicissitudes of the Papacy as a temporal power—in the growth and settlement of the Roman States. The conservation of the independence of the Holy See through the integrity of its territory has been an object of such importance as frequently to engage nearly the whole of Europe in the contests it has occasioned. Empires have risen and fallen in its behalf, and it has been the paramount interest and motive in most of the greatest changes in the political arrangement of Europe. It was a glorious spectacle for mankind, that, through all the shocks and changes of our history, through barbarous and civilised ages, in spite of the temptations of ambition and of the instigation of religious hatred, during centuries of boundless covetousness and violence, the Church, whilst surrounded by heretical and infidel powers, should have continued in possession of her dominions, recovering them whenever they were attacked, and gradually increasing them for nearly a thousand years, although guarded by nothing but the awe of an unseen protector, and the dread of the mysterious avenger who watched over her. Now that this feeling has been discarded as a superstition, now that it has been discovered that the dreaded power is a phantom, that shame is childish and honour absurd, and that conscience is nothing but the unreasonable voice of habit,—now that the spell which was on mankind is broken, and the safeguard of the Church removed, it may be interesting to consider how the head of the Church came to be a temporal governor, and how his government grew into the condition in which it has been overtaken by the storm that now rages. We will

endeavour to explain the rise of the temporal power, and some of the changes it underwent during the Revolution.

Every record older than the thirteenth century which could be quoted as an authority for the full territorial rights of the Holy See is almost certainly spurious, whilst all the documents by which those rights were actually created have been lost. We possess neither the agreement which was made between Pipin and Stephen II. at Quercy, previously to the first expedition to Italy and the first Frankish donation, nor the Act of Restitution of 755, nor the documents by which Charlemagne confirmed the gifts of his father in 773 and 787, nor the deed by which Henry III. conceded Beneventum to the Pope in 1051. Even the act by which the Countess Matilda left her possessions to the Church of Rome, in the year 1077, was lost, and required to be renewed in the year 1102. But if the oldest authentic document describing in full the dominions of the Holy See is the act of Otho IV. in 1201, the historical monuments which are preserved amply make up for what has been lost,* and we are able to trace with something like completeness the formation and the changes of the patrimony of St. Peter.

The origin of the patrimony belongs to the very earliest ages. Even under the pagan emperors, when the Church, not being recognised by law, was not legally entitled to hold property, she was not generally molested in the acquisition and enjoyment of it. About the middle of the second century it was usual for even distant churches to obtain relief and support from Rome. In a letter of that date, in which Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth, sends his thanks to the Pope for the assistance he has received, he speaks of such gifts already as an ancient custom.† This, however, may refer only to money collected among the faithful; but early in the third century, the Christians enclosed a piece of land in Rome (not, therefore, the property of any private individual among them) for the purpose of building a church, and their right being disputed, the Emperor Alexander Severus decided in

* "Non opus foret divinam ipsam, et omni laude superexcellentissimam Romanam primam sedem, se his ambiguis juvare argumentis quæ ex illis epistolis extracta, decreto Gratiani inserta inveniuntur. Sufficiens quidem et multo elegantius, veritas ipsa ex usitatis certis, et approbatis sacris scripturis, et doctorum scriptis, absque hæsitazione haberetur . . . quia etiam illis omnibus scripturis e medio sublati sanctam Romanam Ecclesiam primam, summæ potestatis excellentiæ, inter cunctas sedes quisque Catholicus fateretur." Nicolaus Cusanus, *Concordantia Catholica*, iii. 2.

† 'Εξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὑμῶν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο· πάντας μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ποικίλως εὐεργετεῖν, ἐκκλησίαις τε πολλαῖς ταῖς κατὰ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἐφόδια πέμπειν . . . ὃ οὐ μόνον διατετήρηκεν ὁ μακάριος ὑμῶν ἐπίσκοπος Σωτὴρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηύξηκεν. Routh, *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, i. 167.

their favour.* The great cemetery which bears the name of St. Callistus was placed under his direction by Pope Zephyrinus about the same time, and in the middle of the third century the Church of Rome was rich enough to support 1580 Christian poor (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* vii. 43). During the persecutions of Decius and Valerian, her property, consisting chiefly of churches and cemeteries, was confiscated; but Gallienus, in the edict by which Christianity was first made a *religio licita* (Eus. vii. 13), orders the restitution to the Christians of the burying-places and other lands and houses of which they had been deprived. It appears, therefore, that the first occasion on which the law was enforced on an extensive scale led to its repeal.

At the last and greatest effort to extirpate Christianity under Diocletian, a vast amount of property was doubtless seized; and in the first edicts of toleration, lands and houses are expressly specified as belonging to the churches, and their restitution is enjoined both by Constantine and Maximin.† Finally, in the year 321, Constantine issued a decree permitting the Church of Rome to receive bequests, and he gave the example of generosity himself by munificently endowing the basilicas.‡ This edict was not the beginning of the wealth of the Church, but it led to its rapid and secure increase.§ The biographer of Pope Sylvester, whilst he gives an accurate account of all the gifts of Constantine, also distinctly enumerates donations, both of land and of precious metals, which were made by the Pope himself, and which must have come from the Christians of Rome.|| With the

* “Quum Christiani quendam locum qui publicus fuerat occupassent, contra popinarii dicerent, sibi eum deberi, rescripsit (Imperator) melius esse ut quomodocumque illic Deus colatur quam popinariis dedatur.” Lamprius in *Alexandro Severo, Scriptores Hist. Aug.* i. 1003, ed. 1671.

† Eusebius mentions this in many places. He gives the decree of Maximin, as follows: “Ἰνα μέντοι καὶ μείζων γένηται ἡ ἡμετέρα δωρεὰ, καὶ τοῦτο νομοθετῆσαι κατηξιώσαμεν, ἵν’ εἴ τις οἰκία καὶ χωρία τοῦ δικαίου τῶν Χριστιανῶν πρὸς τοῦτου ἐτύγχανον ὄντα, ἐκ τῆς κελεύσεως τῶν γονέων τῶν ἡμετέρων εἰς τὸ δίκαιον μετέπεσε τοῦ φύσκει, ἢ ὑπὸ τινος κατελήφθη πόλεως, εἴτε διάπρασις τούτων γεγένηται εἴτε εἰς χάρισμα δέδοται τινι. ταῦτα πάντα εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον δίκαιον τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἀνακληθῆναι ἐκελεύσαμεν. *Hist. Eccl.* ix. 10. Constantine writes to Anulinus (*ibid.* x. 5): Εἴτε κῆποι. εἴτε οἰκίαι, εἴθ’ ὅτιονδὴποτε τῷ δικαίῳ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκκλησιῶν διέφερον, σύμπαντα αὐταῖς ἀποκατασταθῆναι ὡς τάχιστα.

‡ “Habeat unusquisque licentiam sanctissimo Catholico venerabilique concilio decedens bonorum quod optaverit relinquere.” *Cod. Theodos.* xvi. 2, 4.

§ “Notandum est edictum hoc ad populum Romanum missum, et in urbe Roma propositum, et sic ad Ecclesias urbis Romæ speciatim pertinere. Inde igitur postea proculdubio Ecclesiæ Romanæ opes in immensum auctæ.” Gothofredus, in *Cod. Theod.* vol. vi. p. 27.

|| Anastasius in *vita Silvestri*, cap. 3, vol. i. p. 78, ed. Vignoli, 1724: “Hic fecit in urbe Roma ecclesiam in prædio cujusdam presbyteri sui . . .

acquisition of wealth grew the thirst for it among the clergy, and serious abuses ensued. Valentinian I., in the year 370, issued a decree restricting the right of accepting testamentary bequests; and the necessity of this restriction was acknowledged at the time.* This law was, however, no permanent impediment to the accumulation of Church property, and it was afterwards revoked.

In the course of the fifth century we find the Popes attending to secular affairs, and exercising great authority, by virtue both of their spiritual character and of the claims which their wealth gave to the people, though without actually interfering in the government of the city. They had, however, already overstepped the bounds which at Constantinople a Bishop was expected to observe. For whereas the Popes had generally sought the assistance of orthodox emperors against the heretics, in the year 420, Celestine I., of his own authority, expelled the Novatians from the churches which they held. In the East, this was considered an alarming stretch of power;† but the history of the patriarchs of Constantinople is a perpetual justification of the policy of the Popes. In the year 449, Leo the Great writes to the Emperor Theodosius that he cannot be present at a synod in the East, because of the pressure of temporal affairs (*"cum nec aliqua ex hoc ante exempla præcesserint, et temporalis necessitas me non patiatur deserere civitatem,"* Opp. i. 887). That these temporal concerns were due in great measure to the obligations which the wealth of the Roman Church imposed upon the Bishops, is evident from the use which they are recorded to have made of it for the support of the Roman people.‡

ubi et hæc dona contulit. Patenam argenteam pensantem lib. xx. ex dono Constantini Augusti. Donavit autem scyphos argenteos calicem aureum fundum Valerianum, etc."

* St. Jerome writes in the year 394: "Pudet dicere, sacerdotes idolorum, mimi, et aurigæ, et scortæ, hæreditates capiunt: solis clericis et monachis hoc lege prohibetur; et prohibetur non a persecutoribus, sed a principibus Christianis. Nec de lege conqueror; sed doleo cur meruerimus hanc legem . . . Cauterium bonum est, sed quo mihi vulnus, ut indigeam cauterio? Provida severaque legis cautio, et tamen nec sic refrenatur avaritia. Per fidei commissæ legibus illudimus . . . Audio præterea in senes, et anus absque liberis, quorundam turpe servitium. Ipsi apponunt matulam, obsident lectum, purulentiam stomachi, et phlegmata pulmonis, manu propria suscipiunt. Pavent ad introitum medici, trementibusque labiis, an commodius habeant, sciscitantur: et si paululum senex vegetior fuerit, periclitantur: simulataque lætitia, mens intrinsecus avara torquetur." Ep. 52 (ad Nepotianum), i. 260, 261. St. Ambrose says: "Nobis etiam privatæ successionis emolumenta recentibus legibus denegantur, et nemo conqueritur." Ep. 18 (ad Valentinianum), c. 14.

† Τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπισκοπῆς ὁμοίως τῇ Ἀλεξανδρέων πέρα τῆς ἱεροσυνῆς, ἐπὶ δυναστείαν ἤδη πάσαι προελθούσης . . . οὐ μὴν οἱ ἐν Κωνσταντίνου πόλει τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν. Socrates, H. E. vii. 11, p. 347, ed. Valesius.

‡ We read, for instance, of Gelasius, at the end of the fifth century: "Hic

As the strength and prosperity of the empire declined, the property of the Church increased. The estates of many patrician families residing in the capital, who had been owners of great part of the land of the Western empire both in Italy and in the provinces, were added to her patrimony. The motives which induced the Romans of that day to make the Church their heir were the same which have been active at all times; but in an age of ruins and decay they had an extraordinary power. The population was dwindling away, and the aristocracy in particular declined with the decline of the state. Many great families became extinct, and in passing away without heirs, it was a natural thought to leave their earthly possessions to the only institution which seemed not to change and not to die. It was generally believed that the end of all things was at hand; and this belief was shared by many of the Fathers at a time when the vitality, the fidelity, and the genius of the barbarians were undistinguishable amid the havoc by which they were chiefly known.* Four centuries later, during another period of tribulation and despondency, the same belief once more prevailed, and it was supposed that the year 1000 would be the last. The consequence was, that numerous legacies were left to the Church; many foundations made at that time, and deeds with the preamble *appropinquante mundi termino*, attest the common expectation. The clergy, and especially the monks, generally opposed the delusion.† In the order of Cluny, in which the elements of regeneration were kept alive, holy men already looked forward to the great reform of which, half a century later, the brethren of Cluny were the foremost champions. A memorial of that time, and of the opposition of the Benedictines to the prevalent opinion, survives in the feast of All Souls.

fuit amator pauperum, et clerum ampliavit. Hic liberavit a periculo famis civitatem Romam." Anastasius, i. 167.

* Even Gregory the Great seems to have had this belief; for he wrote to the emperor: "Plus de venientis Jesu misericordia quam de vestræ pietatis justitia præsumo." Ep. v. 40. And he frequently speaks of the approaching end of the world: "Futurum sæculum ipsa jam quasi propinquitate tangitur." Dial. iv. 41. "Ecce enim mundum hunc quam vicinus finis urget aspicitis." Ep. iv. 25. "Hoc jam ut videmus mundi hujus termino appropinquante." Ep. ix. 68. "Appropinquante fine mundi." Ep. ix. 123, &c. &c.

† "De fine mundi coram populo sermonem in ecclesia Parisiorum adolescentulus audiivi, quod statim finito mille annorum numero Antichristus adveniret, et non longo post tempore universale judicium succederet: cui prædicationi ex evangeliiis ac apocalypsi et libro Danielis, qua potui virtute, restiti. Denique et errorem qui de fine mundi inolevit abbas meus beatæ memoriæ Richardus sagaci animo propulit . . . nam fama pene totum mundum impleverat, quod quando annuntiatio dominica in Parasceve contigisset absque ullo scrupulo finis sæculi esset."—Abbo of Fleury, *Apolog. ad Reges Francorum*, p. 471, ed. Migne.

There is no record of similar donations at the period of which we are speaking,* but there is no reason to doubt that in the sixth century, as in the tenth, the same cause operated in the same way; and at the close of the sixth century we find the Popes the richest landowners in Italy. From the letters of Gregory the Great, and from the lives of the Popes, we know that their estates lay in Italy, Gaul, Africa, and especially in Calabria and Sicily, which produced alone a revenue of three talents and a half a year.† These vast estates were the foundation of the temporal power of the Popes. A recent Jewish historian, whose history of the Roman states has obtained a prize from the University of Göttingen, has rendered it unnecessary for us to cite on this point any of the numerous Catholic writers—such as Orsi, Fontanini, Cenni, Borgia—who in the last century wrote upon the subject. He expresses himself as follows: “It is not to be denied, that in this early possession of such extensive domains the germ of the temporal sovereignty of the Bishop of Rome already existed, and that at the close of the sixth century it laid the foundation of their subsequent dominion over the Eternal City. And it cannot be disputed that some of the Popes even then enjoyed a sort of temporal authority, and exercised various prerogatives of sovereignty over parts of the patrimony of St. Peter.”‡

The times were particularly propitious to the development of the influence which was founded on the spiritual authority and on the possessions of the Holy See. It was the period of the great migration, when many a Bishop appeared, in virtue of his office, and in fulfilment of the trust and expectation of the people, as their guardian, while the imperial officers were unable to protect them. The position to which they were thus naturally elevated, through the helplessness of the civil authorities in the presence of the formidable invaders, was confirmed by the Emperor Justinian. In the pragmatic sanction of 554 he took advantage of the influence which they already *de facto* possessed, to establish by their means a control over the whole administration of the provinces. They were required to superintend the conduct of the governors, to report on their wrong-doings, and to act as defenders and advocates of the people. This was at once a portion of the extensive reform by which Justinian restored self-government to the

* See Note A at end of article.

† Τα δὲ λεγόμενα πατριμόνια τῶν ἁγίων καὶ κορυφαίων Ἀποστόλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πρεσβυτέρᾳ Ῥώμῃ τιμωμένων ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐκπαλαί τιμώμενα χρυσίου τάλαντα τρία ἡμισυ τῷ δημοσίῳ λόγῳ τελεῖσθαι προσέταξεν. Theophanes *Chronogr.* 273, ed. Venice.

‡ Sugenheim, Entstehung und Ausbildung des Kirchenstaats, 1854, p. 4.

towns and provinces, and at the same time an attempt to save the crumbling system of the imperial government, by committing it in great measure to the care of the Church. The result was, to give to the clergy of the West a very extensive influence in matters of state; but it increased in far greater proportion the political power of the Pope, who could direct and command that of all the other Bishops.* Against Rome the efforts of the barbarians were especially directed. It was threatened alike by the Goths and the Huns, Vandals and Lombards, Saracens and Normans. But as the danger was greatest in the capital, so was the influence of the Bishop who repeatedly saved it, and enabled it, by his generous assistance, to support the devastations which he could not prevent. In an old poem, published in Bunsen's *Description of Rome*, i. 243, we find it declared that the Papacy had saved the city:

“Nam nisi te Petri meritum Paulique foveret,
Tempore jam longo Roma misella foret.”

In a petition addressed by the Romans to the exarch during the Lombard wars, they speak of the Pope as their sole defence against the ferocity of the invaders, whom he sometimes persuaded, sometimes bribed to spare them.† The position which they in this way acquired is thus described by a Protestant divine, whose works are well known in England: “The Popes were landowners like any others, but more wealthy than any, and exempt from taxation. But this wealth enabled them, during the troubles which beset Italy from the fifth century, on all sides to diminish the sufferings of the inhabitants, to save them from famine, to redeem captives, to conciliate the barbarians by their gifts. In this way the See of St. Peter became, without any rights of sovereignty, the national centre of Italy, to whom the people had recourse for help and relief even in temporal adversity.”‡

Whilst all these circumstances were uniting to raise the Bishop of the Western capital to a high political position, the emperors were absent from Rome, and from the time of

* Thus Gregory the Great writes to Januarius, Bishop of Caralis in Sardinia: “Necesse est ut fraternitas vestra, dum licet, civitatem suam vel alia loca fortius muniri provideat, atque immineat ut abundanter in eis condita procurentur, quatenus dum hostis illuc Deo sibi irato accesserit, non inveniatur quod lædat, sed confusus abscedat.” Ep. ix. 6.

† “Propinquantium inimicorum ferocitas, quam nisi sola Dei virtus atque apostolorum principis per suum vicarium, hoc est Romanum Pontificem, ut omnibus notum est, aliquando monitis comprimit, aliquando vero flectit ac modigerat hortatu, singulari interventu indiget, cum hujus solius pontificalibus monitis, ob reverentiam apostolorum principis, parentiam offerant voluntariam: et quos non virtus armorum humiliat, pontificalis increpatio cum obsecratione inclinatur.” *Liber Diurnus Romanorum Pontificum*, ii. 4.

‡ Kurtz, *History of the Church*, ii. 194 (1856).

Narses their authority in Italy was diminished and insecure. It was in their interest to promote an influence which could not rival or threaten their own, and could serve to support it against the senate and nobles of Rome. The popularity of the Pope, and his power with the barbarians, rendered his assistance indispensable to preserve the city from the enemy and the people in their allegiance. Every political motive existed, therefore, to conciliate and strengthen the Pope; and it was only in consequence of religious misunderstandings that the fidelity of the Romans was at last shaken. For they were more attached to their Bishop and pastor, upon whose resources and benevolence they depended for those distributions of food and alms to which they had become accustomed in the better days of Rome, than to the emperor, whom they never saw, who did nothing for them, and whose power made itself felt only by the money he demanded and the spoils he had carried away. Indeed the Pope was their advocate, to mitigate not only the violence of the Lombards, but the rapacity of the Byzantine officials.

The letters of Gregory the Great explain very distinctly the position of the Papacy in his time. The imperial power was sinking before the progress of the Lombards, and only the towns on the coast which were accessible to the Greek fleet remained constantly under the exarch, who held his court at Ravenna. In the other cities the emperor was represented by dukes and counts; but as they could do little for the people, their power was generally small in comparison with the preponderating influence of the Bishops. Pope Pelagius had been assured by the exarch that he could send him no assistance against the Lombards, and that he must defend himself as he could. Under these circumstances, on the death of Pelagius, Gregory was taken from his retirement and elected Pope. Bede says that he was distinguished from his predecessors by a higher notion of his office. What that notion was he tells us when he says that he is ready to die, rather than that the Church should degenerate in his time: "*Paratior sum mori, quam beati Petri apostoli ecclesiam meis diebus degenerare*" (Ep. iv. 47). Instead of devoting his attention, like many of those who came before him, to the decoration of the churches of the city, he soon found himself plunged in affairs of state. "I have been recalled into the world," he complains, "under the appearance of being made a Bishop, and am more occupied with temporal concerns than when I was a layman."* He says that he discharged the

* "*Sub colore episcopatus ad sæculum sum reductus . . . tantis terræ curis inservio quantis me in vita laica nequaquam deservisse reminiscor.*" Ep. i. 5.

office of the emperor's paymaster in Rome; that he was virtually the Bishop not so much of the Romans as of the Lombards, because they occupied all his attention, and carried away great part of his resources.* As he received no aid from the exarch, he made peace with the Lombards on his own authority; and as he could not obtain his assistance, he did not wait for his sanction.† The Lombards treated with him as an independent power.

It is probable that from this time forward it would have been possible for the Popes to throw off the yoke of the empire. In many respects it was a source of annoyance and oppression; and the necessity of awaiting the permission of government at each election caused a very troublesome delay. The people, too, were with the Pope; and the exarch, who could not protect them against the Lombards, would have been unable to subdue them by force of arms. Nevertheless this anomaly was tolerated, with all its injurious consequences, for a century and a half after the death of Gregory; so much did his successors dread the duties and responsibilities of sovereignty, and so great was their respect and their forbearance for the imperial authority. But from this time the change was prepared in the minds of the people; they became familiarised with the idea of transferring their government from the hands of the distant, useless, and generally unpopular emperor, to the Bishop, who was every thing to them—who was ever solicitous and active for the interests of their city and their country—who already exercised the authority which was slipping from a grasp unable to hold it, and in whom Rome saw herself rising once more to the supremacy which it was believed that she would never lose.

“His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono,
Imperium sine fine dedi.”

They became attached to him by gratitude and interest, love and pride. All that was required was a breach between the emperor and the Pope, to afford them an opportunity of showing on which side their allegiance lay.

This opportunity at last came. In the year 692, the Emperor Justinian II. required that the Pope should adopt the decrees of the Trullan Council, and Sergius refused, *eligens*

* Every Bishop, he considered, had in those days to attend to more than the purely spiritual welfare of his flock: “Nostis quia talis hoc tempore in regiminis debeat arce constitui, qui non solum de salute animarum, verum etiam de extrinseca subjectorum utilitate et cautela sciat esse sollicitus.” Ep. x. 62.

† He writes to Ravenna that the Lombards offer a separate peace: “Nobiscum quidem specialem pacem facere repromittit, sed scimus quia et diversæ insulæ et loca sunt alia proculdubio peritura.” Ep. iv. 29.

ante mori, says his contemporary biographer, *quam novitatum erroribus consentire*. An officer was sent to bring him a prisoner to Constantinople; but the army of the exarchate marched to Rome to protect the Pontiff who was the pillar of Italian freedom, and the imperial emissary only saved his life by taking refuge under the bed of the Pope. The deposition of Justinian, by one of the frequent revolutions at Constantinople, put an end to the mutiny. But the jealousy of freedom was awakened in Italy; disturbances became frequent; several exarchs were murdered at Ravenna. The people were left to defend themselves against the Lombards, and acquired self-reliance and consciousness of their strength.* Under the Roman empire, the love and the appreciation of freedom were absorbed by the respect for the law; and at the time of the Teutonic invasions, the latter alone survived. Even the turbulence and passion in which the Romans had found relief during the worst periods of tyranny had given way to a tame submission; and the people, who had so often and so wantonly changed their rulers, silently acquiesced in changes that were independent of their will. The long antagonism of the Greeks and the Lombards gave birth to new ideas; the notion arose, that a balance of authorities is a security for the subject. They sought a protection for their own weakness in the weakness of their governors; and that practice then commenced of seeking always to have two masters, which has ever been the secret, the limit, and the bane of Italian freedom. "The freedom of the tyrant," says a great historian, "is the end at which the Italian aims." It is of this that the renowned history of the Italian Republics consists. Their notions of freedom are neither those of the ancient Romans, which survived in Venice, nor those of the Teutonic race, which sometimes animated the municipalities of Northern Italy. When the ablest of their patriots drew up a scheme of independence, it resulted in a code of the most unbounded tyranny; and as Machiavelli, in the sixteenth century, conceived a free Italy only by means of the despotism of a prince, so their patriots in our day can imagine liberty only in the form of the absolutism of the state. These ideas took their rise in the age of which we are speaking.

The events of the year 692 were repeated in 712, when

* An excellent Italian historian speaks as follows of this period: "Fino a quest' epoca quasi tutte le città romagnuole sfuggirono la signoria longobarda; mentre certo è che l'esarca non avrebbe potuto conservarle all' impero, se i cittadini stessi non si fossero armati a difesa; e i cittadini si armarono non per affetto alla greca autorità, cui egualmente abborrivano che quella de' Longobardi, ma per un sentimento non conosciuto e negli umani animi innato di un viver più libero e indipendente." Vesi, *Storia di Romagna*, i. 275.

the Emperor Philippicus, a Monothelite, was placed on the throne. The Romans refused to receive his image, his orders, or his coins; his name was not pronounced in the Mass, his officer was not admitted into the city. He tried to force his way; and several lives had been lost, when the Pope sent the priests to stop the combat. Almost immediately after this, the heretical emperor was dethroned in his capital, and the excitement subsided. The decisive moment for the dominion of the Greeks in Italy, and for the formation of the Roman state, was brought on a few years later (in 728) by the Iconoclastic Controversy. Leo the Isaurian had sent emissaries to put the Pope to death, because he resisted the levying a new tax. This was prevented by the people, and brought them more closely on the side of the Pope in the dispute which immediately followed. When the decree for the destruction of the images arrived, the Pope prepared for a severe conflict—*contra imperatorem quasi contra hostem se armavit*. Leo ordered him to be put to death, and immediately seized all the patrimonies of St. Peter in Calabria, Sicily, and the East. All the Italians of Venice and the Exarchate took the side of the Pope. The imperial officers were expelled, new governors were elected in their place; and the people would have elected another emperor, but the Pope prevented it.* Throughout this dispute, the Pope alone restrained the Italians from throwing off their allegiance to the emperor. He wrote to the Venetians to bring back the people of Ravenna to the empire. The Lombard king Luitprand had seized the opportunity to conquer the Romagna. He was expelled by the Venetians: but Ravenna continued to fight for its independence; and in the year 733, the Greeks were defeated in a great battle, in which the slaughter was so enormous, that for six years the people would not eat the fish of that arm of the Po on whose banks it was fought. In Rome, the position of the imperial dux had become untenable, and the office was henceforth completely dependent on the Pope. Gregory II. is the first who go-

* "Permoti omnes Pentapolenses atque Venetiarum exercitus contra imperatoris jussionem restiterunt, dicentes nunquam se in ejusdem pontificis condescendere nece, sed pro ejus magis defensione viriliter decertare . . . omnes ubique in Italia duces elegerunt, atque sic de pontificis deque sua immunitate cuncti studebant . . . omnis Italia consilium iniit ut sibi eligerent imperatorem, et Constantinopolim ducerent. Sed compescuit tale consilium pontifex, sperans conversionem principis." *Anast. Vita Gregorii II.* cap. 6. "Omnis quoque Ravennæ exercitus, vel Venetiarum, talibus jussis uno animo restiterunt, et nisi eos prohibuisset pontifex imperatorem super se constituere aggressi sunt." *Hist. Miscell. Additament.*,—*Muratori Scriptores*, i. 185.

verned the city without even the phantom of imperial authority beside him.*

This year 728, however, marks not only the commencement of actual independence in Rome, but of the pontifical sovereignty over other territories. The Greeks had endeavoured in vain to draw Luitprand to their side against the Pope. But the Lombards were now orthodox Catholics, and even at the time when they were Arians they had never persecuted religion.† Their hostility was directed against the Greeks only, whom they wished to expel from Italy. When, therefore, Luitprand took the town of Sutri, on the road to Rome, he was easily persuaded to cede it to the Holy See. No mention was made of the rights of the emperor; and this is the first territorial donation from which the States of the Church took their origin. It was considered that the claims of the empire did not survive the conquest by the Lombards, and that the parts of Italy which had remained so long in the hands of the Greeks became, by right of conquest, as much the property of the Lombard kings as those territories which they occupied from the time of their first invasion. When, therefore, the Lombards consented to restore any portion of their conquests, they restored it not to the Greeks, but to the Pope. They had the same right to dispose of their new acquisitions as of their original possessions. Nor had the Pope any motive to intercede for the restoration of imperial territory. He could only urge the rights of the Holy See as proprietor of its patrimonies, not the rights of the empire to the sovereignty of Italy. The Lombards were a colonising race, and the country which they conquered was considered to belong, not only to the king as sovereign, but to his followers as their property. Of the original owners, some were slain; others fled for safety, and this flight peopled Venice with patrician families. None of the old Roman population were suffered to remain on the land, except in the position of tenants.‡ The patrimonies of the Holy See formed an exception to this. They were continually restored

* "Il ducato Romano spontaneamente per dedizione de' popoli si assoggettò al Romano Pontefice verso l'anno 730, ond' ebbe principio il temporale dominio della chiesa Romana." Moroni, *Dizionario Storico Ecclesiastico*, xxxiv. 117.

† "Super indignos nos divinæ misericordiæ dispensationem miror, qui Longobardorum sævitiam ita moderatur, ut eorum sacerdotes sacrilegos, qui esse fidelium quasi victores videntur, orthodoxorum fidem persequi minime permittat." Gregorius Magnus, *Dial.* iii. 28.

‡ "Multi nobilissimi Romanorum ob cupiditatem interfecti sunt, reliqui vero per hostes divisi, ut tertiam partem suarum frugum Longobardis persolverent, tributarii efficiuntur." Paulus Diaconus, *Hist. Longob.* ii. 32,—in Muratori, i. 436.

after each expedition of Luitprand, and at last the Pope was probably almost the only landowner independent of the Lombards. This independent possession under the Lombards amounted to a virtual sovereignty, and one sort of claims came to be identified with the other. As the restitution of the Lombards went to form the States of the Church, a similar claim of sovereignty was advanced over those domains which had been confiscated by Leo the Isaurian. Whatever had belonged to the Patrimonium S. Petri as property, was understood to belong by rights to the same patrimony when it had become a sovereign state. That these lost domains were numerous and extensive we know, but we cannot determine their limits. We have, in any thing like completeness, only the letters of one Pope of that age. If we had more, it is possible that we should find other places mentioned as belonging to the Holy See besides those spoken of by St. Gregory. In this way, we conceive, the fiction of the donation of Constantine very naturally arose. We know from St. Gregory that the deeds were frequently lost, that it was not always easy to determine the limits of the domains of the Church. But many authentic deeds of gift of Constantine were preserved. It was easy, therefore, to attribute to him the origin of possessions which came from forgotten sources; and when the property of the Holy See began to develop itself into sovereignty, it was not unnatural to attribute to Constantine the origin of both. We find the germ of this idea in a letter of Hadrian to Charlemagne in the year 777.* Scarcely half a century later, the donation of Constantine sprang into existence.

The next considerable accession of territory was in the year 742. The Lombards had obtained great successes against the Greeks. The intercession of the Pope was invoked by the people of the exarchate, and he proceeded to Pavia to obtain peace for them. Luitprand consented to make peace, and to liberate all his prisoners. By this time the Pope is acknow-

* "Sicut temporibus beati Sylvestri, Romani pontificis, a sanctæ recordationis piissimo Constantino magno imperatore, per ejus largitatem sancta Dei catholica et apostolica Romana Ecclesia elevata atque exaltata est, et potestatem in his Hesperiae partibus largiri dignatus est, ita et in his vestris felicissimis temporibus atque nostris, sancta Dei Ecclesia, id est beati Petri apostoli, germinet atque exsultet . . . quia ecce Divus Christianissimus Dei Constantinus imperator his temporibus surrexit, per quem omnia Deus sanctæ suæ Ecclesiæ beati Ap. principis Petri largiri dignatus est, sed et cuncta alia quæ per diversos imperatores, patricios etiam et alios Deum timentes pro eorum animæ mercede et venia delictorum in partibus Tusciæ, Spoletio seu Benevento, atque Corsica, simul et Savinensi patrimonio beato Petro Ap. . . concessa sunt, et per nefandam gentem Longobardorum per annorum spatia abstracta atque ablata sunt, vestris temporibus restituantur." *Codex Carolinus*, 350.

ledged by the exarchate, as well as by the duchy of Rome, as the only authority who could protect and save it. Luitprand also restored to the Pope all the *patrimonia* which he had occupied during the war, adding to them the four towns of Ameria, Orta, Bomarzo, and Bleda.* The growth of the temporal power was therefore simultaneous with the practical recognition of the Holy See as the real protector of Italy. The celebrated John Müller† says of the period of Gregory II., Gregory III., Zachary, and Stephen II.: "Jamais la chaire de S. Pierre n'a été remplie par une suite aussi longue d'excellens princes et de vertueux Pontifes." Of Gregory II. another Protestant divine writes: "Not the Church, but the government, was weak in Italy. The Pope could have declared himself supreme; but he disdained it."‡ But this could not continue; and his successors were obliged to accept a position which the Popes had long endeavoured to avoid. The whole condition of State and Church in Italy made it impossible for them longer to resist the general current of the age.

In the other great towns which had escaped the domination of the Lombards, a process was going on at the same time strikingly analogous to what occurred in Rome; which, though modified and varied in a very characteristic way by local circumstances, proves how general and how natural was the change which made the Pope a temporal sovereign. Next to Rome, the chief of these towns were Ravenna, Venice, and Naples. In all these places a sort of independence was acquired at this time, under the pressure of the necessity of self-defence in the absence of aid from Constantinople; and in all the episcopal authority already rivalled that of the imperial vicar.

Naples was accessible to the Greeks by sea; and for this reason, and because of its remoteness, it was never taken by the Lombards, and an attempt, in the seventh century, to cast off the Greek yoke was at once suppressed. The growth of independence was therefore later and more gradual than elsewhere. At the general rising of Italy under Gregory II., Naples was the stronghold of the Iconoclastic party; and an expedition went forth from its walls against the Pope, in which the Neapolitan Dux Exhilaratus lost his life. But when the

* "*Pacem cum ducatu Romano ipse Rex in viginti confirmavit annos.*" Anast. *Vita Zachariae*, cap. 5.

† Works, viii. 335.

‡ Hasse (über die Vereinigung der geistlichen und weltlichen Gewalt) on the Union of Spiritual and Temporal Supremacy in the States of the Church of Rome; Haarlem, 1852, p. 28. This partial performance obtained the prize offered by the Academy at Haarlem for the best book on the subject. It is more unfair and superficial, but not so frivolous as the similar work of Sugenheim, to which we have already referred. Both are weakest in the earlier parts, where the strength of the older Italian historians lies.

exarchate had fallen, and Rome and Venice had become really independent, the secular and ecclesiastical authorities united to obtain the independence of Naples. The Archbishop was very powerful, and it was found necessary, for the maintenance of order, to unite his authority with that of the civil and military governor. In the year 768, when the see was vacant, the dux or consul Stephen, a layman, was elected his successor; and the Pope confirmed his election, in consideration of his good administration as secular governor.* The same thing occurred once more a century later; but it is unnecessary for us to pursue the history of Naples beyond the period when it affords so striking a synchronistic parallel with what was going on in Rome.

The position of Venice secured it alike from the arms of the Lombards and from the fleets of the emperor, and its connection with Ravenna was for a long time very slight. The Venetians were particularly devoted to the Pope. They rose in arms to defend him against the emperor; they restored at his bidding the imperial authority in Ravenna; they separated themselves in the tricapitular controversy from the patriarch of Aquileia, and obtained a patriarch of their own in the Bishop of Grado. The authority of the Bishop was great, as in all Western cities; but he was without those advantages of wealth and ecclesiastical jurisdiction which made the Pope the monarch of Rome. When Venice became independent, he was the chief author of the change; but his supremacy did not long survive. The islands were governed severally by tribunes; but the decline of the power of the exarch made the people feel the want of a central authority, and the patriarch, who was the only bond and symbol of their union, caused the election of a doge (*dux*) in the year 697. This officer was elsewhere appointed by the emperor; but as there was none at Venice, the election was considered to indicate the union of the islands, not the establishment of independence, and the doges continued on good terms with the emperor. But the imperial authority was as completely gone as in Rome, and the year 697 is as important an epoch in the Venetian annals as the year 728 in the history of the Roman state. For a time there was a rivalry between the patriarch and the doge, and the former attempted to establish the same ecclesiastical authority over the state with which the Popes had been invested. But it was quite consistent with the purely Roman character of the place and

* "Nam Parthenopensem ducatum laudabili quiete duodecim rexit annos." Johannes Diaconus, *Chron. Episc. S. Neap. Eccl.* cap. 41,—in Muratori, i. p. ii. 310.

people, and with the weakness of the hierarchical element, that the secular authority should prevail. The Bishop had not, like the Pope, the recommendation of being a national representative; for that distinction belonged to the Pope alone among the Italian Bishops, and at Venice the doge was the people's choice.

Whilst both at Venice and at Naples the Bishop was instrumental in the establishment of independence, and balanced for a time the power of the duke, at Ravenna, when the exarch disappeared, the Archbishop naturally and without opposition succeeded to his place; and it was so much in the order of things that the Bishop of every great community should rule it after the overthrow of the Greeks, that it was some time before the Archbishop of Ravenna would submit to the temporal authority of the Pope. A rivalry of honour had long subsisted between the Bishop of the new capital of Italy and the Bishop of the old. When, therefore, the exarchate was given to the Pope, the Archbishop, Sergius, resisted, and claimed in his own province the same temporal rights which the Pope enjoyed in Rome.* His successor Leo pursued the same course; and in the year 774, Pope Hadrian complains to Charlemagne that the Archbishop claimed the whole of the exarchate.† Thus in every great town whose history at that time is sufficiently known, the same scene occurs on a smaller scale which in Rome was the origin of the temporal power.

We have seen how the position of the Holy See in the declining empire of the Greeks gradually led to its complete independence, and to the complete detachment of its territory and dependencies from that empire, although the forms of submission continued to be used, and although the Pope acknowledged the Eastern emperor as his sovereign until the revival of the empire in the West. We have seen that it was no sudden or single act, that it was part of a general analogous movement throughout Italy, and a result not of design, but of necessity; that it was a physiological process rather than a political act. The scene now passes from the empire of the Greeks to that of the Franks, in which the situation of the Pope is greatly altered; in which his temporal power receives a vast increase, but in which he is surrounded with the perils and difficulties of a new system, and commences

* "Judicavit iste a finibus Perticæ totam Pentapolim, et usque ad Tusciam, et usque ad mensam Uvulani, veluti exarchus, sic omnia disponebat, ut soliti sunt modo Romani facere." Agnellus, *Liber Pontificalis, vita Sergii*, 4.

† "Asserit . . . in ea potestate sibi exarchatum Ravennatum quam Sergius archiepiscopus habuit tribui." *Cod. Carol.* 52.

a new contest for the freedom which his temporal sovereignty seemed rather to have imperilled than assured.

The almost total disappearance of the imperial armies from the West, in consequence of the war with the Saracens, left the Lombards free to conquer the whole of Italy, without meeting any independent power capable of resistance but the Pope. Luitprand, the most successful of their kings, died in 743. During his reign, the Pope had been obliged to appeal to Charles Martel for aid, which no longer came from his own sovereign; but that aid was not given, and at his death Luitprand was reconciled with the Pope.* But in the year 753, the Lombards under Aistolphus conquered the exarchate, and the Greek domination in Central Italy came to an end. Aistolphus demanded the submission of the Pope. Stephen II. applied first for relief to the heretical emperor Constantine, before he took a step which must be fatal to the imperial rights over the exarchate. Constantine could send no expedition to Italy, and directed the Pope to negotiate with the Lombard king the restoration of his territory. Stephen proceeded to Pavia, where he obtained nothing, and then to France, where the new king Pipin, who had been just crowned by St. Boniface, had already given him a secret promise of assistance. Pipin invaded Italy in two successive years, and formally gave the exarchate, which he wrested from the Lombards, back to the Pope. By this transaction, his position in Italy was not greatly altered. His authority was established over a territory in which his influence had already been paramount, and in which the imperial authority, long scarcely more than nominal, had expired altogether. Two or three years before, Pipin, then mayor of the palace in France, considering that the Merovingian dynasty had for several generations been merely a phantom on the throne, had sent to ask Pope Zachary whether it was necessary that, although without the royal power, they should continue to bear the title; and the Pope had answered, that he that really possessed the power ought to have the name of king.† Pipin acted upon the same principle in restoring to the Pope that authority over

* The later Frankish chronicles represent this appeal as an offer to transfer the Roman territory from the Greek to the Frankish dominion: "Epistolam quoque decreto Romanorum principum sibi prædictus præsul Gregorius miserat, quod sese populus Romanus, relicta imperatoris dominatione, ad suam defensionem et invictam clementiam convertere voluisset." *Annal. Mettenses ad ann. 741*,—in Pertz, *Monumenta*, i. 326.

† "Missi fuerunt ad Zach. P. interrogando de regibus in Francia, qui illis temporibus non habentes regalem potestatem, an bene fuisset, an non. Et Z. P. mandavit Pippino, ut melius esset illum Regem vocari, qui potestatem haberet, quam illum, qui sine regali potestate manebat." *Annal. Laurisenses*,—Pertz, i. 136.

the exarchate which the emperors were no longer able to exercise, and which he alone could effectually possess. At the same time, the Pope thus obtained compensation for the domains which the Greeks had confiscated.

It was only by slow degrees that they obtained possession of what had been conceded to them. The exarchate did not come completely into their hands for twenty years after the expedition of Pipin. In 774, Charlemagne overthrew the Lombard kingdom, and made new concessions to the Holy See. Some were in fulfilment of his father's engagements; some in satisfaction of old claims advanced by the Popes, which always required to be thoroughly substantiated. A complete account of all these concessions is to be found in the Lives of the Popes, and in their letters in the *Codex Carolinus*. In the *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica* (iv. p. ii. 8), the celebrated Pertz of Berlin enumerates, as follows, the possessions of the Holy See at the death of Charlemagne.

I. Of their own right (*ex antiquo jure*) the Popes held: the city and duchy of Rome, that is, the Campagna and Maritima, as far south as Ceperano and Terracina; Tuscia Romanorum, with the towns of Portus, Centumcellæ, Ceres, Bleda, Marturianum, Sutria, Nepes, Castellum, Gallisium, Ortum, Polimartium, Amezia, Tuda, Perusia cum insulis tribus, Narnia, Utriculum. All these possessions were, *de jure* or *de facto*, anterior to the Frankish donation.

II. By the gift of Pipin and Charlemagne: the exarchate and Pentapolis, comprising the towns named by Anastasius in the life of Stephen II.—“Tradidit . . . Ravennam, Ariminum, Pisaurum atque Fanum, Cesenas, Senogallias, Esium, Forum Pompilii, Forum Livii, cum castro Sussubio, Montemferetri, Acerragio, Montem Lucari, Serram, castellum Sancti Mariani, Bobrum, Urbinum, Callium, Luculos, Eugubium seu Comiacum. Nec non et civitatem Narniensem.” From the letters of Pope Hadrian we know of many other places, partly conceded by Pipin, partly by Charles after the defeat of Desiderius. The great critic we are quoting says: “Sed et Faventiam, ducatum Ferrariæ, nec non Imolam, Bononiam, et Gabellum simul traditas fuisse, ex subsequentibus patet Annis duo-de-viginti post, Desiderio primum fuso, Spoletini, Reatini, incolæ ducatus Firmani, Auximani, Anconitani, et habitatores castelli Felicitatis ad Hadrianam papam se contulerunt.”

III. By virtue of the first agreement between Pipin and Stephen, and of old claims made good to Charlemagne (*ex pacto Carisiacensi et jure Karolo Regi probato*), the territorium

Sarinense, the towns in Tuscia Longobarda, and certain rights in Beneventum.

This is the authentic and definite extent of the Roman States under the Carolingian empire. Some writers have wished to represent the temporal dominion as far older than the eighth century, and as far more extensive than this. The latter opinion is founded partly upon the vague traditions and fictitious documents of the middle ages, partly upon claims raised by the Popes themselves at various times. These claims were themselves in part founded on those documents; and such as were not founded on them, and yet are not included in the above list,—Corsica, for instance, which was claimed in vain by Leo III., and by Leo IX. in the year 1054,—were never satisfied; what was afterwards added was acquired in a different way. The notion of the greater antiquity of the actual sovereignty of the Popes originated partly also in the fancies of uncritical times, but in great part in the difficulty of believing that in ages of great violence and adversity the spiritual authority could be preserved without the support of a wide material basis. But that which the Holy See required was, in the first instance, not riches or power, but freedom. Temporal sovereignty was for a century within their reach; but they resolutely refused it, and at all times amply acknowledged and respected, under Catholic or heretical as well as under heathen emperors, the authority of the empire which was the cradle of the Church. In the fixed system of the old society, their mission was more exclusively spiritual than among the barbarous races who destroyed it. They had less contact with the world. Their independence was sufficiently secured by the general absence of the emperor and of the Teutonic kings from Rome. Sovereignty, when it came, was forced upon them; they regarded it as an evil, and had for ages reason to doubt whether it was the less of two evils.

It is more easy to ascertain the extent of the dominions than the extent of the authority which they received from the Franks. Charlemagne introduced into Italy the political system which he had established in the rest of his monarchy. In that system he had given the Church a great part.* Many

* “Volumus atque præcipimus ut omnes suis sacerdotibus tam majoris ordinis quam inferioris, a minimo usque ad maximum, ut summo Deo, cujus vice in Ecclesia legatione funguntur, obedientes existant. Nam nullo pacto agnoscere possumus qualiter nobis fideles existere possunt, qui Deo infideles et suis sacerdotibus apparuerint, aut qualiter nobis obedientes nostrisque ministris ac legatis obtemperantes erunt, qui illis in Dei causis et Ecclesiarum utilitatibus non obtemperant . . . qui autem in his, quod absit, aut negligentes eisque inobedientes fuerint inventi, sciant se nec in nostro imperio

of her canons obtained force of law in the state, and her ministers were invested with great civil authority. The influence thus given to them in the scheme of Charlemagne was secured and increased by the property they acquired. The distribution of property determined, in the Frankish monarchy, the position, the power, and the rights of each individual and of every class. It was necessary and easy for the clergy to take their place in that hierarchy of landed proprietors. In order that they might not thus become subject, like all other classes of society, to the laws and to the will of the sovereign, they obtained for their domains and those who resided on them an immunity from the civil jurisdiction; and the domains themselves were called Immunities (*Immunitates*). These rights and privileges, and the most extensive participation in affairs of state, continued to be respected and even increased by the emperors; so that out of this position of the clergy in the state a territorial independence afterwards developed itself, and ecclesiastical states arose, almost identical in origin and character with that of the Popes. It was entirely in the interest of the sovereign that the clergy should be powerful; but it was in his interest that they should be subservient. The greater the influence of prelates in the state, the greater was the inducement to appoint only such as were most agreeable to the government. Hence the vital importance of the dispute which necessarily arose on the freedom of investiture.

The position of the Pope in the Carolingian empire already resembled in many respects that of other Bishops. His states were, in one aspect, the greatest Immunity of the empire. The limits of his jurisdiction cannot be ascertained in detail;* but the great test of independence, the freedom of

honores retinere, licet etiam filii nostri fuerint sed magis sub magna districtione et ariditate pœnas luere." *Capitulare de honore Episcoporum*,—Baluzius, *Capitularia*, i. 437.

* The most instructive document in this respect is the Constitution of the Emperor Lothar, in 824, and the oath which he exacted from the Romans.

"Volumus ut in electione Pontificis nullus præsumat venire, neque liber neque servus, qui aliquod impedimentum faciat, illis solummodo Romanis, quibus antiquitus fuit consuetudo concessa per constitutionem sanctorum patrum eligendi pontificem.

"Volumus ut missi constituentur de parte domni apostolici et nostra, qui annuatim nobis renunciare valeant, qualiter singuli duces et iudices justitiam populo faciant, et quomodo nostram constitutionem observent. Qui missi, decernimus, ut primum cunctos clamores qui per negligentiam ducum aut iudicum fuerint inventi, ad notitiam domni apostolici deferant, et ipse unum e duobus eligat, ut aut statim per eosdem missos fiant ipsæ necessitates emendatæ, aut si non, per nostrum missum fiat nobis notum, ut per nostros missos a nobis directos iterum emendentur.

"Volumus ut cunctus populus Romanus interrogetur, qua lege vult vivere, ut tali qua se professi fuerint vivere velle, vivant."

election, was as completely wanting under the Carolingian as under the Greek emperors. Until the elevation of Gregory III., the confirmation of each election had to be obtained from Constantinople or Ravenna before the Pope could be consecrated, and the delay which ensued from this practice is often complained of by the Popes. The Franks were supposed to have succeeded the Greeks in all the rights of their supremacy.* Accordingly, from the time of Charlemagne, the Popes sent to France for their confirmation. Stephen went himself to Rheims to obtain it. Paschal I. was consecrated without the emperor's consent, and sent at once to excuse himself. Of most of his successors it is recorded that they awaited the imperial sanction.† With friendly emperors, there were no evil consequences from this arrangement; but at last the election came entirely into their hands.‡ When the Carolingian empire fell to pieces, the Holy See came under the dependence of the factions and families in Rome, whom there was no power to restrain, and who were supreme during every vacancy. From these it was rescued for a time by Otho at the revival of the empire, who assumed once more the right of confirmation, and even the right of

Sacramentum Romanorum, consequent on this decree.

"Promitto quod ab hac die in futurum fidelis ero domnis nostris imperatoribus . . diebus vitæ meæ . . salva fide quam repromisi domno apostolico; et quod non consentiam ut aliter in hac sede Romana fiat electio pontificis nisi canonice et juste . . et ille qui electus fuerit, me consentiente consecratus pontifex non fiat, prius quam tale sacramentum faciat in præsentia missi domni imperatoris et populi." Pertz, *Monumenta*, iii. 240.

* "In supplemento historiæ Pauli Diaconi, quod extat in Corpore Francicæ historiæ veteris et sinceræ, ad hunc annum legitur: Lotharius Imperator primo ad Italiam venit, et diem sanctum Paschæ Romæ fecit. Paschalis quoque apostolicus potestatem, quam prisci imperatores habuere, ei super populum Romanum concessit." Pagi, *Critica in Baronium*, iii. 510.

"Statutum est juxta antiquum morem ut ex latere imperatoris mitterentur, qui judicariam exercentes potestatem, justitiam omni populo . . penderent." *Vita Ludovici Pii*,—in Bouquet, *Recueil des Historiens de France*, vi. 106.

† "Eodem anno (816) Leo Papa Romanus obiit, et Stephanus post eum successit, qui statim postquam pontificatum suscepit, jussit omnem populum Romanum fidelitatem cum juramento promittere Hludowico." Theganus, *Vita Ludovici Imp.*,—Pertz, *Monumenta*, ii. 593.

"Paschalis successor electus, post completam solemniter ordinationem suam et munera et excusatoriam imperatori misit epistolam missa tamen alia legatione, pactum quod cum præcessoribus suis factum erat, etiam secum fieri et firmari rogavit." Einhardi, *Annales*,—Pertz, i. 203.

"Gregorius . . . electus, sed non prius ordinatus est, quam legatus imperatoris Romani venit, et electionem populi, qualis esset, examinavit." Ibid. 216.

‡ "Nicolaus præsentia magis ac favore Hludovici regis et procerum ejus quam cleri electione substituitur." *Annales Bertrinani*, ad ann. 850.

"Romani, Pontificis sui morte comperta, Stephanum in locum ejus constituerunt. Unde imperator iratus quod eo inconsulto ullum ordinare præsumpserant, misit Liutwartum et quosdam Romanæ sedis episcopos, qui eum deponerent." *Annales Fuldenses*, ad ann. 885,—Pertz, i. 402.

appointing and deposing Popes. In Germany, where the Bishops were a formidable power in the state, the freedom of election had been abolished, and the nominee of the emperor always succeeded. Otho attempted the same thing with the Papacy. In reality, he would have reduced the Pope nearly to the position of the Patriarch of Constantinople; but the oppression which the Holy See had suffered was so intolerable, that his rude violence appeared as a deliverance; and Pope John XIII. soon after declared, that Rome and the Church had been brought near to destruction by wicked men, but had been saved and restored to the ancient splendour by the Emperor.* The Holy See was not delivered from this alternate dependence on the emperor and the nobles of Rome until the law of Nicholas II. in 1059. Gregory VII., in his efforts to secure the freedom of the prelates throughout the Church, established also, for all future ages, the freedom of the Papal election. The full temporal sovereignty over the Roman States was first secured by the same act which established, on a foundation which has never since been permanently shaken, the independence of the head of the Church.

The territorial losses of the Holy See during this period were as great as the Popes' political weakness and insecurity would lead us to expect. In the course of the ninth century, the Popes surrendered a great part of their possessions to the barons on feudal tenure. There was no other way of obtaining military service, and the feudal system was already quite in the spirit of the times. There were so many claimants of these concessions, and they were so often convenient for the purpose of conciliating dangerous or ambitious men, that the Popes were obliged to declare a portion of the patrimonium their own private domain, and inalienable *beneficialiter vel alio quolibet modo*.† In the States of the Church, as in all other feudal states, this system soon overgrew the supreme power. Here, as elsewhere, the feudatories sought to make their fiefs hereditary; and often, from the weakness of the sovereign, they so far succeeded as to make the *dominium directum* of the Holy See little more than a name. For a long time it seemed probable that, as in Germany, the terri-

* "Roma caput totius mundi, et ecclesia universalis ab iniquis pene pessumdata, a Domino Ottone augusto imperatore, a Deo coronato Cæsare, et magno et ter benedicto . . . erecta est, et in pristinum honorem omni reverentia redacta." Mansi, *Concilia*, xviii. 509.

Mansi questions the authenticity of this and other letters of John XIII. (*ibid.* 506), but it is admitted by modern Catholic critics. Fless, *Privilegium Leonis VIII.* 1858, p. 38.

† Council of Ravenna, 877, Jaffé, *Regesta Pontif* 269.

tories would make themselves permanently independent; and it was not until after a struggle of more than five centuries, that in Rome, as in France, and about the same time as in France, the central power triumphed over the feudal barons. Sacrifices of rights and territory were not, however, confined to the nobles. In the year 997, for instance, Gregory V. surrendered to Gerbert, afterwards Sylvester II., the Archbishop of Ravenna, almost all his rights over the city and its territory.* In the time of Gregory VI., says William of Malmesbury, the Papal dominions were so much diminished, that the Pope had scarcely wherewithal to maintain himself.† In the same year in which Nicholas II. settled the mode of the Papal election by the cardinals, he concluded a treaty with Robert Guiscard the Norman, who undertook to recover all the lost rights and possessions of the Holy See; and thus, as we have already said, the temporal rights and the ecclesiastical independence were fixed at the same time. The Countess Matilda left her states to the Pope early in the following century, and this vast accession of territory was, after a long struggle with the emperors, finally recognised and confirmed under Innocent III. Before the dispute was concluded, the Popes had been exiled more than once, imprisoned, and deprived of nearly all their dominions; but in the act of Otho IV. of the year 1201, repeated in 1209, the independence of the Roman States is definitely settled and acknowledged.‡ This document has been called, not unjustly, the Magna Charta of the Papal dominions; and it was repeatedly cited and confirmed by later sovereigns.

During the three following centuries, the limits of the possessions of the Holy See were, if we except the acquisition of Venaissin and Avignon, not greatly changed, but the extent of their authority constantly varied. They triumphed at last over captivity and the schism; over the emperors, the barons, and the republics. It would far exceed our limits to

* "Districtum Ravennatis urbis, ripam integram, monetam, teloneum, mercatum, muros, et omnes portas civitatis." Jaffé, 342.

The Archbishops of Ravenna continued to extend their dominion even till Gregory VII.'s time. He writes in the year 1073: "Quidam Imolenses... nobis indicavere quod confrater noster Guibertus archiepiscopus Ravennas eos contra honorem S. Petri, cui fidelitatem juravere, suæ omnino ditioni subigere, et ad juranda sibi fidelitatis attentet sacramenta compellere." Epis. i. 10.

† "Ita apostolatus Romani statum per incuriam antecessorum diminutum invenit, ut præter pauca oppida urbi vicina et oblationes fidelium pene nihil haberet quo se sustentaret." *De gestis Regum Angl.*,—Pertz, xii. 469.

‡ "Ad has pertinet tota terra quæ est a Radicofano usque Ceperanum; exarchatus Ravennæ, Pentapolis, Marchiæ, ducatus Spoletanus, terra comitissæ Mathildis, comitatus Brittenorii, cum aliis adjacentibus terris expressis in multis privilegiis imperatorum a tempore Lodoici." *Ottonis juramentum Papæ*,—Pertz, iv. 205.

relate in what manner, and after what vicissitudes and revolutions, the unity of their states was completed by force of arms, first by Albornoz, and at last by Cæsar Borgia and Julius II. During the pontificate of the latter, the Roman States formed for the first time a real monarchy, extending from Piacenza to Terracina. A few territories subsequently lapsed: Ancona, 1532; Camerino, 1539; Ferrara and Comacchio, 1598; Urbino, 1626; Castro, 1649. It was not, therefore, till the middle of the seventeenth century that the Papal dominions reached their highest point of increase. For more than a century the temporal authority of the Popes remained unchallenged and unaltered, and they enjoyed a period of repose such as they had never known in more Catholic times. Then, at the end of the eighteenth century, came a period of disaster and decline, of which we have not seen the end nor, we fear, the worst.

The external changes which have since occurred in the temporal condition of the Church were preceded and prepared by changes which had taken place within. She had resisted the outward assault of the Protestant Reformation to be sapped by the Revolution, which had its seat in Catholic countries, and extensively prevailed in the Church herself. The spirit of opposition to the Holy See grew in energy, and the opposition to its system and ideas spread still more widely. In many respects, the Jansenists were the chief partisans of these opinions. The suppression of the Jesuits was their work; they had great part in the revolutionary reforms of such princes as Joseph II.; and when the French Revolution broke out, they supported the confiscation of the property of the Church. The assemblies of Ems and Pistoja prove how far subversive notions of Church government had extended among the higher prelates. It is to the prevalence of false political theories—or rather, perhaps, to the absence of a sound political system among Catholics—that the success of the Revolution against the Church, and the feebleness of the resistance, are to be ascribed.

The danger with which feudalism menaced the freedom of the Church was so great, that the two things were thought incompatible. Whilst, on the one hand, a simoniacal and wedded clergy was considered necessary to the wellbeing of the feudal state, it was deemed, on the other hand, that independence required exclusion; and one of the Popes proposed to cut the knot by surrendering all the feudal property held by ecclesiastics. The struggle between the Church and the world resolved itself into a contest between the Church and

the State, the priesthood and the empire; and whilst neither thought it could secure its rights and respect those of the other, each conceived that it was safe only if it was predominant. The notion of the superiority of the ecclesiastical power ripened into the notion of the worthlessness of the civil power, and of the derivation of its authority from the Church.* No better speculative basis than this was found for the conflict with the state in those days. This anti-political theory was defended on Scriptural grounds, with that facility of quotation and respect for all written authority which is so characteristic of the middle ages. It was much assisted by that view of the antagonism of the two cities, of Church and State, which had been made popular by St. Augustine. It was especially confirmed and promoted by the influence of ancient heathen literature, which gave to the theocratic doctrine a democratic basis. The heathen notion of tyrannicide became an auxiliary in the development of that view of the secondary and derivative nature of all civil authority on which the deposing power was often defended. That the notion of the rightfulness of destroying tyrants came into Catholic theology from heathen sources, and is not a product of Christian ethics, is proved by its presence, in the most offensive form, in the works of a man who was more deeply imbued than almost any of his contemporaries with ancient learning, and who wrote before such questions were discussed in the schools, before what is called scholastic theology began to be known.† This combination of Jewish and Grecian notions was a welcome weapon in the hands of the Reformers against Catholic princes,‡ and was

* "Cui aperiendi claudendique cœli data potestas est, de terra judicare non licet? Absit! Quis nesciat, reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pœne sceleribus, mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares scilicet homines, dominari cœca cupiditate et intolerabili præsuntione affectaverunt?" *Gregory VII. Epist.*, viii. 21.

† "Aliter cum amico, aliter vivendum est cum tyranno. Amico utique adulari non licet, sed aures tyranni mulcere licitum est. Ei namque licet adulari, quem licet occidere. Porro tyrannum occidere non modo licitum est, sed æquam et justum. Qui enim gladium accipit, gladio dignus est interire Certe hostem publicum nemo ulciscitur, et quisquis eum non persequitur, in seipsum et in totum reipublicæ mundanæ corpus delinquit." John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, iii. 15, vol. iii. p. 217, ed. Giles. And St. Thomas, in defining the right of tyrannicide, rests it upon heathen authorities, and is careful to vindicate even Cicero from the reproach of false morality: "Tullius loquitur in casu illo quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit, nolentibus subditis, vel etiam ad consensum coactis, et quando non est recursus ad superiorem, per quem judicium de invasore possit fieri: tunc enim qui ad liberationem patriæ tyrannum occidit, laudatur et præmium accipit." *Com. in ii. Sent.*, dist. 44, art. 2, ad quintum.

‡ "Pacem civilem perturbat dogma illud Reformatos se dicentium, licita esse pro religione subditorum in regna arma Intelligimus quid significet Reformatos se dicentium confessio, cum dicit tributa et obsequia deberi

abundantly used by the Catholics in the days of absolute monarchy against Protestant sovereigns, such as Henry IV. and James I. For the protection of their Catholic subjects, many of the divines of that day had recourse to the theory of the sovereignty of the people, and of the indirect derivation of all civil authority from God, not through the Church, as had been held before, but through the people. From this system, of which the most complete exposition is to be found in Suarez, and which has been revived in our own day chiefly by Ventura,* but which was at no time generally received, to the pure revolutionary theory of Rousseau,—from the notion that power comes from the nation, to the opinion that the nation may control, modify, or resume the power it has conferred,—there is but one inevitable step.

At the period of the French Revolution, these ideas were not extinct among Catholic divines, and an adaptation of religious ideas to the popular system of the day was attempted by Spedalieri, who is better known by his refutation of Gibbon, in his work on the rights of man (*I Diritti dell' Uomo*, 1791), which is said to have received the corrections of Pius VI. and Gerdil, and was dedicated to Cardinal Ruffo. The author received a benefice in St. Peter's, and the congratulations of the universities of Padua and Pavia. He endeavoured to show the harmony subsisting between the teaching of the Gospel and the newly-proclaimed rights of man. The state is founded on the original contract, which is the work of the people alone, and of which God can only be called the author so far as He is the First Cause of all things. By this contract, the people have the right of judging and cashiering their sovereigns; and every man may use force, whenever it is necessary for his defence or for the assertion of his rights.

These ideas met with great opposition; but they were shared by men of high station; and it is evident that the Revolution was required to bring back a safer and truer political system. When the French invaded the Legations, and established the Cispadane Republic, Cardinal Chiaramonti, Bishop of Imola, issued a Christmas pastoral, recommending the people to submit quietly to the invaders, and declaring that the French principles of government were not opposed to the maxims of the Gospel. He was denounced as a Jacobin by the people of

regibus, dummodo summum Dei imperium salvum maneat. Per summum enim Dei imperium intelligunt religionis suae libertatem, qualem ipsi aliis, ubi invalere, non concedunt." Grotius, *Rivetiani Apologetici discussio*,—*Opera Theolog.* iv. 701, 702.

* Memoria pel riconoscimento della Sicilia come stato sovrano ed indipendente, 1848: "La sovranità è trasmessa dalla comunità civile a chi, e dentro i limiti e le condizioni che le è piaciuto di adottare" (p. 14).

his diocese. Artaud de Montor, who has translated the pastoral, attributes the most questionable passages to the advisers of the cardinal. That it was not completely approved of in Rome, appears from the manner in which the Roman biographer of Pius VII., Pistoleri, deals with it. He says that it was directed against French principles, and brought its author into trouble with the French authorities.* The misfortune was, that this conciliatory tendency assisted the spread of revolutionary principles, by meeting half-way a favourite argument of their supporters. For while Catholics who did not understand the revolutionary theory thought they could agree with it, the Revolutionists, who did not understand Christianity, often proclaimed themselves its real apostles.†

The danger of the Revolution, its real character and tendency, were not at first understood. In an allocution of March 29, 1790, Pius VI. says, that at first it had seemed as if nothing was intended but arrangements of political economy; and that as these were designed for the alleviation of the imposts on the people, it appeared that they would concern in nothing his apostolic ministry.‡ It was not until Religion herself was attacked that the danger was recognised.§ In a brief of August 17, the same year, Pius VI. excuses himself with the French king that he had not from the first more openly declared his hostility to the revolutionary opinions;|| and he says nearly the same thing in a letter to the French Bishops of March 10, 1791.¶

In fact, there was a revolutionary element in the centralising tendency of the age from which the government of the Roman States was not exempt. Thus at the Restoration, Consalvi not only takes advantage of the French reforms, but rejoices that they facilitate the execution of the projects of centralisation, which he describes as essential to a well-governed state;** and a Bolognese historian, otherwise full of

* Vita di Pio VII. i. 4. The same mistake is repeated in the article on Pius VII. in the dictionaries of Feller and Moroni. Probably until the publication of Artaud's Life, the pastoral was very rare.

† We need hardly recall the answer of Camille Desmoulins before the revolutionary tribunal, when he was asked his age, which was 33.

‡ Artaud, *Histoire des Papes*, viii. 214.

§ Even Artaud says of the Pope's letter to Louis XVI., "Ici Pie VI étend un peu trop la faculté qu'un roi de France a de renoncer aux droits de la couronne" (219).

|| Ibid. 221.

¶ Ibid. 239.

** "Noi riflettemmo in primo luogo, che la unità ed uniformità debbono esser le basi di ogni politica istituzione, senza delle quali difficilmente si può assicurare la solidità di governi, e la felicità de' popoli; e che un governo tanto più può riguardarsi come perfetto, quanto più si avvicina a quel sistema di unità stabilito da Dio tanto nell'ordine della natura, quanto nel sublime

admiration for Pius VI., speaks of the invasion as having delivered the provinces from an oppressive and almost tyrannical system which was on the point of being introduced.* In reality, this unpopular process had not made much progress, and was impeded by the great privileges of the barons and the liberties of the towns. The most independent of these was Bologna. That town, in capitulating to Julius II., after many centuries of alternate submission and resistance, had stipulated for the maintenance of its rights as the condition of its fidelity. All civil causes were judged by a code called the Statute of Bologna. The taxes were imposed by the senate, which was composed of forty hereditary senators, belonging to the old nobility of the province, who conducted the whole financial administration, and superintended all internal interests. Bologna was represented in Rome by an ambassador, and the Pope sent a legate to represent him at Bologna. The whole province only paid 35,328 scudi a year to the Pontifical treasury, whilst the revenue from Ancona amounted to 363,599 scudi, and the whole revenue from the states to 2,278,923 scudi.†

edificio della religione. Questa certezza c' indusse a procurare perquanto fosse possibile la uniformità del sistema in tutto lo stato appartenente alla Santa Sede."—*Motu proprio*, 6 July 1816. Bullarii Magni continuatio xiv. 47.

"Mancava ancora al nostro stato quella uniformità, che è così utile ai pubblici e privati interessi, perchè formato colla successiva riunione di domini differenti, presentava un aggregato di usi, di leggi, di privilegj fra loro naturalmente difforni, cosicchè rendevano una provincia bene spesso straniera all' altra, e talvolta disgiungeva nella provincia medesima l'uno dall' altro paese.

"Penetrati i sommi pontefici nostri predecessori della verità delle massime sopra enunciate, profittarono di ogni opportunità per richiamare ai principii uniformi i diversi rami di pubblica amministrazione, e noi medesimi nel cominciamento del nostro pontificato procurammo di servire in parte a queste vedute medesime. La collisione però dei diversi interessi, l'attaccamento alle antiche abitudini, gli ostacoli che sogliono moltiplicarsi, ove si tratti di correggiare stabilimenti esistenti, ed usi inveterati, non permisero fin qui condurre al compimento quell' opera. . . .

"Ma la sempre ammicabile provvidenza divina, la quale sapientemente dispone le umane cose in modo, che talvolta d'onde sovrastano maggiori calamità, indi sà trarre anche copiosi vantaggi, sembra che abbia disposto, che le stesse disgrazie de' trascorsi tempi, e l'interrompimento medesimo dell' esercizio della nostra temporale sovranità aprissero la strada ad una tale operazione, allorchè pacificate le cose si desse luogo alla ripristinazione delle legittime potestà. Noi dunque credemmo di dover cogliere questo momento per compire l'opera incominciata." Ibid. p. 48.

* "Desioso d'un autorità assoluta ed imperiosa, non poteva riguardare con occhio d'amico nemmeno quei vestigi di libertà, che davano a Bologna da gran tempo il primato sull' altre terre ecclesiastiche. Fù sconvolto l'ordine delle cose, si manomisero i diritti antichi; e il senato fù costretto colle minacce al silenzio. . . . E già pareva deciso che i redditi della provincia subirebbero l'amministrazione infedele dei ministri di chiesa." Muzzi, *Annali di Bologna*, viii. 556.

† Lalande, *Voyage en Italie*, v. 281. *Annali di Bologna* dall' anno 1797 ai nostri giorni, dal Dottor L. A. 6.

The taxation was very low ; for vast sums continued to be sent from other countries, and there were no longer the same demands on the Papal treasury which at the time of the Turkish wars, and of the wars of religion, were a constant and terrible drain. The annual revenue which the Pope derived from the whole Church, independently of the income from his states, was estimated in the year 1595 at 700,000 scudi,* whilst the temporal sources did not produce more than 300,000. In the eighteenth century, the revenue from some countries was diminished. It is estimated by the traveller we have just quoted at 509,512 scudi. From Germany alone the annual income was 410,297 florins. A recent writer, who is often well-informed, computes the revenue from spiritual sources alone at 3,500,000 francs before the Revolution, and 1,500,000 in 1847.† The existence of this productive source of revenue was a great alleviation to the inhabitants of the Roman States. Since the Revolution, it has in great part ceased.‡ The domains of the Church, exceeding 8,000,000^{l.}, were lost. The contributions levied by the French under Pius VI. alone amounted to 9,000,000^{l.} sterling, on a population of less than 2,000,000 ; and the revenue has increased from 2,300,000 scudi (460,000^{l.}) to 14,600,000 scudi, or nearly 3,000,000^{l.}, in 1857. This is one great result of the Revolution ; it rendered the Church dependent on the State, and the efforts made to meet the new expenses led to great social and constitutional changes.

By an edict for the restoration of the finances, November 28, 1797, Pius VI. ordered the sale of the property of the towns (*comunità*) and of a fifth of the property of the Church. The exile of the Pope followed soon after ; and his successor, on his arrival in Rome, proclaimed at once the restoration of the old forms of administration.§ But a few months later, it was decreed that the government should take

* Bozio, de Signis Ecclesiæ, lib. x. sign. 42, cap. 12.

† Neigebaur, der Pabst und sein Reich, 106.

‡ This was Consalvi's argument for the restoration of the Papal States in his note to the Powers, dated London, June 23, 1814: "Ayant perdu presque entièrement les autres moyens pour pouvoir les supporter (les grandes dépenses pour le bien de la religion), le Saint Père, encore pour cet objet, ne saurait être privé des ressources qu'il pourrait trouver au moins en conservant la totalité de ses propriétés."

§ *Reformatio curiæ Romanæ*, October 30, 1800. Bullar. Cont. xi. 49. Post Diuturnas. "Cessare volumus illud temporarium regimen quo provideri publicis rebus necessitate cogente debuit, ac suam vim restituimus antiquis regiminis formis"

"Maxime enim nobis in animo est ut esse debet, formas et regendi rationes a nostris prædecessoribus sapientissime stabilitas, et longo usu et multorum sæculorum experientia comprobata, quantum fieri potest, retinere et conservare."

upon itself the debts of the *communes*, and should assume for that purpose the administration of their estates, “i quali corsi, è a tutti abbastanza noto, sono di gran lunga inferiori all’ immensa mole dei debiti che l’ opprimono.”* Thus the basis of the self-government of the country was lost.

During the French occupation, it was not restored; yet their administration was not felt as oppressive. It was particularly popular with those classes of the laity which have since been most discontented. For though the nobles did not recover their baronial rights, a great career was opened to them in the state which was closed before. But this compensation they afterwards lost, without recovering their old feudal authority.

At the restoration, Pius VII. was preceded on his return to Rome by Rivarola as apostolic delegate. He issued a manifesto, May 15, 1814, announcing that the people would be relieved from the oppressions of the French administration, and that the whole of the earlier legislation and system of government should be restored.† At that time Consalvi was

* Ibid. 132, Motu proprio, March 19, 1801. In two allocutions of 1808, March 16, and July 11, Pius VII. expresses himself as follows on the temporal authority of the Holy See, its obligations, and the incompatible proposal of the French Emperor that he should accept the Code Napoléon:

“Hoc nostro, nobis a Deo dato, temporalis principis munere nihil aggredi possumus, quod officiis apostolici ministerii, nobis item a Deo præcipueque commissi, adversetur.

“Itaque pro discrimine quod inter nos, aliosque interest principes, qui non iisdem obligantur vinculis, quibus ipsi obligati sumus, nobis non semper licet in ratione politicarum rerum iisdem, atque illi principiis uti.

“Vim huic summo sedis apostolicæ imperio afferre, temporalem ipsius potestatem a spirituali discernere, pastoris et principis munera dissociare, divellere, excindere, nihil aliud est, nisi opus Dei pessumdare, ac perdere velle, nihil nisi dare operam, ut religio maximum detrimentum capiat, nihil nisi eam efficacissimo spoliare præsidio” (xiii. 261, 263).

“Primum Romani, tum plures Italiæ civitates spontanea deditione Romanæ ecclesiæ potestati se subjecerunt, cujus præterea auctoritas mirum in modum amplificata est ex suavi et leni Summorum Pontificum imperio

“Stephanus III. adiit Pipinum Caroli magni patrem, ut Aistulphi insolentiam totam pene Italiam depopulantis compesceret, eumque ad reddendas eas urbes ac provincias astringeret, quas uti ad Romanum jam Pontificem spectantes Pontifex repetebat

“Imo, si quis cujuscumque familiam tam longevæ possessionis jure unitam a privato fundo exsturbare auderet, neque a iudice audiretur, et non nisi per vim et calumniam id fieri posse unusquisque censeret

“Postremo, codicem promulgari urgerique, in quo ut multa, sed leges præsertim, quæ de impedimentis matrimonii, divortiisque disponunt, divinis et ecclesiasticis institutis contrarias complorare cogimur.” Ibid. 294, 296, 297.

† “Sua Santità crede dover sollevare i suoi sudditi dall’ oppressione che hanno sofferta con tanta pazienza e coraggio Il codice di Napoleone e quello del commercio, il codice penale e quello di procedura, resta da questo istante abolito in perpetuo in tutti i domini di Sua Santità L’ antica legislazione civile e militare, tale ch’ esisteva all’ epoca della cessazione del governo pontificio, è rimessa da questo istante in vigore.” Pistolesi, iii. 191.

negotiating the restoration of the Legations at Vienna. At the second restoration, in 1815, the government was in his hands, and he proceeded on a different system. The point of contact between the French system and the tendency of the Roman government before the Revolution was, the inclination towards unity and the increase of the central power. Whatever contributed to this end, in the French institutions, was preserved. The feudal rights were so greatly restricted,* that prince Colonna and other nobles resigned them altogether. All municipal laws, all statutes and decrees, under whatever title and authority, and in whatever portion of the state they might be, whether given for a whole province or a particular district, were abolished, excepting such as related to agriculture, pasturage, or watercourses. The revolution was so complete, that in a pamphlet written by a partisan of Consalvi during the conclave of 1823, it was defended on the plea, that Pius VII. had treated his states, and justly treated them, as a conquered territory, "*ricquistò colle arme altrui.*"† In the same year, the opposition to his reforms avenged itself upon him in the epigram,

" Il ciel ci salvi
D' un uom despotico qual è Consalvi."

On his way to Italy from his prison at Bézières, in April 1814, Cardinal Consalvi one day found himself delayed, as the posthorses were required for the emperor, who was passing on the road to Elba. Consalvi stood by the roadside to let the emperor's carriage pass. Napoleon recognised him, and pointed him out to the Austrian officer who accompanied him, saying, "*C'est un homme qui ne veut pas avoir l'air d'être prêtre, mais qui l'est plus que tous les autres.*" In his political notions Consalvi belonged to his age and country. He did not understand what we should call conservatism; like all counter-revolutionists, he had something of the revolutionist in his politics, and the words of De Maistre, "*Nous ne voulons pas la contre révolution, mais le contraire de la Révolution,*" could not be applied to him. He upheld the principle of legitimacy only so far as the Church was in-

* "In tutte le popolazioni è comunità dello stato, ove esistono i baroni, sono e s' intendono fin da ora soppressi ed aboliti tutti i diritti tendenti ad obbligare i vassalli alla prestazione di qualunque servizio personale; tutti quelli di successione ereditaria riservata ai medesimi baroni . . . esenzioni . . . privative . . . e regalie feudali . . . senza che si possa dai baroni pretendere alcun compenso per tali abolizioni. 184. Sono parimente soppresses ed abolite tutte le riserve di caccia, e di pesca, nei fondi non proprii; e lo sono pure nei fondi proprii che non hanno recinti." *Motu proprio*, 6 July 1816, § 183.

† Considerazioni sul Motu proprio del S. P. Pio VII. dei 6 Luglio 1816.

terested in it; he treated the secret societies as dangerous, not to the State, but to the Church,—as heretical, not as revolutionary; and he never would countenance the Holy Alliance. But although the state was centralised and secularised, although all other ecclesiastical governments had disappeared, and that of the Pope stood alone, he yet gave to the priesthood an unprecedented influence in it. In the town-councils it was decreed that the clergy should preponderate,* and the great offices were given to them. This was, in fact, the greatest change of all. Before the Revolution, the administration was in the hands of the local authorities, of nobles and burgesses in their several spheres. The central authority had so little to do, that nobody complained of its being in clerical hands. There was no opposition or rivalry between the nobility and the clergy, because the higher grades of the *prelatura* were filled by the sons of noble families, who regarded it as their natural career. The Church was so rich, that it was worth the while of men of rank to belong to her, and the nobles were rich enough to support younger sons in the first and less profitable period of their ecclesiastical course. After the Revolution, this good understanding ceased. Both were impoverished; the nobility surrendered much of its authority into clerical hands, and ceased to form a considerable part of the body who now possessed it. The revolutionary movement was directed against the Church, and its institutions were generally calculated to diminish or control her influence. Yet these institutions were now preserved, and the clergy itself was to administer them, whilst the foundations of its power were destroyed. Thenceforward there was an unceasing and incurable antagonism between the clergy and the laity, who were excluded from the higher offices, and a still more pernicious antagonism between the ecclesiastical body and the system by which they had to govern. This difficulty has made itself keenly felt ever since; and the efforts of three reforming Popes—of Leo XII., Gregory XVI., and Pius IX.—have not succeeded in overcoming it, or in casting off the fatal legacy of the Revolution.

It does not come within the scope of this retrospect to discuss the crisis which has at last arrived. Decentralisation is not a process which our age appears capable of achieving, and no state can escape from its own past, or swim twice down the same stream. The secularisation of the Roman system is simply contrary to the notion of a state which exists

* Besides sitting as deputies of the clergy, "ogni ecclesiastico inoltre potrà essere consigliere se avrà eletto," and "gli ecclesiastici sederanno in consiglio al di sopra dei laici." *Motu proprio* of 1816, cap. 158.

as the property and for the benefit of the whole Catholic Church.* No scheme has been hitherto devised which could secure to her ruler the advantages, without the drawbacks, of temporal dominion, either by the old system of domains, by contributions of the faithful, by engagements of the powers, or by any combination of the three. Pius II. has recorded† words, which were spoken in an age of equal tribulation, which are not inapplicable to our own: "These are not times in which virtue is regarded. It is of all importance whether it resides in the strong or in the weak. A helpless virtue is despised by the princes. I have often felt inclined to agree with those who think that the temporal power ought to be separated from the spiritual; for I thought that the priests would be better enabled to perform their functions, and that the princes would be more obedient to them. But now I have learnt that virtue without power is scorned, and that the Pope without the patrimony of the Church is but a servant of kings."

The most powerful and prosperous of all the successors of St. Peter has said, that what he relied on was not his own power, but the prayers of the whole Church—*Non de nostra virtute confidimus, sed de universalis Ecclesiæ prece speramus.*‡

* We may quote on this point the two most eminent Protestant canonists now living:

"It must not be forgotten that the Roman State has always been considered as a part of the property of the Church; that its revenues are intended to cover the expenses of the ecclesiastical government; and that when viewed in this light, its clerical administration is fully explained." Richter's *Canon Law*, 247, 5th ed.

"The States of the Church must be considered essentially the property of the Church. For in the guarantees of 1815, as well as in the donation of Pipin, the chief motive undoubtedly was to supply the great centre of administration with possessions whose revenues should contribute to maintain it in independence; . . . and the appointment of prelates to the high offices of state, which was usual also in the ecclesiastical states of Germany, follows from the nature of the state, and can hardly be blamed in principle." Mejer, *Zeitschrift für Recht und Politik der Kirche*, 1847, i. 67.

"If we admit," says Ranke, "that the Catholic Church requires the Pope, that the Pope requires Cardinals, who elect him, and the Cardinals the *prelatura* out of which they proceed; and if we acknowledge that the Pope, in order to be independent, must be a temporal sovereign;—it seems impossible to exclude those who are of the same nature and character as himself, and by whom his existence is determined, from the government of his dominions." *Historisch-politische Zeitschrift*, i. 772; 1832.

† De Concilio Basil. p. 107 sq.

‡ Innocent III. Epist. i. 176.

NOTE A, to p. 296.—Theodorus Lector says, indeed (writing at the beginning of the sixth century), that the Roman Church did not keep the property it acquired in land. "Ἔθος τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῆς Ῥώμης ἀκίνητα μὴ κρατεῖν δίκαια. *Collect.* ii. 567, ed. Valesius. Bingham observes (*Antiquities*, ii. 63, ed. 1843), "If this was the custom of the Church of Rome, it was a very singular one." It is one which would prove, at least, that it was with no view to temporal aggrandisement that the property was acquired.

THE FORMS OF INTUITION.—No. III.

IN our two former papers we have established the existence of five mental forms, of which the three active forms, power, knowledge, and will, constitute the inner man, the self or *ego*; while the two passive forms, space and time, are but the outward clothing of the soul, foreign to its inner substance, and present to it only as conditions of its sensibility.

In this our third and final paper, we have to justify the jump from subjectivity to objectivity that is made whenever we judge that the phenomena presented in our subjective forms of thought are transcripts of real objects. We have to show why, though so great a part of our knowledge is derived from within, it cannot be held that all our knowledge is so derived; and to prove that it is contrary to reason to be simple egoists, or to think ourselves the only realities, and all else mere appearance.

Reality is defined to be *ens actu*; not *existence* simply, but existence that *acts*, and is therefore *force*. The intuition of objective reality is therefore the intuition of external force. Now does this intuition exist? have we an intuition of external force in the same sense as we have an intuition of our own actual existence? and if so, what is the criterion of the validity of this intuition? By the word 'external,' we do not here mean distinctness in time and place, but distinctness from the unity of the individual self: we have an intuition of the *self*; have we equally an intuition of the *not-self*? To answer that all thought *implies* a difference between the subject thinking and the object thought is insufficient; for it does not prove that the object thought is more than a differentiation of our own minds. We are not looking for an inference or implication, but for an intuition, not of mere existence, but of external force.

Now our thesis is, that there are in the mind two original modes of intuition: first, the consciousness of the internal activity of our own powers; secondly, the consciousness of an external resistance to those powers. The first may be called the way of *creation*; the second, the way of *discovery*. The mathematician *creates* his figures, but he *discovers* the laws which regulate them: the way of creation does not place him in the presence of any objective truths; whereas, by the conscious struggle against law, law is discovered to be an objective necessity not depending on our will. But the way of creation gives us intuition of all that is in the things we have created; the mind knows what it has at-

tributed to or put into objects, it is conscious of the virtue that has gone out of it. If this virtue or force amounted to actual existence distinct from that of the mind,—if the mind were able to project the objects of its thought outside its own sphere, and to give them a separate substance and reality,—then the mind, by the way of creation, would know their reality, simply by knowing the force which it had given them. This is the only way in which we can conceive an Infinite Being to know external objects. He cannot discover them by their resistance: a finite force could make no resistance to an infinite force; the infinite would penetrate every thing, and annihilate all obstacles without any conscious struggle. The infinite Creator of all things can only know them in the way of His creative force, not in the way of their external resisting force, as St. Thomas says: * *Deus alia a se videt, non in seipsis, sed in seipso* ("God sees things that are distinct from Him, not in themselves, but in Himself"); and this must be St. Augustine's meaning, when he says, "God sees nothing outside Himself,"—not that He sees nothing as existing distinct from Himself, but that He sees all as existing with that exact force which He knows He has given,—*in semetipso cognoscens virtutem quæ exierat de illo*; † for perfect knowledge knows perfectly the force of a thing. ‡ All intelligences know in the same way, by knowing the *virtus* or force: God knows *à priori* as Creator, just as men know *à priori* what they have themselves put into objects; as He has put their whole essence into all objects, He knows all essences *à priori*. To know as discoverer is generally to know *à posteriori*, except in those cases in which we can exhaust all possible experiments; as when the mathematician has produced a circle by the revolving line, he knows both that he has drawn every possible line from the centre to the circumference of that circle, and that all other circles (which must be formed on the same plan, or they will not be circles) must follow the same law with regard to their radii. He has therefore exhausted all possible experiments with regard to the making of the radii of a circle, and therefore he knows all about them; and he knows that whatever inference he can draw from the relations of one circle is equally valid for all circles. So when he has discovered the necessary laws of the circle, he may call them *à priori*; for they are independent of the question of the real existence of any circle outside himself, that is, independent of external

* Sum. 1, q. 14, art. 5, 9.

† Mark v. 30.

‡ "Si perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod *virtus* ejus perfecte cognoscatur." St. Thos. ib.

experience: but they are *à posteriori* in regard of the fact, that he cannot know their necessity till he has virtually exhausted all possible experience concerning them; and it is the mathematician's creative power in the pure form of space that enables him thus to exhaust all possible experience.

The geometrician has two forms of proof: one by making the figure, and seeing what is in it by virtue of its creation; another, by struggling to do the impossible, and failing. The first is the positive proof; the other is the *reductio ad absurdum*. The first exemplifies the creative way; the second, the way of discovery. In all human knowledge there must be a combination of these two ways; as in geometry there is the creation of lines and figures, but with the data of space, the moving point, and the necessary laws of space which we discover by their compulsory force over our creations. We only come to know geometry by the active, searching, creative movement of the mind forming the figures; but this movement is defined beforehand by the immutable laws which it discovers. It cannot create as it pleases. The field of space is grooved for us, and we can only move our pencil in this groove. As the geographical explorer cannot travel at will over the face of the earth, but must rule his course by the laws of his limbs, and by the course of rivers and mountain-chains, so the index of the mind must obey its laws; it cannot create arbitrarily, or alter the axioms of thought. On every side it feels itself forced into the lines which are ruled for the creative thought to trace.

Knowledge, by way of creation, is only possible in its purity to an infinite being; knowledge, by way of discovery, is proper to a limited being. Discovery is the mind becoming conscious of the limits of its power. Now does this consciousness of the limitation of our power always presuppose the intuition of the externality of the limiting force? Not always; for we may as readily suppose our force to die out of itself in weakness and impotence, as to end because it encounters a foreign force which bars further progress, and against which we vainly struggle. Both these limitations are familiar to us: the idea of a transient force, which like a fire would soon go out without fresh fuel,—which becomes weary, and goes to sleep, and dies,—is perfectly natural; so also is the idea of a permanent force which does not die out of its limits, but is full of life, and beats its breast against the bars of its cage in its struggles to transcend the barriers which confine it. “The quality of necessity in a cognition,” says Hamilton,* “may depend on two different and opposite

* Met. lect. xxxviii. vol. ii. p. 366.

principles, inasmuch as it may be the result of a *power* or of a *powerlessness* of the thinking principle." Let us attempt to think of two straight lines enclosing a space: we feel we have full power over our thought, and can draw all possible straight lines; but we find that to draw the two straight lines required is impossible. Our power is permanent; but it is overcome. On the other hand, let us try to think of a perceptible universe built upon other foundations than space or time; thought sighs and dies at the task, though it encounters no constraining and overruling force. Yet we cannot say that the universe required is impossible; only that our power is transient, and has vanished in weakness.

In the latter case we have no intuition of existing reality; for we have encountered no external force, but have been stopped by our own weakness. In the former case we are stopped by an opposing force. Yet even here it is possible to deny that the force is really without us. That which we struggle against may be part of ourselves: "I could divide myself, and go to buffets," says Hotspur. When a man says, "I am impressed with this or that idea," "I cannot help thinking or feeling thus," he does not determine whether the impressing force is internal in his mind or external to it; whether his imagination is impressing his belief,—his wish is father to his thought, his idea of infinite force is creating his idea of infinite space,—or whether a real external object is impressing his perceptive faculties, and his creative faculties are struggling against a real objective force that controls and limits them. He does not determine whether his feeling or thought is the result of self-impression, that is, of subjectivity; or whether it results from external impression, that is, from objectivity. Our question is, whether there is any criterion to distinguish subjective from objective impression. We understand by scepticism the doctrine which denies the criterion to exist: sceptics, we imagine, do not go so far as to hold that "no intuitive judgment can be held with any confidence;" all feel confident of the fact of their being impressed with certain feelings, and of the validity of their reasonings from one impression to another. Scepticism owns the *reality* of these impressions, but questions their *veracity*. The sceptic doubts whether *all* impressions are not merely subjective; his opponent professes that while *some* are only subjective, *others* are as certainly caused by external objects.

To say that all impressions are subjective, is to say that they are all caused by the soul impressing itself. On this theory, the soul has two functions: one passive, to receive the impressions; the other active, to give them; the first

conscious, the second unconscious; the first function in our own power, the second having all power over us, making us the unwilling playthings of the impressions which it chooses, or rather which we choose,—for it is only a function of our own mind,—to impress upon us. The contrary theory, which defines personality to be the *conscious unity* of a given force, reason, and will, cannot admit this dark unconscious side of the soul; the soul is conscious of its whole self, and there is no part of itself beyond the range of its consciousness. “*Lucerna Domini spiraculum hominis, quæ investigat omnia secreta ventris*”* (“Man’s spirit is a light given him by God, to investigate every secret recess of the soul”); “*Quis enim scit quæ sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est?*”† (“For who knows a man’s powers, but the human spirit which is in him?”) There may be many undeveloped possibilities sleeping unconsciously in the soul, there may be many trivial acts which she habitually performs without adverting to them; but that our whole relation to the external world should be a deception wrought by one part of the soul on another,—that all perception, memory, and imagination should be equally fantastic, perception being the falsest of all, because it affirms the externality of objects more strongly than either memory or imagination,—that there should be any such mischievous and unruly imp attached to our soul, and forming a portion of our personality,—is a quaint and eccentric proposition, which does not require to be confuted before it has been seriously proposed. The soul may be ignorant of her future, inattentive to her present, and forgetful of her past; but to say that, with all her attention to her present operation, she cannot tell whether her present perceptions and feelings are self-inflicted or impressed by a force which is not hers, is contrary to common sense and to fact. It is a law, applicable alike to every function of consciousness, that we have an intuition of external reality whenever we encounter a force which, beside or against our wills, modifies the voluntary force which we had put forth; for then our conscious action feels the shock of a reaction which we are conscious is not ours. The easiest symbol of this action is the sense of touch; as we stretch out our hand to feel, so “the mind must go half-way to meet what comes to it from without.”‡ We “knock our head against a truth;” we call it “tangible,” “palpable,” “striking,” to express its unquestionable reality; an unanswerable argument “knocks us down,” and true sorrow “hits hard.”§ All these words express the reaction of

* Prov. xx. 27.

† 1 Cor. ii. 11.

‡ Dr. Newman, *Lectures* (1859), p. 343.

§ Shakespeare, Sonnet cxx.

reality on the active soul. The sceptic who admits the existence of nothing besides the *ego* in the universe, places this action and reaction in the same subject, thus identifying the seer and the seen, the anvil and the hammer. And then follows this difficulty,—either the subject has power over itself, or not: if it has, then it can modify all its phantasms at pleasure, nothing will come to it unexpectedly, nothing involuntarily; if it has not, then it undergoes what Plato calls the *βίαία παθήματα** of sense, and is subject to a power not its own, and therefore outside it. But the whole character of the sceptic is staked on the denial of any objective power outside the subject. The way in which we discover the reality of external objects is in all points analogous to the way of discovering mathematical laws. It is not by the passive contemplation of ready-made shapes that we come to know the laws of figures, but by the active generation of these figures in our form of space. So, also, if we are only passive spectators of shapes in space and moving phenomena in time, we have no reason to assert that these phantasms correspond to external realities. We demonstrate this correspondence in the same way as we demonstrate a mathematical problem, by the generative or active power of the three living forms of the intuition.

Let us begin with one of the simplest acts of the mind—perception. Let us suppose that there is a vivid image in the sensorium; how shall we decide whether it corresponds to a present external reality or not? How shall we decide whether it is a perception (that is, an influx of a present object), a memory (that is, a reproduction of a past influx), an imagination, or a dream? It is clear that the mere sensation or passive impression of the image presented may be the same in each case; hence the mere sensation contains no criterion to discriminate perception from memory or fancy. It is not till we call into play the active powers, and make the index of the mind pass over the outline presented that we can make this discrimination. If the fancy only is employed, the image is perfectly inconstant: we can easily plant the tree with its roots in the air and its branches in the earth; but if we are *perceiving* a tree, we are forced to see it as it is given, and the more we struggle against the force, the more we find ourselves compelled by it. The same image is referred to a present reality by perception, to a past perception by memory, and to an indeterminate origin by imagination. In perception, the index of the mind finds it impossible to change the given image, because it is guided and mastered

* "Impressions produced by violence." *Timæus*, iii. 42.

by the present influence of the reality. In memory, the index of the mind is still controlled, but not so forcibly, for the image is only a reproduction of one whose outline may have become effaced and colours feeble; in imagination, on the contrary, the index of the mind is perfectly free to change the image arbitrarily. In all three cases the image, taken by itself, may be precisely the same; it is clear, then, that the criterion is not in the image, considered as mere passive phenomenon, but in the resisting power of the image. When the imaginary image has this full resisting power, we are compelled to take it for the perception of a reality. This is a disease—a madness, and while it lasts, no man is answerable for the inevitable mistakes into which it leads him; for the mind cannot help taking its fancies for realities as soon as the criterion fails it. One of the two forms of madness is defined to be “the loss, partial or complete, of power to distinguish between unreal images created within the sensorium and the actual perceptions drawn from realities.”* The insane seem to have a groove cut for their perceptions, ideas, and arguments, from which nothing can displace them; they reason as correctly as the rest of mankind from the interior law to the external reality. But their sensorium is diseased, and the images traced upon it from within are more rigid and less alterable than those traced from without; and they reasonably believe what they think they see.†

In dreams, the use of the criterion is suspended, and fancy is taken for perception; and the moment of waking, when the criterion returns to work, affords a good test of our thesis. A man, awaking for the first time in a strange place, assumes that he is at home, and that the strange aspect of things is a delusion deposited by his dreams; he rubs his eyes, expecting to find the lines of the room fall into the familiar arrangement: but when the phenomena remain obstinate, the external force subdues his mind; he recognises the fact that he is not fancying, but perceiving, and he requires from himself an account of his change of place.

Thus perception is a function of the active intellect; we perceive by going over the impression on our sensorium with

* Sir H. Holland, chapters on Mental Physiology, p. 44.

† In the same way, when through inattention the will neglects to apply the criterion, the distinction between perception, memory, and imagination is erased. “Then,” says St. Augustine (*De Trin.* xi. 4), “*tanta offenditur similitudo speciei corporalis expressæ ex memoriâ, ut nec ipsa ratio discernere sinatur utrum foris corpus ipsum videatur, an intus tale aliquid cogitatur.*” Augustine’s criterion is, that whereas the fancy is illimitable in images, “*singulis tamen in memoriâ præscriptus est intransgressibilis modus*” (*ib.* xi. 11).

the mental index, much as an artist strengthens the faint outlines of the camera with his pencil.

"Mine eye hath played the painter, and hath stêled
Thy beauty's form on tables of my heart. . . .
Mine eyes have drawn thy shape."*

And a careful perception of this kind is necessary for the memory of *what* we have seen, as distinguished from the memory of the emotions excited by the view. It is the artist's way of examining a Gothic cathedral, as distinct from the poet's, or from that of the ordinary observer, who is content to enjoy his emotions without noting them or caring to put them in words, and whose memory, for all practical purposes, is perfectly evanescent.

On the whole, then, the intuition of resistance is the intuition of external force. This is true for all the three mental forms, power, reason, and will; and for all their subordinate faculties,—for the conative faculties, which are the ministers of our force; for the senses and reflective faculties, which are the ministers of our reason; and for the passions and emotions, which are the household of the will. All these contribute their share to the intuition of external reality; for we will never subscribe to the doctrine that our soul is a congeries of discerptible powers, and that the reason or the power is something separate in substance from the will. We hold the soul to be a conscious and willing force, and a forcible and rational will—a conscious force, a conscious reason, and a conscious will—conscious in each act, and founding each of its acts in the principles of consciousness and reason. Hence the proof of externality and objectivity cannot be drawn from pure reason isolated from force and volition; for reason cannot subsist in this separate state. *Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est*, says Bacon. No act is an act of pure reason, for each act requires the coöperation of the other forms of the soul; hence, to insist upon explaining any act by the principles of pure reason, we must first mutilate and misrepresent the act which we pretend to explain.†

The conative faculties, in which the funds of our force are invested, are at the root of all our struggles; but a struggle without resistance, or an action without reaction, is as impossible to imagine as it is to measure the motion of a single body in an infinite void. If the conative faculties do not recognise resistance, the force must think itself omnipotent; it must feel like a force without limits, till it is con-

* Shakespeare, Sonnet xxiv.

† See, on the unity of our various powers, Hamilton, *Metaphys. lec. xx.*; and Gratry, *Connaissance de Dieu*, c. i. § 3, vol. i. p. 67, 4th ed.

scious of some limits ; and there will be no end to its castle-building and its brag till it inaugurates a new era of self-knowledge by hurting its pinions against the bars of its cage. There is no strength in the first ignorant presumption of strength ; our strength consists in knowing exactly what we can do, and in bounding the map of our power by the obstacles which we find insurmountable.

The senses are the windows of knowledge, and curiosity is the lever which opens them. And not only do the senses recognise the external force that produces the impression, but the curiosity adds its proper testimony to the same effect. Not only do the senses recognise the external compulsion which forces them to perceive in the given manner and in no other way, but the knowledge also, by recognising in the impression thus given a subject of curiosity, confesses that it is in presence of something which it has not found out or invented for itself, and attests the fact that fresh knowledge, which it knows it had not previously in its own stores, is accruing to it from without. The knowledge that supposes there is nothing knowable that it does not know thinks itself omniscient ; hence the first feeling of curiosity is a confession of ignorance, and the confession of ignorance is the profession of the objectivity and externality of the things to be known.

The same thing is true of the will, and of the passions and affections which subserve it. The passions and affections are objective in their tendency, and presuppose the intuition of their proper objects : conscious love is impossible without the consciousness of the beloved object ; love and the other passions thus become eyes of the mind.

“Love, admiration, fear, desire, and hate,
Blind were we without these ; through these alone
Are capable to notice, or discern,
Or to record.”*

“It is plain that passions and affections are in action in our minds before the presence of their proper objects ; and their activity would of course be an antecedent argument of extreme cogency in behalf of the real existence of those objects, supposing them unknown.”† The will is the beginning of knowledge, because a soul without love is without curiosity or desire, therefore without activity, therefore without perception. And in this love is implied the objectivity of the thing loved ; as curiosity is the will to know something that we do not yet know, so love is the will to possess something that we do not yet possess as we would possess it. Desire is

* Wordsworth, *Excursion*.

† Newman, *Development*, p. 51.

the wish to attain an object which we conceive will add to us something which we as yet have not, and which we cannot create for ourselves by a mere internal act of will. What a man fears is something out of his control; fear ceases as soon as he is convinced that the object is imaginary, or in his power. Love is absurd as soon as we are convinced the beloved object has no reality. Admiration confesses an unexpected light; love leans towards an absent unenjoyed lover; power seeks power, knowledge seeks knowledge, will seeks will. In all these there is the *τύπος ἀντίτυπος*, the action of the subject and reaction of the object: we do not say that power *sees* power, or that love *sees* the beloved object; nor do we only say, that if the reason stands in doubt of the existence of outward forces or outward objects, the passions and sentiments cut the knot, and force the mind to decide for the reality of objects. This is doubtless true; for every passion acts *ad extra*, and assumes the existence of an external object: *ignoti nulla cupido*; not only are the passions aimless without external objects, but they are impossible except they bear in their bosoms the previous affirmation and intuition of the reality of these objects. But there is a deeper intuition of externality than this necessary inference. Power, reason, and will, each has its own mode of recognising its object: power feels the shock, reason sees, will loves or hates; or else power, reason, and will are not human, but brute and material. Once deny the reality of these intuitions, and you assume all objects of the sentiments to be your own creation; your friends, your lovers are of your own making: you have no reason for anxiety about them; you cannot lose them against your will; if you let them drop out of your mind, you can at will replace them by fresh creations,—or if you cannot, then either you are at once omnipotent and all-powerless, a creator liable every moment to be overwhelmed by his own creation, or else your assumption is false, and the objects of your intuitions have a real objective existence, and are not merely your own creations.

And it is not only in their operations *ad extra* that the power, reason, and will encounter the controlling forces which oblige us to recognise their objectivity. In the internal processes of the faculties they are equally bound by necessary laws. The power cannot trace figures in space, or create numbers in time, except according to the necessary rules of geometry and arithmetic; the reason cannot proceed except by the laws of logic; the will is totally unable to escape from the equally stringent laws of morals. That which is outside us, distinct from us, out of our power, not

only comes to us from without, not only clips in our body, and makes its entrance through the corporal windows of the senses, but also affects our minds within,—is intimately present to us even when all the doors of our senses are closed, and resists our utmost efforts to change it. It comes to us as a law, not imposed by ourselves on ourselves, but imposed by some one or some thing independent of ourselves. It is an objective, not a merely subjective force. It is a Force that limits our force, a Reason that limits our reason, a Will that rules our will.

If a man may say, "I think, therefore I am," he may also say, "I think in the grooves ruled by an external reason, therefore this external reason exists." We have an internal sense or intuition of this external reason, just in the same way as we have an external sense of the sun, or an internal sense of our own existence. Our force experiences the shock of external force; our reason is invincibly bent by external reason; our will feels the obligation of an external law. Where our force, our reason, or our will die out and fade away, they have no strength to struggle; but where they struggle against an obstacle, there they perceive the limits imposed upon them. That which limits power must itself be power; for force can only be controlled by force. That which limits reason must be reason; that which hems round our knowledge must itself be possible knowledge; otherwise, when we advance the frontier of our present knowledge, our new acquisitions will be something not knowledge—the knowable must always surround the known. And that which comes into the like relations with the will must also be will; only the loving can be lovely, only the hating hateful.

The same formula which gives the possibility of the intuition of external force, reason, and will, gives the possibility of the intuition of the various degrees, that is, of the various unities or individualities (for each degree is a unity) of these realities. The same intuition by which we perceive resistance gives us the degree of the resistance. We struggle up to a certain point, and then overcome; the way of discovery has made known to us an external force; the way of creation has shown us the degree of our own force to which the external force is equivalent; henceforth we not only know *that* it is, but what it is, for we have the measure of its individuality. Similar statements would be true of the rational and willing forces which we encounter. As each degree of force is a unity, and therefore something by itself, and not a mere constituent part of a larger force, each force given in the intuition must be looked upon as an individual, and not a mere

constituent element of the greatest force, which is only greatest in degree, not in extent; for "in iis quæ non mole magnâ sunt, hoc est majus esse quod est melius esse."* We have, therefore, the intuition of objects as distinct forces, or actual beings, each with its own degree of force, reason, or will.

But the respective values of the two objective intuitions, by way of creation and by way of discovery, must be distinguished. The way of discovery is infallible in showing "quod," *that* a thing exists; the way of creation shows "quid," *what* it is, but not with equal certainty. In the way of creation we see the thing, not in itself, but in ourselves; we measure not *its* force, but the degree of *our own* force which we consider its equivalent. But this equivalence is not necessarily true; the measure of the existence of the thing need not be exactly the measure of our knowledge of it.† Still we could not know *that* a thing is unless we knew *what* it is sufficiently to distinguish it from all else. The truth seems to be, that each faculty is infallible in discerning the existence of, but not the degree of, its like; force is infallible in feeling the shock of force, not so in defining the species of the force perceived; reason is infallible in seeing reason, not so in defining the degree of reason which it sees.

We have seen that the objective intuition of individual finite beings is possible, though, if what we have just said is true, we have no infallible measure of their degree. But a greater difficulty remains behind. Is the objective intuition of an Infinite Being possible? We reply, it is certainly possible in the way of discovery. We have seen (p. 176) that our power, though not infinite itself, necessarily affirms the possibility of transcending any limits whatever; for every limit of power implies a power that limits: so that thought can go on removing limits even to infinity. There is, then, the possibility of an infinite act; therefore there is an infinite agent. For though it is a bad illation to conclude the existence of an effect from its possibility, yet it is good from the possibility of the effect to conclude the existence of a

* Aug. de Trin. vi. 7. See also Roger Bacon, Opus Tertium, p. 194: "Dei essentia est infinita intensive, non extensive; sicut sua virtus et potentia."

† See St. Aug. de Trin. viii. c. 5 and 6. "We know St. Paul as man, because hoc sumus, *i. e.* homo . . . hoc de illo credimus quod invenimus in nobis. And we know him as *animus justum*, quia et nos habemus animus,—not because we have seen it, but because we have it. Quid enim tam intime scitur, seque ipsum esse sentit, quam id quo etiam cætera sentiuntur, *i. e.* animus? . . . animus cujuslibet ex nostro novimus. But how can we see his justice if we are not just? Num est alius animus justus in animo nondum justo?"

cause capable of producing it. The intrinsic possibility of the thing implies its extrinsic possibility, or the presence of a sufficient cause. We necessarily affirm the possibility of transcending any given limits in space, without for a moment doubting the reality of the power that can transcend them, till we reflect on the consequences of our position, and recoil before the apparition of the Infinite. Then perhaps we say, it is possible, if the Infinite exists. But we might as well translate *Cogito ergo sum* into "I think if I am," as say, "thought can transcend any possible limit in space, if infinite power really exists;" thought is thus transcendent, as really as it is at all; therefore I know that infinite force exists by an intuition as real as that by which I know that I exist. I know also that the infinite power which I cannot help thinking is not my own; therefore my intuition of it is objective, and I am contemplating an infinite Being external to myself.

Still the question occurs, What is the immediate object of our consciousness? Does the Infinite manifest Himself directly to our minds, or are we only conscious of the image of Him reflected in our souls? Is the intuition of infinite power immediate or representative? If immediate, what are the finite faculties capable of receiving the presentation of the Infinite? If representative, what are the faculties that can interpret the representation, and enable man to compare it with the original?

If, with Hamilton, in the proof of his famous "law of the conditioned," we limit ourselves to the consideration of space and time, the idea of the Infinite will soon land us in contradictions. Space must be conceived either as bounded or unbounded: yet it is inconceivable either as absolutely bounded or as infinitely unbounded; and one or other of these inconceivable alternatives is necessary. So, again, if the absolute minimum or atom of space is inconceivable, the infinite divisibility of space is equally so: yet one of these alternatives is necessary. So time, as an absolute infinite, a whole either in regress or progress, is inconceivable; similarly, the moment of time is either divisible to infinity, or else composed of certain absolutely smallest parts: yet both alternatives are inconceivable. In time and space, the infinitely little and the infinitely great are equally inconceivable. But there is nothing inconceivable in the idea that an agent should be capable of putting out a force either infinitely little or infinitely great. There must be a possibility of acts of division and of acts of extension to infinity, though time and space may be matters incapable of responding to these acts. The law of the Conditioned is only true for time and space, and

not for force, reason, and will, till they are reduced to terms of time and space.

Hence in thinking of the Infinite, we must "transcend space and time;" we must be conscious that, however space and time necessarily enter into the terms of our thought, they must be allowed for and eliminated when we think of the Infinite. The forms of space and time are but the accidental and separable vestment of man's soul; they cannot have even this relation to the Infinite.

To the Infinite the laws of space and time are not necessary by any necessity of nature, but only by necessity of *fact*. "Quod factum est, ipsum permanet."*

"—non tamen irritum
Quodecumque retro est efficiet; neque
Diffinget infectumque reddet."†

To our intelligence they are necessary absolutely, because they are the form of the world that is "put into our heart," and we have no other form of thought for conceiving or imagining any other creation. Enabling us to conceive the actual world, they hinder us from discovering the other works that may have been wrought "ab initio usque ad finem;"‡ for it cannot be held that the Infinite was unable to devise a universe founded on other principles than those of space and time. If space was to be, all the properties of space also were to be. For, simple as it looks, space is a complex of the most wonderful richness. Each property of space is an integral constituent of the whole; destroy one, and all are destroyed, space is annihilated, and human thought becomes formless and impossible. It has no form in which to reflect even its power, reason, and will. Space and time are the data, the *materia prima* furnished to the creative forces of our minds. Without these data all our thought is barren, for we are subject to the axiom *ex nihilo nihil*. Not so the Infinite. He creates not only the form, but the matter of the universe. He requires no data but Himself, His own power, reason, and will,—not as the matter out of which He creates, but as the force which creates. He could annihilate space and time, and still exist as He existed before them: but He could not change a single property of space and time without changing the whole; for He has made all these laws mutually dependent, so that the destruction of one is the destruction of all. Hence the mathematical laws and the laws of reason and will are not in God in the same way. The laws of reason and will are Himself; the laws of mathematics are His creation, no more Himself

* Eccl. iii. 15.

† Hor. Od. iii. 29. 47.

‡ Eccl. iii. 11.

than the properties of any other creature, whose idea He must have conceived from eternity. The laws of reason and will, then, are eternal and uncreated realities; the laws of mathematics are only necessary on the hypothesis that space and time are to be, and to be such as they are. Mathematical truth is only necessary if space exists; but moral and intellectual truth are necessary and universal if soul, spirit, or God exists.

If we interpreted the axiom "like knows like" with arithmetical precision, we could not assert any intuition of the Infinite. But when we make the likeness of the subject to the object to consist not in shape, or in size, but in force,—when we interpret this axiom to mean, that spirit alone can know spirit, and that the substance which we attribute to objects is but the projected image of our own force, the case is different.* It is not true that the forces of our souls can only know their exact equivalents and no more. Even in space and time, where the conception is identical with the image, we know spaces and numbers which are far beyond our powers of imagination, can *represent* them by symbols, and calculate them with the greatest precision. So with our senses. We have no means of presenting to our sensibility the feeling of a hundred degrees of cold, or three hundred degrees of heat; for either, really felt, would destroy all feeling: yet we can *represent* either; and the man who has exposed his bare skin for a moment to an Arctic wind, or who has snuffed a candle with his fingers, can form a very tolerable representative idea of both. So with our force, reason, and will; our conscious powers know all powers similar to themselves. Our limited power sympathises with, and responds to, the shock of all power, whether less or greater than itself, provided it is of the genus power. But power, generically considered, is illimitable; the limit of power, if not another power, and so on *ad infinitum*, is weakness, the very contradictory of power. Therefore he that knows power as power generically, knows unlimited power. Without this consciousness of illimitation there could never be the consciousness of limit; it is only when I feel that my power ought to extend beyond the bounds that confine it that I advert to these bounds at all; we should never look for space without motion, nor should we knock our heads against our prison-walls, except we tried to get through them,—an attempt that would never enter the head of a prisoner who had no idea of locomotion, no conscious

* St. Augustine says (De Trin. x. 5), that the mind considers the images of bodies "factas de semetipsâ de semetipsâ; dat enim eis formandis quidam substantiæ suæ."

faculty of power—generic power, transcending all given limits. If, on the other hand, we assumed that no idea of power can surpass the actual degree of power possessed by the thinking subject, the same conclusion would reappear. He that knows no greater power than his own thinks he has all power; the intelligence that can conceive nothing wiser than itself must think itself all-wise. A man's ignorance is not unconsciousness of power, but unconsciousness of its limits. Like Bottom, he wonders at nothing; he has no doubt he can fiddle, though he never tried; no manifestation of force astonishes him. Barbarians bow in fear before stones and trees; for when the limit of force is unknown, the force seems limitless; but this seeming would be impossible, unless force was given as limitless in our consciousness or intuition. The inexperienced youth builds castles in the air; for only time teaches the limits of the practicable, the extent of our powers beyond which they collapse. Thus, the first original consciousness is of power limitless, the universal, the possible; the perfected consciousness is of limited force, of the particular, and the practicable. The first, dreamy as it is, is a necessary foundation for the definite and regulated versatility of the practical man, who knows his amount of available force, and the work to which it is applicable.

In the way of discovery, we know things greater than ourselves; we feel the shock of greater powers, we stand in admiration before greater wisdom, we are lost in the love of unimaginable beauty: but if in the way of creation we could know these objects, if we could find an equivalent for them within our own souls, it might be plausibly said that we claimed equality with this power, wisdom, and goodness. But it is not so in reality. The nature of the mind is such that it can think more than it is. Its power is not in extension, but in degree. Force is presented to us, in the first intuition, as an intensity incapable of limit; our force, little as it is, is almighty to us till we know of other forces, as a mustard-seed, according to St. Thomas, would fill all space if there were no other body in the world. So with knowledge; the knowable in the first intuition is convertible with the possible,—all that can *be* can be *known*. The field of the will is equally illimitable. A degree is a unity, not made up of parts, but whole and perfect in itself. Things that differ only in degree are alike in essence: so we may hold that the mind by its degree of power, whatever it may be, is not only able, but even compelled, to conceive dimly all power, even infinite; by its degree of knowledge, to conceive all knowledge; by its degree of will, to conceive all will. If this

power did not exist, there would be no poetic creation beyond internal experience; Shakespeare must have *been* both Iago and Othello before he could have created the characters. Nor could any reader understand what is written without first being what he understands, unless the principle is true that like knows like, not in measurement, but in kind.

Through the windows of the senses the world can never present itself to us as infinite, therefore the world is an insufficient foundation for the proof of infinite power; but we look out into the world furnished beforehand with a knowledge that power exceeds all possible limits, and the world confirms this knowledge, by presenting itself to us as something both greater and more subdivided than at any one time it can be conceived to be. We cannot conceive it to be infinite, just as we cannot conceive infinite space and time; but it comes so near it, it so far surpasses any imaginable limit, that it becomes the fittest possible expression and symbol of infinite force.

But the attempt to conceive the Infinite must not be made in the forms of space and time; the Infinite must not be made an empty formula of lines and relations, but an infinite liberty of power, reason, and will; an infinitely free, canning, knowing, and willing force. Its reason must not be conceived as an aggregate of all possible modes of consciousness, any more than a wise man's brain is the aggregate of the brains of four fools, or an eagle's eye the aggregate of fifty bats' eyes. Neither is absolute power the sum of all existing powers, nor absolute being the total of all actual and possible beings. The Infinite is an infinite degree or intensity of knowledge and power, as individual and distinct from other degrees of power as one human person is from another; but of power and knowledge so intense, that all possible subtraction lessens it not, and all possible addition adds nothing to it. Add to its power all that every other being can do, it is no stronger than before; add to its knowledge the wisdom of every other intellect, it knows no more than before; add to its will the force of all other wills, it is no more free, no more voluntary than before. It is not the sum of all reality; for real beings exist outside of it, distinct from it, however their independence is overshadowed by its transcendent might. Distinction, which is fatal to the idea of an infinite unity in time and space, does no damage to the idea of infinity in intensity and liberty; for space and time are *made up* of parts, and infinite space is made up of all spaces, so that the distinction of one from another subtracts something from it, and mars its infinity; but infinite force is not lessened by the

presence of any number of finite forces distinct from itself. Unlike absolute space, absolute force may stand in relation to other forces without losing its infinite perfection ; it is no derogation to conceive it as using its infinite freedom in relation to the finite beings around it just as it pleases. If it may co-exist with any number of subordinate forces, it must so temper its action on each as not to overwhelm it with the full presence of its might. Thus each is acted on by the Infinite without experiencing infinite action, yet each feels and experiences the Infinite; as the finger passed through a flame feels a heat greater than that to which the skin is really raised, or as a man passing into the frosty air feels the intense cold without having his skin actually reduced to the temperature of the air, so we may pass through the hands of infinite power, and feel it to be infinite, though the degree of its operation upon us is but finite. We are under the necessity of supposing the highest possible degree of power or reason to be infinite ; whenever we, rightly or wrongly, suppose ourselves to be in the immediate presence of the highest possible power, we, in a manner, have an intuition of the Infinite ; and this intuition is in itself just as trustworthy as the intuition of any other degree of force. Our intuition of any given degree of wisdom larger than our own inherent in another person, is as difficult to account for as our intuition of infinite wisdom in God. We know *that* it is, better than we know *what* it is ; we know *what* it can do better than we know *how* it does it. It is seen roughly from without, not accurately from within. Infinite space and eternal time are inconceivable either in general or in detail, because they do not exist ; infinite liberty of power, knowledge, and will, is not only conceivable, but is conceived as a necessary reality, though in detail all its operations and its whole essence are inconceivable. But its reality affirms itself so strongly to our minds, that, as we have seen, the intuition of infinite power and thought necessitates our imagining the infinity of space and time, in spite of the inherent contradictions and impossibilities.

To recapitulate. In our first article we endeavoured to show that the forms of the rational intuition are as necessary as the forms of the sensibility for the construction of science, and that Kant erred in not using the former forms, as well as the latter, as the stuff out of which the categories of the understanding have to be constructed. In our second article we endeavoured to show that these two sets of forms contain all possible objects of thought ; the former set containing all phenomena or phantoms, the latter all realities or forces.

We endeavoured also to distinguish them into two separate orders: space and time, though intuitions of the mind, are no parts of the mind; they are but the coats of the soul, and have no community of nature with her. The soul, though imagining space, and perceiving all objects in space, does not recognise its reality. Force, on the other hand, is at once an object of intuition, an instrument of intuition, and a constituent element or quality of the mind; it is not a mere coat or tunicle, but it is of the substance of the soul. In our third article we have attempted to show how these internal powers, girt round by phantoms, and apparently having no direct means of communication with external objects, yet have the intuition of the reality of these objects. We concluded that *force* is in all instances the test of reality. No actual thing can be without force: the force of our own minds stands beneath the phantoms of the mind; the force of external nature stands beneath the phenomena which we know not to be due to the forces of our own minds. Our force receives the shock of external force; our knowledge sees external knowledge. "If we read a book which it requires much thought and reason to understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason exist in that book, *irrespectively of our minds.*"* Our will, our love and hate, feel the presence of external wills. The order of this perception of external reality seems to be this: first, we conceive all phenomena to be impressions made by persons like ourselves, but varying in power and intensity, some mightier than others, as the sky, the winds, the sea; then by a process of abstraction, described in our second article, § 7, we gradually come to distinguish the various kinds of reality—lifeless force, vegetable, animal, and human life; but though we have thus removed all conscious reason and will from the immediate natural object of our perception, they remain in some other object which we are forced to conceive as presiding over and directing the immediate object, and giving it its order or latent reason, and its beauty or latent love. We must conceive this Being as abstracted from phenomena and from time and space, and as resembling our souls without their external envelopes. To Him we must refer all those forces which compel the mind from within,—such as the laws of mathematics, of reason, and of morals; with this distinction, that those laws which relate only to time and space are simply the laws of His creation, while

* Baden Powell, third series of Essays, 1859, p. 238.

those which relate to power, reason, and will in themselves belong to His nature, and are probably viewed by Him as the laws of space are viewed by us,—accepted as the forms of all thought, but understood to be forms not imposed from without, but imposed by the very constitution of His own self-existing nature. Thus *persons* are the first cognisable objects, the first recognised sources of all force; and all other sources of force, or objects, are ever afterwards recognised in terms of our personal force, reason, and will, adjusted to the forcible influence which they exert on our own force, reason, and will through our senses and our sensibility.

Communicated Articles.

THE CHURCH IN THE ANCIENT SYMBOLS.

My object in the present article is to examine and compare together some of the more important symbolical representations employed by the early Christians to describe the Church. The scope of this examination and comparison is, to bring out as clearly as possible the idea of the constitution and qualities of the Church which they entertained, and endeavoured to express in the choice of these symbols. It is true that a symbolical description of any object falls short of an historical description in point of accuracy and fullness of detail, since it is the characteristic of a symbol partly to manifest and partly to veil the truth. Nevertheless, this very ambiguity of expression has its own merits, and is declared by Clement of Alexandria to be one of the great advantages of symbolism; whilst, on the other hand, a true symbol is never so obscure as to demand a sibyl for its interpretation. For, being intended to represent a given object, it must have a tendency to produce in the mind of the beholder some leading feature of that object; otherwise it would cease to be a symbol. Besides, in the present instance, the monuments to be discussed have all been illustrated in the writings of contemporary Fathers; so that, whatever obscurity may be met with in the former will be compensated by the perspicuity of the latter.

The monuments to which I invite attention are supplied by paintings of the Roman Catacombs, by the mosaics of the

early Christian basilicas, sepulchral inscriptions, antique gems, and carvings in ivory and bronze. Generally speaking, they belong to the first four or five centuries. Their *great* antiquity naturally gives great weight to the portrait of the Church which they exhibit; for its authors were the very earliest Christians, men whose minds were fresh from the teaching of the Apostles, and who would naturally describe the Church as they had learnt to know it from their instructors. Hence their views on the ecclesiastical body and its qualities are an historical expression of what the Apostles believed and taught, and as such, of the last importance to the theologian.

The symbolical representations of the Church naturally group themselves into two distinct classes: in the first are comprised those symbols which illustrate the formation of the Church and the elements of which it is composed; the second contains those which describe the nature and qualities of the Church already constituted and in being. To the first class is to be referred a mosaic which belongs to the time of Celestine I., in whose pontificate it was placed in the basilica of Santa Sabina at Rome, where it is still to be seen.* St. Peter and St. Paul occupy the upper part of this mosaic, and under each of them stands a female figure, one on either side of a large inscription. The figure under St. Peter holds in her left hand an open book, and has the middle finger and forefinger of her right hand stretched out and somewhat raised; beneath is a scroll with the following legend: ECCLESIA EX CIRCUMCISIONE. On the opposite side of the large inscription above referred to, immediately under the picture of St. Paul, stands the other female figure, corresponding in almost every respect to the first. She too holds in her left hand an open book, whilst near her breast she keeps her right hand with the forefinger extended: under her feet is a scroll, with the words, ECCLESIA EX GENTIBVS. These inscriptions place it beyond a doubt that the two figures we have described are symbolical representations of the Church. The books they hold in their hands are probably the books of the Old and New Testaments: the Old is held by the Church of circumcision, as appertaining more especially to the Israelites, "to whom belongeth the adoption of children, and the glory, and the covenant, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises" (Rom. ix. 4); whilst the New Testament is properly placed in the hands of the Church of the Gentiles, to whom St. Paul declares that he was sent to preach the gospel of the uncircumcision. The entire composition is an admirable rendering

* Ciampini, Vett. Mon. i. 186, 187, edit. Rome, 1690.

of the words of the same Apostle (Gal. ii. 7-9), "To me was committed the Gospel of the uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision: for He who wrought in Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, wrought in me also among the Gentiles." But it may be said, that the notion of expressing the Church as a female figure is too far-fetched and extravagant to deserve any attention from the student. This is not the case; for this representation springs naturally from the interpretation given by the early Fathers of many passages in Holy Writ. For example, St. Hippolytus* thus comments on the Apocalypse (cap. xii.): "Under the figure of a woman clothed with the sun, he has most plainly signified the Church clothed with the Word of the Father, which beams more brilliantly than the sun. When he speaks of the moon beneath her feet, he exhibits the Church arrayed in heavenly charity like the moon. What he says of the crown of twelve stars on her head refers to the twelve Apostles by whom the Church has been founded. And she being with child, cried, travailing in birth, and was in pain to be delivered, because the Church ceases not to give birth from her heart to the Word, which suffers persecution from infidels in the world. And she brought forth, he says, a man-child who was to rule all nations; that is, the Church, by always giving birth to Christ, the male and perfect offspring of God, who is styled both God and man, acts as the teacher of all nations." Again, in the *Pastor* of Hermas (num. ii. sec. 4), the seer meets with a woman who presents him with a book: on being asked by his guide whom he imagines her to be, and on replying that he takes her to be the sibyl, he is informed by his interrogator that he is wrong. Upon which he asks, "'Who, then, is she, sir?' And he said unto me, 'She is the Church of God.' And I said to him, 'Why, therefore, is she old?' 'Because,' said he, 'she has been created first of all; and for her sake the world has been made.'" A similar representation of the Church as a woman occurs three or four times more in the same work. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the use of this symbol was quite familiar to men's minds in the early ages of Christianity, and that there was nothing forced or violent in it, when we consider the vein of thought then current among the faithful. Hence Ciampini is most probably right in his conjecture, that the two female figures from the Catacombs given by Severano† represent the Church. The same conjecture has been made with respect to a single female figure thus described by the same Severano,‡ where he

* De Antichristo, n. lx.

† Rom. Sott. lib. iv. c. 14.

‡ Tom. ii. lib. iv. c. 7.

treats of the paintings of the second chamber in the cemetery on the Latin Way: "On the wall of an arched monument is painted the figure of a woman, standing, with outstretched hands, in the attitude of prayer. At her feet lie two of the small cases which were used by the ancients to hold books." It is probable that the double *capsa*, or book-holder, in this composition has reference to the two books we saw in the mosaic of Santa Sabina. Again, the Cav. De' Rossi* declares that the woman standing at the altar, in one of the remarkable paintings of the lately-discovered cubicula of the cemetery of Callistus, is also most probably a figure of the Church. The idea expressed in the mosaic of Santa Sabina is to be found somewhat similarly treated in a series of monuments varying in date from the latest to the earliest period of Christian art. As these monuments throw great light on our subject, it will be useful to describe them. Aringhi† gives a sarcophagus from the Vatican cemetery which is almost an accurate copy of a very ancient vetro, or glass, edited by Buonarrotti.‡ On the upper part of this glass (which is somewhat broken) is represented our Saviour standing on a mount, from whose slopes issues a stream of running water. On the right-hand side stands a man with a long beard, and clothed in a pallium; on the left, a man with a fragment of a cross, or some such object, on his shoulder, who appears about to enter the water, and who receives from the Saviour an open volume, in which some name appears to be written, of which only the last four letters, *INVS*, remain. It is doubtless *DOMINUS*; for in the mosaic in the Church of Sta. Costanza, close to St. Agnes fuori le Mura, the whole inscription remains, *DOMINUS LEGEM DAT*. Behind the figure on the right is placed a palm-tree, with a phoenix resting on its branches. But we are more immediately concerned with the group on the lower part of the glass. Immediately below the figure just described, we see a lamb standing on a mountain, similar to the one which in the upper picture supports our Saviour. On either side are represented two cities, of which the one on the right has written above it, *IERVSALE*; the other, on the left, *BECLE* or *BETLE*, the final *M* being omitted in both words, as not unusually occurs in such monuments, and the letter *c* being written for *t*. The space around these two cities, Jerusalem and Bethlehem, is filled by a number of sheep looking towards the lamb upon the mount, from which springs a river with the inscription *IORDANES*. These two cities also ap-

* De Christ. Monumen. IXΘN exhibentibus, ap. Spicileg. Solesm., tom. iii.

† Rom. Subter. p. 295.

‡ Osser. in Vetr. tav. vi. fig. 1.

pear in the mosaics of Santa Maria Maggiore, of Sts. Cosmas and Damian, and in the Church of St. Mark. Now there is no doubt but that the cities, with their symbolical sheep, represent respectively the converts from Judaism and those from out of the Gentiles; for the firstfruits of the vocation of the Gentiles were gathered in the persons of the Magi by our Lord at Bethlehem. In confirmation of this, Buonarotti quotes St. Augustine,*—"At the light of that star the faith of the Gentiles commenced;" and the collect for the Epiphany, in the Gothic Missal published by the venerable Cardinal Tommasi: "Qui hanc superventuræ solemnitatis diem electionis gentium primitiis consecrasti." We have, therefore, in this glass another view of the same subject represented on the mosaics of Santa Sabina; the *Ecclesia ex circumcisione* being understood in the sheep who are moving from Jerusalem towards the lamb on the mystical mount, and the *Ecclesia ex gentibus* in those who from Bethlehem tend to the same centre of union.

Are there, then, two distinct Churches? it may here be asked; are there divisions in the Church, in one of whom St. Peter rules supreme, and in the other St. Paul? Do not these monuments, therefore, appear to go very far to prove the theory advanced by the German neologist commentators on the Epistle to the Galatians, in which they assert that the early faithful were split into two distinct organisations, independent and exclusive one of the other? Where, then, is the divinely-instituted primacy of St. Peter over all believers in Christ? where that unity of faith and communion which the modern Church pronounces to be altogether essential? These objections are all easily disposed of, so far as they are suggested by the glass before us. It is true, indeed, that there are two cities, it is true that there are two flocks of sheep; but it is not true that they are distinct, separate, or divided. They are represented as abandoning Bethlehem and coming out from Jerusalem, that is, from Judaism and from paganism. They are seen gathering together round our Saviour on the mountain of the house of the Lord, to be taught His ways and to walk in His paths (Isaias ii. 3). They had been Jews, they had been Gentiles; but they are such no longer: they are Christians. Nay more; the visible bond through which that unity is effected and preserved is most clearly expressed. For around the base of the mystic hill flows the stream that springs from its side, and that stream is named on the monument the Jordan, that is, the waters of baptism; for since the day when our Lord was

* Serm. x. de temp. de Epiph. ser. iii.

baptised in the Jordan its name is synonymous with baptism. Not only, then, are they described as one fold and the sheep of one shepherd, but the visible rite by which they become so is clearly expressed. This is even more apparent from the figures in the upper compartment of the glass, if we admit as satisfactory the explanation given of them by Buonarotti. According to him, the man who is in the act of giving to, or receiving from, Christ the scroll on which the letters *INVS* are inscribed, is another representation of baptism: first, because he appears about to enter the water; secondly, because the giving in their name, "*dare nomen*," was one of the ceremonies gone through by those who were about to be baptised. In support of which view he quotes an expression of St. Gregory of Nazianzum, in his oration addressed to those who defer their baptism: "Give me your names," says the holy father, "that I may write them in a material book, to the end that God may inscribe them in His incorruptible tablets." But whatever weight the reader may be inclined to attach to this explanation of the group in the upper portion of the glass, it is certain that baptism is expressly set forth in the lower one, inasmuch as the vivifying bond which unites all the faithful in one body is therein declared. This important conclusion is still more clearly brought out by St. Augustine in a passage which is almost a commentary upon the glass I am describing. In his 137th sermon (c. vi. ed. Migne), he thus expresses himself: "The Church, made up of Jews and Gentiles, is one. You have the Lord declaring of the Pharisees, 'they sit in the chair of Moses' (Matt. xxiii. 2). But not to them only did the Lord allude, as if he wished to send those who believe in Christ to the school of the Jews, there to learn the path to the kingdom of heaven. Did not the Lord come to build up the Church, and set apart such of the Jews as had true faith, and true hope, and true charity, as the grain is separated from the straw, and make one wall of circumcision, to which should be added another wall of the foreskin of the Gentiles, He Himself being the cornerstone where these two walls, so different in their origin, might meet? Did not, therefore, this same Lord say of the union of these two peoples, 'And other sheep I have which are not of the flock' (He was addressing the Jews), 'and these also I will bring, and there shall be but one fold and one shepherd'?" Let us now see what conception of the Church could have existed in the minds of those early Christians who employed these symbolical representations to describe it. In the first place, we can gather from what has been said that they believed the Church to be universal, em-

bracing the entire human race. The children of the house of Israel and the stranger have equally their places within it; there is no distinction of Jew and Gentile. Although some may have come from the Holy City, and others from the lands where idolatry is in honour, they all enter the Church by the one door of baptism. They are like sheep that have come from many and various pastures, but are now united in one fold, and governed by the voice of one Pastor. Hearing the same divine lessons from the Author and Finisher of faith, they are brethren in the same belief as they are brethren by the same baptism. "One Lord, one faith, one baptism."

Such monuments as I have examined up to this principally regard the formation of the Church and the materials of which it is composed. There is another symbol which makes us acquainted with the sentiments of the early Christians regarding the necessity incumbent upon all of belonging to the true Church, and this symbol is the ark of Noah. It would be an endless task to catalogue the various monuments, whether paintings or inscriptions, which exhibit the ark. Moreover it would be useless, for no one denies that such monuments exist. I would rather bring forward some arguments to show that the ark of Noah has been employed by the early Christians as a figure of the Church. St. Jerome,* alluding to 1 Pet. iii. 20, speaks of "the ark which the Apostle Peter interprets as a figure of the Church;" and St. Augustine:† "No one amongst us has any doubt but that the Church was typified in the ark of Noah, inasmuch as (saving the literal sense) the house of the just man was to be exempt from the ruin that overwhelmed sinners; which truth might appear a mere conjecture of man's imagination, had not the Apostle Peter expressly declared it in his epistle." And St. Hilary of Poitiers:‡ "For since in that passage§ the ark is a figure of the Church, he who abandons the Church (seeing that he has no other ground on which to stand) is like unto the sinner, who having no place of rest in this world except the Church, prefers nevertheless to fix his dwelling in the midst of secular vanities." Finally, St. Maximus of Turin:|| "We have a figure of this in the Old Testament; for as the ark of Noah preserved safe amidst the general destruction all those who were carried in it, so also will the Church of Peter preserve unhurt in the general conflagration all those whom it contains." From these passages it is clear that the ark

* Epist. 123, ad Ageruch.

† De Unitate Ecclesiæ, n. 9.

‡ Tract. in Bal. 146, no. 12, ed. Migne.

§ Gen. viii. 7.

|| Serm. de diversis, serm. 89, de Mirabilibus, p. 639, ed. Rome.

was used by the ancient Christians as a symbol of the Church. Now, as I said before, a symbol, in order to be a true symbol, must have a tendency to produce in the mind of the beholder some striking or leading idea of the thing symbolised; it remains, therefore, that we should determine what idea the history of the ark of Noah suggests as being a leading feature in the Church. The Bible narrative would of itself at once remove all doubt on this score, even if the passages just quoted from the Fathers were not explicit in declaring that the analogy between the ark and the Church consists in this, that as the ark was the only means of escape from destruction in the Deluge, so the Church is the only means by which men can escape from the destruction of the soul. But all are obliged to endeavour to escape from spiritual death; therefore all men are obliged, by the strictest obligation, to belong to the true Church. The Church, according to the ancient Christians, is therefore not only a body in which the entire human race may meet in unity of faith and baptism, but it is a society of which whoso refuses to become a member must perish.

The symbolical figures intended to set forth the nature and qualities of the Church, considered as already constituted, now claim our attention. Of this class I will select but a single example, namely, that of the ship, and will confine myself exclusively to the discussion of the monuments in which the ship appears. It will be necessary, in the first place, to pass in review the various monuments of the kind I have collected, and afterwards to prove that the ship was certainly used by the ancient Christians as a symbol of the Church. But here I must first of all lay down some general principles to enable us to determine, with greater or less approximation to accuracy, the true date of each of these monuments. The facts upon which the truth of these principles mainly rests have been proved by Cav. De' Rossi in the letter above referred to.* The monuments in question comprise sepulchral inscriptions, gems, and carvings in ivory or bronze. In determining the age of a sepulchral inscription which bears upon it no date, it must be remembered that there are two classes of such inscriptions very unlike each other. First, there are the inscriptions which have been extracted from the Catacombs; and secondly, the inscriptions which were placed in the porches and cloisters of the basilicas and on the sepulchres aboveground. These two classes have been frequently mixed up together in the restoration of the basilicas in the sixteenth century, and this confusion has been the source of many mistakes on the part of those who attempted to deter-

* De Christ. Monumen. IXΘRN exhiben. in Spicileg. Solesm. tom. iii.

mine the date of particular inscriptions. For undoubtedly the inscriptions used in the subterranean cemeteries are more ancient than those written after the Christians had already commenced to inter their dead in cemeteries under the light of day; and although the date has never been altogether satisfactorily ascertained at which the interments in the Catacombs fell into disuse, we have every probability on our side when we fix it, at a rough calculation, about the end of the fourth century. Any inscription, therefore, which we know to have been extracted from subterranean cemeteries may be presumed to belong to that early period. This presumption becomes certainty, when we find on the inscription particular symbols which were in use among the ancient Christians only during that period of history. Of such symbols, I am concerned more especially just now with that of the $\text{ix}\theta\text{r}\text{z}$, or fish, which, as will presently be seen, appears on many of the monuments upon which I am engaged. Now Cav. De' Rossi, after a careful inspection of the monuments themselves, proves that the use of the sacred symbol of the fish was confined to the first four centuries. Out of eleven hundred inscriptions which bear a date posterior to the time of Constantine, one only occurs upon which the fish is found, and on that one in an abnormal way; whilst out of thirty similar inscriptions which bear a date prior to Constantine it occurs also once, but regularly. On the other hand, it is found on seventy-four epitaphs without date, sixty-four of which De' Rossi testifies were certainly found in the Catacombs, and, which there is every reason to believe, earlier than the first half of the fourth century. We may fix, therefore, the following as our second criterion: whenever we find on a monument the sacred symbol of the $\text{ix}\theta\text{r}\text{z}$, we may safely refer that monument to the first four centuries.

I now pass on to describe the monuments themselves. I will begin with the sepulchral inscriptions.

1. This is a sepulchral titulus, which Cav. De' Rossi knows to have been extracted from the Catacombs, and which is now in the Church of Sts. Cosmas and Damian at Anagni. The letters are elegantly shaped, and read as follows:

CASSVS DOMNINVS

Underneath is a fish, bearing a ship on its back. 2. An inscription from the cemetery of St. Agnes, edited by Boldetti* and others:

NABIRA . IN . PACE . ANIMA . DVLCIS


QVI BIXIT . ANOS . P XVI . M . V

* Osser. lib. 2, c. iv. p. 373, ed. Rome, 1720.

ANIMA . MELEIA . TITVLV . FACTV
A . PARENTES . SIGNVM . NABE .

On the corner to the right hand is seen a ship with sails expanded. It was customary to place on the outside of the sepulchre some token which might guide to the spot the relations of the deceased in after-days. Sometimes, as in the present case, the token made choice of contains a kind of allusion to the name of the person interred; thus the grave of Nabira, or Navira, is marked by the *signum nabe* or *nave*, that is, the sign of a ship. Nor does this circumstance prove that the sign so used loses in that case the symbolical signification it elsewhere may possess; for in at least three inscriptions the anchor (which is the symbol of hope) appears on the epitaphs of individuals whose names are derived from words signifying hope, *e. g.* Elpidius. 3. An inscription from the cemetery of Callistus and Pretextatus, edited by Boldetti:*

FLAVIA . SECVNDA . QVÆ . VIXIT
AN . XXXIII . BITORIANVS . BE
NEMERENTI . CONIVGI . SVE . FECIT

We have in this titulus a ship in full sail, with a large dove perched on the masthead, and looking in the direction in which the vessel is moving. We shall see presently what is the meaning of this combination of symbols. 4. An inscription, GENIALIS IN PACE, from the cemetery of Priscilla. These words are written over a vessel without mast or sails, on the stern of which sits a dove holding a palm-branch in its mouth. It is given by Perret.† 5. The same as the preceding, but without the dove; the name inscribed is BIVIUS RESTVTVS. It was found, in 1809, in the cemetery of Calepidius, and is given by Perret.‡ 6. Ship with sails full set, but no name or inscription.§ 7 and 8 have each a ship with a pharos, or lighthouse, close at hand, given respectively by Perret (p. 41, no. 10) and by Boldetti (p. 372). Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, have a simple ship, and are given by Boldetti. 13 is an epitaph in Greek belonging to Serenilla. Underneath is a vessel without masts or sails; in the upper part Boldetti|| places two doves, but Cardinal Mai¶ gives only one. 14. A large ship in full sail, with a dove on the top of the mast, looking in the direction in which the vessel is moving, namely, towards the monogram of Christ,  which is situated on the side. 15. The epitaph of Refugerius, from the cemetery of St. Helen, given by Boldetti,** which has a vessel with a helm, and

* Lib. 2, c. iv. p. 361.

† Catacombes, vol. v. pl. 32, no. 80 bis.


‡ Ibid. pl. 36, no. 109.

§ Ibid. p. 38, no. 126.

|| Lib. ii. p. 365.

¶ Tom. v. Vett. Auctt. Vat. Coll.

** Lib. ii. p. 346.

overhead the monogram  of Christ. These fifteen inscriptions, although they by no means exhaust the subject, nevertheless contain specimens of the principal combinations in which the ship is placed with other symbols on sepulchral tituli. Next in order come the gems. 16. A singularly valuable onyx, which has been made the subject of a special dissertation by Aleander. A large fish supports on its back a ship, on the cradle or watchhouse of whose mast sits a bird, with its face towards the stern of the vessel, the stern itself being occupied by a second bird looking towards the prow. Behind the mast stands a man holding the helm; in front of the mast and on the prow two other men are seen, raising their hands as if in wonder or supplication. At some little distance on the sea, Christ appears walking on the waters, and stretching forth His hand to Peter, who is sinking into the waves. Lest any doubt should exist as to the personages represented in this group, the names $\overline{\text{IHC}}$ (that is, Jesus) and $\overline{\text{PET}}$ (Peter) are respectively inscribed over their heads. 17. A gem, edited by Ficorini;* on it is seen the forepart of a ship, under which is placed the mystic fish; the yardarm, or *antennæ*, is made to form such an angle with the mast as to have all the appearance of a cross. This shape is evidently the work of design, and frequently occurs in monuments of this kind. 18. A beautiful jasper, of which a print is given by Monsignore Borgia, Secretary of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, in the frontispiece of his book *De Cruce Veliterna*. The front part bears a ship, whose mast and yardarm are joined so as to form a cross. The steersman is at his post near the helm; six rowers are visible on one side, and therefore six others are understood to be similarly engaged on the other. That the steersman is Christ, and the twelve oarsmen the twelve Apostles, is clear from the reverse of the gem, where the name $\text{IHC}\overline{\text{OV}}$, engraved in elegant style, gives a key to the mystery of the entire composition. 19. A cornelian, with front and reverse. The side bearing the inscription has been published, although imperfectly, by Ficorini;† a full sketch of both sides is given by Perret.‡ In the centre of one of the surfaces is engraved a palm-branch, around which are arranged the letters IHOENIXVA , which stand probably for $[\text{P}]\text{HOENIXVA}[\text{LE}]$. The owner's name might have been Phœnix, and the palm-branch (in Greek $\phi\omicron\iota\nu\iota\xi$) intended as an allusion to that name. On the reverse we have a ship with the mast and yardarm so arranged as to form

* Gemme, lett. tav. xi. no. 8.

† Ibid. tav. viii. no. 20.

‡ Tom. v. pl. 16, no. 37.

the letter *Tau*; which letter, as is now sufficiently proved, resembled the ancient cross in shape. In the ship are seated two persons, perhaps, says M. Perret, St. Peter and St. Paul, one at either extremity of the vessel. What amount of probability can be claimed for this opinion, we shall be better able to judge presently. This gem is now in the Biblioteca Reale at Turin. 20. A cornelian belonging to the Kircherian Museum. It presents a rare collection of almost all the symbols which were used by the early Christians. The good shepherd with the sheep on his shoulders, the cross-shaped anchor with the mystic fishes, the dove bearing the olive-branch, the lamb, the ancient cross, the letters *ixerc*, and the ship, are all engraved upon it. The ship has two tillers, and its mast is formed so as to represent the cross, which appears no less than three times in this gem. Its shape is a departure from the usual style, and bears more resemblance to the ark of Noah, as it is commonly represented on similar monuments, than to the ancient ship. The delicacy of the workmanship, which reveals a hand trained in the palmy days of art, and the presence of the *ixerc* combine to prove the great antiquity of this interesting relic. It has been published in the *Civiltà Cattolica*.* 21. A ship engraved on a kind of composition (*pâte brune*), with the mast and yardarm in the shape of a cross or *Tau*; a large helm at the stern, but no figure or inscription. It is published by Perret,† and is now in the Biblioteca Reale at Turin. 22. A ring, given by Boldetti.‡ Many such rings have been found within the sepulchres in the Catacombs bearing doves, ships, monograms of Christ, palm-branches, the letters *alpha* and *omega*, &c. engraved upon them. The one I am describing has a ship, with the sail partly spread on the mast, and by its side a large anchor, not as an appendage to the ship, but as a distinct symbol. The anchor, in Christian monuments, is generally understood of hope, although some, with M. Raoul-Rochette, think otherwise. This interpretation is correct; for the Fathers, after St. Paul,§ speak of the anchor as the image and sign of Christian hope. Hence, when I shall have proved that the ship is used as a symbol of the Church, we may apply to this gem the words of Tertullian: "The Church knows that she is a stranger upon this earth, that among externs she quickly meets with enemies; but she knows too that she has her origin, her seat, her *hope*, her grace, and her dignity in heaven."

Next follows the third class of monuments, namely, carv-

* 3d ser. vol. v. n. 168.

† Lib. 2, c. xiv. p. 502.

‡ Tom. v. pl. 16, no. 51.

§ Heb. vi. 19.

ings in ivory and bronze ; and of this class I shall adduce but two specimens.

23. An ivory from the Vatican Museum, published by Buonarotti.* It represents a ship containing three men, one holding the tiller, another leaning over the prow, so as to watch the third, who is engaged in drawing from the water into the vessel a net in which a large fish is caught. The letters IHCV are carved in good characters on the ship's side. The entire work appears to have been intended as an ornament to be placed on the top of a pillar or wand ; for the ship rests on a group of acanthus-leaves, very gracefully designed and executed. We shall presently determine what meaning is to be attached to this monument. 24. The celebrated bronze lamp-ship, now in the Gallery at Florence, and published by Bellori in his *Lucerne Antiche*,† and by Faggini.‡ It is an oil-lamp of several lights, made in the form of a ship, discovered in some excavations made on the Celian Hill, near the Church of San Stefano Rotondo. Antiquaries are agreed in declaring it to be of a date not later than the fifth century. The ship is in full sail ; the helm is governed by a man in a sitting posture, and the prow occupied by another whose hands are upraised as if in the act of preaching. To the mast is fastened a tablet with the inscription,

DOMINUS . LEGEM
DAT . SVERO
EVTROPI . VIVAS .

The design of the whole is very spirited, and the execution perfect. The learned who have treated of this monument almost universally hold that these two men are St. Peter and St. Paul ; St. Peter at the helm, and St. Paul at the prow, preaching the Gospel, according to the words of Holy Writ, —Acts xiv. 11, where he is styled the “chief speaker,” and Acts ix. 15, where he is called the “vessel of election to carry God's name before the Gentiles and kings and the children of Israel.” The arguments by which this explanation is recommended will have greater weight after the completion of the proof that the ship is undoubtedly a symbol of the Church of Christ. I now enter upon this proof.

To proceed in order, I shall prove first, that the ship on Christian monuments is intended as a symbol of some sacred object, whatever that object may be ; and secondly, that in most cases that object is the Church. But let it be understood at the outset, that I am not concerned with the ship

* Osserv. sopra alcune antiche Medaglie, p. 395, and Preface, p. xxvii.

† P. iii. tav. 31.

‡ Rom. Itin. B. Petri, p. 485.

that figures in the representations of the history of Jonas, but with the ships that have no connection whatever with that history. That a symbolical signification was attached to such ships is clear, first, from the well-known text of Clement of Alexandria (*in Pædagogico*), where, treating of the symbols which could with propriety be engraved on Christian rings, &c., he expressly includes among them the ship; his words are, "But let our signs (*signacula*) be the dove, the fish, or the ship which is borne towards heaven." Now it is undoubted that the dove and the fish were used by the early Christians as sacred symbols. The ship, therefore, was also a sacred symbol, whatever may have been the object it was intended to represent; the more so because Clement does not speak of any kind of ship, but of one which is making a voyage towards heaven. Besides, in the monuments just described, the ship is frequently placed in such a connection with objects that are manifestly symbolical, as to become altogether inexplicable and out of place in the supposition that it is not to be taken as a symbol: for example, when it is placed upon the fish, as in Nos. 1, 17, 23; or when it is marked with the sacred name, as in 18 and 23; or when it bears on its masthead the dove, as in 13, 14, and 16. Surely such combinations of objects cannot be explained, if it be said that the ship is nothing more than an ordinary ship, without any symbolical meaning. Finally, in very many of the monuments described, it was seen that the masts and yardarms of the ship were so arranged as to represent the cross, sometimes in the shape now in use, as in Nos. 17 and 18; and sometimes in the shape of the letter *Tau*, as in Nos. 19, 21. And, what is more important still, so anxious were the artists that their work should exhibit the cross, that they had no difficulty in departing from the usual shape of the ship by introducing such alteration in the position of the masts, &c., as best promoted this object. Now, unless the ship were meant as a sign of something sacred, why this departure from received forms? why all these alterations? We may therefore conclude that the figure of the ship was employed by the early Christians as a means of conveying to the mind of the beholder something more than its idea ordinarily suggests.

It now remains to be shown that the object symbolised by it was, generally speaking, the Church of Christ. I say, generally speaking; for I do not affirm that the ship represents the Church exclusively, and I am willing to allow that it may have other significations. But in most, and in the more important of the monuments above described, it is certainly a figure of the Church. It is true that we have not in this

case the same advantages as we enjoyed in the case of the figures in the mosaic of Santa Sabina, where the name underneath removed all doubt as to the subject of the representation. Nevertheless there are strong arguments to support my assertion. And in the first place, we have observed how constantly the cross is introduced in the monuments above described, and how much study has been expended by the artist to find a place for it in his composition. Now the ancient Fathers delight to describe the Church precisely as a ship which bears aloft in its centre the cross of Christ. Thus St. Hippolytus:* "The world is the sea, on whose waves the Church is tossed indeed, but perisheth not; for it bears with it a skilful Steersman, Christ; and erect in its centre carries a trophy over death, for it brings with it the cross of the Lord." And St. Ambrose:† "The Church is a ship, which voyages successfully in this world by means of the sail of the Lord's cross, filled by the breath of the Holy Ghost." Who can deny the wonderful similarity between the monuments and the description of the Church as given by these Fathers? who, therefore, can deny that the monuments represent the Church? Secondly, the ship in No. 18, besides having the cruciform mast, has also at its helm a man as to whose identity with Christ the name *IHCΩV*, on the reverse of the gem, leaves no room for doubt. Moreover it is propelled by twelve oarsmen, who are most certainly the Apostles on whom the Church is founded. Now can that ship be other than the Church, which for its steersman has Christ, and for its crew the Apostles? Hence Pseudo-Clement:‡ thus writes: "The condition of the entire Church is like unto a large ship. . . . Let, therefore, the master of the ship be God Himself; let the steersman be likened unto Christ, the watchman to the Bishop, the sailors to the priests," &c. Thirdly, the ship supported by the mystic fish in No. 16 is evidently the same as the ship under which is found a similar fish in No. 17, the which gem connects it, by means of the cruciform mast, with the whole series of cross-carrying ships. Hence, if we can succeed in determining the symbolical meaning of the ship in No. 16, we shall have thereby determined its meaning throughout the entire class. Now No. 16 contains a representation of Christ's miraculous walking on the waters, and the failure of Peter's attempt to join Him until assisted by his Master's hand, which scene the holy Fathers declare to be a figure of Christ's concern for His Church. For example, St. Augustine:§ "Let the sea, therefore, check its rage, let it at

* *De Antichristo*, n. lix.† *Ep. ad Jacob.* c. xiv.‡ *De Virg.* cap. xviii. n. 118, ed. Migne.§ *Enarr. in Psal.* xcii. n. 7, ed. Migne.

length become tranquil, let peace be given to the Christians. The sea was agitated, the vessel was tossed about; the vessel is the Church, the sea is the world. The Lord came: He walked upon the water, and calmed the waves." Nor let it be urged against this, that in No. 16 the ship is one of the figures historically necessary to complete the description of the miracle. For that something more than the Apostles' bark is there meant by it is plain from the presence of the *ixorx*, and the doves on the mast and stern. Once more, therefore, the ship is a symbol of the Church.

Finally, it has been already proved that the ship is a sacred symbol of some sort, and that it was used to convey to the mind of the beholder the idea of some sacred object. What that object was, certainly could not have escaped the holy Fathers, who lived during the period in which it was so often employed. Hence they would naturally allude to it in their writings; or at least, if they were silent as to its true meaning, would not attribute to it a sense different from the one it was ordinarily understood to convey. Now how do matters really stand? There is no object to which the Fathers so frequently compare the Church as to a ship, none whose attributes they more frequently attribute to it. This is so important for my purpose, that I will prove it at some length from the works of the Fathers themselves. Thus Pseudo-Clemens, cited above: * "The condition of the entire Church is like unto a large ship, which, through a mighty storm, carries men of divers countries, desirous of becoming citizens of a good kingdom. Let, therefore, the master of the vessel be God Himself; let the steersman be likened unto Christ, the watchman to the Bishop, the sailors to priests, the officers to deacons, the accountants to catechists, the entire multitude of the brethren to the passengers, the world to the sea, adverse winds to temptations; persecutions and dangers and all kinds of afflictions to huge waves, to the gales from land, the words of seducers, and false prophets savage and wild spots to those men who are without reason and doubt of the promises of the truth." And St. Hippolytus: † "The world is the sea, on whose waves the Church is tossed indeed, but perisheth not: for it bears with it a skilful steersman, Christ, and erect in its centre carries a trophy over death; for it brings with it the cross of the Lord. Its prow is the east, its stern the west, its hold the south, its tillers are the two Testaments; the cordage spread over it is the charity of Christ, which binds the Church; the line it draws along with it is the laver of regeneration, which renews the faithful. The breeze that im-

* Ep. ad Jacob. no. 14.

† De Antichristo, n. lix.

pels it is that Heavenly Spirit by which the faithful are sealed for God. Along with it it has iron anchors, namely, Christ's holy precepts, strong as iron: nay more, it has sailors on the right and on the left, assisting like the holy angels, by whose help the Church is defended. In the ladder which ascends aloft to the yards is the saving image of Christ's passion, attracting the faithful that they may ascend into heaven. The signs above the yards are the full array of prophets, martyrs, and Apostles, now at rest in the kingdom of Christ." And Tertullian:* "That bark was a figure of the Church, because on the sea, that is, in the world, it is tossed about by the waves, that is, by persecutions and temptations; the Lord meantime, through patience, as it were asleep, until, aroused at length by the prayers of the saints, He checks the world and restores tranquillity to His own." And St. Augustine:† "There the ships shall go.' Behold, in the very element which was the cause of terror, ships sail and sink not. By ships we understand the Churches; they go in the midst of tempests, in the midst of storms of temptations, in the midst of the waves of the world, in the midst of creatures little and great. Their steersman is Christ by the word of His cross. 'The ships shall go.' Let these ships have no fear; let them not mind much where they go, but by whom they are guided. 'These ships shall go.' What voyage can be disastrous to them when they have Christ as their pilot? They shall go in security; let them go with perseverance: they shall come to their allotted end, they shall be led to the land of rest." Again, St. Hilary:‡ "The Church is like unto a ship, and is styled so in many places; which ship, having taken on board passengers of the most different races and nations, is exposed to all the storms of the winds, and to all the commotions of the deep. So also (the Church) is harassed by the attacks of the world and of unclean spirits. For setting before our minds every kind of danger, we enter the ship of Christ, which is the Church, knowing that we are to be tossed by wind and sea." Compare also the same Father§ and St. Ambrose:|| "This man (Christ) goes on board a ship; but on board that ship in which either the Apostles sail or Peter fishes (Luke v. 3). Nor is that a mean vessel which is led out into the deep, that is, which is separated from unbelievers. For why is a ship chosen as a seat for Christ from which to teach the multitude, if not because

* De Bapt. 1214 A.

† Enarr. in Psal. ciii. in vers. 26, no. 5.

‡ Comment. in Matt. vii. 9.

§ Ibid. xiii. 1, 2, and c. xv. no. 10.

|| De Virginit. c. xviii. v. 118.

the Church is a ship which voyages successfully in this world by means of the sail of the Lord's cross, filled by the breath of the Holy Ghost? It is in this ship that Peter fishes; and he is commanded to fish at one time with the hook, at another with nets. What a wondrous mystery is here! for that is a spiritual fishing, in which he is commanded to cast into the world the hook of doctrine." And St. Maximus of Turin: * "He entered into a boat, and crossed over. Christ enters into the ship of His Church to calm at all times the waves of the world, in order that He may conduct in tranquillity to their heavenly country those who believe in Him, and may render citizens of His kingdom those whom He has made sharers in His humanity. Christ, therefore, has no need of the ship, but the ship has need of Christ; because, without His divine guidance, the ship of the Church cannot arrive at the port of heaven through such and so many perils over the sea of this world." And again (Ser. 90): "Behold, therefore, this ship is not a ship which is handed over to Peter as if to perish, but it is the Church which is intrusted to the government of Christ. For the Church is a ship which is wont not to kill, but to vivify those who are raised into it from out of the world's tempests, as from out of the waves of the sea. For as the boards of the fisher's boat hurt and keep prisoners the fishes taken from the deep, so the ship of the Church gives life to men when it receives them rescued from the storm. The Church, I say, gives life to them, and vivifies them, being as it were dead. For this is signified by the word 'vivify,' since that alone can be said to have been vivified which some time before was lifeless. Peter, therefore, is said to be about to reanimate the tempest-stricken, and those overwhelmed by the billows of the world; and he who wondered at the vessel filled with struggling fishes, was still more to wonder at the Church laden with a multitude of living men. This entire lesson contains a mystic meaning. For when in a former passage the Lord, sitting in the ship, said to Peter, 'Pull out into the deep, and let down your nets for a draught,' He does not teach him so much to cast into the deep his draw-net as to preach the Word; He does not, I will say, teach him to enclose fishes in a net, but to gather men together by faith. For faith effects upon the earth what the net does in the waves: for as the net suffers nothing to escape that it has caught, so faith does not allow any one to err whom it has once gained over; and as the net in its folds conveys all that has been taken to the ship, so does he (Peter) bring to rest, as it were in his bosom, all whom he has assembled around him."

* Hom. cviii. in cap. ix. Matt. p. 357.

Finally, in the *Liber Hymnorum* of the ancient Irish Church, in a note to the hymn written by Secundinus in honour of St. Patrick, we find the following expression: "The sea is the present world; the ship is the Church; the pilot is the preacher, who guides it to the port of life; the port is the life that is perpetual." Now I repeat, if the ship had been used by the early Christians as a symbol of any sacred object other than the Church, would not these passages of the Fathers be calculated to mislead and confound the faithful rather than to edify and instruct them? I may consequently consider it as proved, that the ship is a symbol of the Church.

I have now established the fact that the ship was a symbol of the Church familiar to the early Christians, and common on their monuments; it remains for me to determine the more important question, what is the precise teaching conveyed under this symbol? or, if my readers do not recognise any conscious didactic effort in its employment, what were the ideas familiar to the early Christian mind that found their universally recognised expression in the sign of the ship? As I have already drawn out my paper to an inconvenient length, I must ask leave to postpone the answer to this question to your next Number.

C.

DARWIN ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.*

THE fathers of the last synod of Oscott proclaimed that the battle of controversy is no longer against sectarianism, but against infidelity; and the publication and reception of the remarkable book which I am about to discuss is a startling fulfilment of their prediction. The infidelity we have to combat is no longer the grinning sarcasm of Voltaire, or the blasphemous buffoonery of a half-sceptical libertine; but it is the calm philosophic discussion of men with their minds stocked with facts and instances, who, if they are without metaphysics enough to see the fallacies of their induction, yet earnestly believe the cogency of their proof. When such men come to conclusions quite incompatible with practical faith in any religion whatever, though the mischief is as great, the means of repression are not as handy as in the case of more vulgar infidels. It would be not only an anachronism, but a folly, to say that their case was one rather for the

* *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.* By C. Darwin, M.A. London, Murray.

halter or fagot than for argument. They profess to love truth for itself as strongly as we do, and any hint of persecution would only tend to gird their brows with the appearance of a martyr's wreath. Now where forcible repression is impossible, either argument or ignorance is the only resource left for faith.

The decision between ignorance and argument is hard. Ignorance doubtless has its advantages, even in metaphysics, where most ideas are clear enough till we meditate upon them. Matter and spirit, says St. Augustine, are things which we know by not knowing, and know not by knowing—*cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci*. "I find no difficulty in time or space," says Charles Lamb, "for I never think about them." So the mysteries of religion are clear to the unsophisticated intellect, and only grow dark as they are refined upon. The humble believer cannot be troubled with difficulties which he never thinks about; he is ensconced behind earthen ramparts that are not to be breached by the batteries of argument. This is the fortress of ignorance; a safe retreat in some ages, but perhaps untenable by those whose lot it is to live with their eyes open in the midst of the controversies and movements of the present time. A blind confidence in the inert force of ignorance is sure to lead some minds to confound ignorance with the simplicity of faith. Then it naturally follows that the test of a religious truth is its simplicity; it must be something which "he who runs can read," and which needs no defence by subtleties of argument. The next step is fatal. In philosophy or literature, or even in common conversation, we are all liable to find hints or arguments which breed in the mind serious objections to some dogmas—say, to those of the Trinity and Incarnation. These objections may be of the subtlest nature, and therefore may require the most subtle replies; but the theory of simplicity teaches its advocates to say, that they cannot believe any doctrine to be necessary which needs the intricacies of philosophical distinctions for its defence. They do not see the hypocrisy of keeping indirect avenues open for the admission into the mind of all kinds of literary and scientific difficulties against religion, and of then refusing to argue directly against these difficulties, on the ground that no religion can be true which requires so subtle a defence. In this way dogma after dogma has been scratched out from the liberal Christian's creed. The difference between Arianism and orthodoxy was called a mere "dispute of words and of letters." The judicious Hooker, who is staunch for the faith of Athanasius, yields to the "simplicity"

theory in the matter of Transubstantiation; "simplicity of faith," he says, "is preferable to that knowledge which, curiously sifting what it should adore, and disputing too boldly of that which the wit of man cannot search, chilleth for the most part all warmth of zeal, and bringeth soundness of belief many times into great hazard."* If the simplicity theory requires that doctrine after doctrine is to be given up as each enters the sphere of controversy, on the ground that the subtlety of defence which is brought out by the subtlety of attack is a sign, if not of the falsehood, at least of the triviality and indifference of a doctrine, then certainly the advocates of that theory must now be prepared to yield to Mr. Darwin's attack, and to resign all faith in God as Creator. Those believers, on the contrary, who have confidence that all truth will be ultimately found to harmonise, will enter into the controversy without fear either of the subtleties with which they will be forced to repel his subtle attacks, or of admitting whatever truths in the physical order he seems to have established on a fair foundation.

Mr. Darwin's theory has no novelty in its elements, much in its construction and compactness. Its real scope is rather mythological than scientific; for it professes to give an account of the origin of man, of animals, and of plants. The development of all organisms from one primeval organism was as integral a feature of some heathen mythologies† as is creation of Christianity. The idea was patronised by the whimsical Monboddo and the brutal Robinet merely in opposition to religion; Lamarck was the first to give it any scientific pretensions. Nature, he said, by the movement developed in a globule of liquid, formed the first infusory monad; and by gradual additions to this rudimentary organism, she proceeded to the development of the most perfect beings. Thus a monad would become a mollusc, then an articulated animal, then a fish, a reptile, a bird, and at last a mammal,—first a ruminant, then a rodent, then a carnivorous beast, and at length an ape, which would ultimately develop into a man. The author of *Vestiges of the Creation*, while he familiarised this theory to the imaginative, rather damaged its cause with men of science. The idea of these writers was, that the change took place by a spontaneous adaptation of organs to circumstances. The monkey's tail would wear off, and his hind hands become feet, when he took to sitting and walking, and became man; the land-bird's neck would gradually lengthen as it sat on the brink of the stream to fish.

* Eccl. Polity, V. lxvii. 12.

† For instance, the Persians derived all beings from the bull Abudad.

In place of this imaginary adaptability, Mr. Darwin has substituted a force which exists *in rerum natura*, and really brings about certain changes in organic beings under our observation. This force he calls "natural selection;" variations, he says, occur probably in all animals and plants in the course of generations, just as mankind has become negro or Caucasian, and as various new breeds of cattle are continually being produced. These variations would probaby be propagated, —as negroes give birth to negroes, and not to white men, and as gardeners and cattle-breeders secure the improvements they happen to find in their seedlings and young stock. In nature, an analogous principle of selection is always at work; for "if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised." Thus the various organs were perfected, not by being created for any final cause, but by accidental improvements being seized upon and perpetuated, because they gave their possessors advantages in the struggle for existence. Here, again, I must deny Mr. Darwin's originality. Aristotle quotes opponents who said, "It does not rain in order that the corn may grow, but because vapour carried upwards is cooled, and is precipitated; it is a mere accident that rain makes the corn grow." So with the organs of animals; teeth were not made to eat with, but animals without teeth would perish helplessly; and in general the same may be said of all the parts of an animal: "for when the very same combinations happened to be produced which the law of final causes would have called into being, those combinations, which proved to be advantageous to the organism, were preserved; while those which were not advantageous perished, and still perish, like the minotaurs and sphinxes of Empedocles."* By the aid of this natural selection acting through cosmical epochs of millions of ages, Mr. Darwin thinks it *proved* that all animals have descended in one direct genealogical line "from at most four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number;" and *probable* that "all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from one primordial form, into which life was first breathed" (p. 484).

The perpetual oscillations of science alternately obscure

* "Οπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἐνέκᾳ τοῦ ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα. Arist. Phys. ii. c. 8.

and illustrate the doctrines of religion. A short time ago, naturalists accepted the perpetual recurrence of miraculous acts of creation during the geological epochs as a proved fact; and they admitted the late appearance of man on the earth. But they denied the unity of mankind; they divided our race into from five to fifteen species, and gave us *une quinzaine d'Adams* instead of one. Mr. Darwin, on the contrary, assures us "that all the individuals of the same species, and all the closely-allied species of most genera, have within a not very remote period descended from one parent, and have migrated from some one birthplace" (p. 486). He connects, almost as cause and effect, the production of new and improved forms with the extinction of the old (p. 317), and therefore admits that man will one day perish, though instead of being swept away by a catastrophe, he will be improved off the face of creation by some superior race, some Demogorgon which will proceed from his loins. But Mr. Darwin does not stop here. "In the distant future," he prophesies, "I see open fields for more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation,—that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light also will be thrown on the origin of man and his history" (p. 488). It will be proved that cellular tissue in one stage of development vegetates, in another walks, in another feels and sees, in another acts by instincts, and finally thinks; and man's descent will be traced, proximately perhaps, from an Adam the offspring of a baboon, and ultimately from a monad through a slug.

Mr. Darwin's book contains two elements, intimately blended. One is the mythological conclusion just enunciated, which he props up with the traditional apothegm, *natura non facit saltum*; the other is his accumulation and arrangement of scientific facts. The first is fabulous, the second is most striking; but between the two there is as great a gulf as between the experiments and the conclusions of the alchemists, and no argument will ever logically pass from one to the other. Yet, unaccountably enough, his reviewers have very generally admitted the validity of his process, and have declared that he is only to be met on his own ground; that is to say, that whereas he has chosen to build on physical arguments a metaphysical conclusion that is subversive of psychology, metaphysics, and theology, all these sciences must cover their mouths, and await with resignation the decision of physical science, their new "mother and mistress." "The sufficiency of his hypothesis," says the *Times*, "must be tried by the tests of science (*i. e.* physical science) alone,

if we are to maintain our position as the heirs of Bacon and the acquitters of Galileo." If we think Mr. Darwin's hypothesis physically plausible, we are not to be deterred from holding it by the trifling consideration of its incompatibility with any faith in the spirituality of the soul or the creative action of God.

So far as words go, Mr. Darwin declines to enter on the question of the "origin of the primary mental powers, or of life itself" (p. 207). But this reticence is not real. He is full of disdain for the notion of creation, and if he must admit it, he would thrust it as far back as possible into the abyss of time (as a schoolboy's all-sufficient excuse for the breaking of a window is, that it was done ever so long ago); for even the Creator's claims may be barred by a scientific statute of limitations. Having thus "jumped the world to come," he turns round and attacks those who boggle at the leap:

"These authors," he says, "seem no more startled at a miraculous act of creation than at an ordinary birth. But do they really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's history certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues? Do they believe that at each supposed act of creation one individual or many were produced? Were all the infinitely numerous kinds of plants and animals created as eggs or seed, or as full grown? and in the case of mammals, were they created bearing the false marks of nourishment from the mother's womb?"* Although naturalists very properly demand a full explanation of every difficulty from those who believe in the mutability of species, on their own side they ignore the whole subject of the first appearance of species in what they consider reverent silence" (p. 483).

That is, in a silence which only differs in its qualifying adjective from that wherewith Mr. Darwin slurs over the first origin of life. The adroitness with which he throws a burden of proof which he declines to bear himself on the shoulders of his opponents is very noteworthy. In all this I accuse him of no conscious unfairness, but only of a temporary forgetfulness of the limits of his hypothesis.

Mr. Darwin has not the slightest expectation that his theory can ever be proved by a rigid induction of facts. Even if kangaroos were really derived from bears, "we should not be able to recognise one species as the parent of another, if we were to examine them ever so closely, unless we likewise possessed many of the intermediate links between their past, or parent, and their present states; and

* The author is evidently alluding to Mr. Goss's foolish though well-intentioned essay *Omphalos*. The question there discussed is not new, as may be seen from *Hudibras*.

these many links *we could hardly ever expect to discover*, owing to the imperfection of the geological record" (p. 464). Besides this, his proofs are all capable of a different interpretation. "I am well aware that scarcely a single point is discussed in this volume on which facts cannot be adduced, often apparently leading to *conclusions directly opposite* to those at which I have arrived" (p. 2). And very many of them are only founded on our ignorance and inability to answer his questions,—“If we make due allowance for our ignorance of the effects of climate, . . . if we remember how profoundly ignorant we are with respect to the means of transport, . . . I think that the difficulties in believing that all the individuals of the same species, wherever located, have descended from the same parents, are not insuperable” (p. 406). Objections which, if admitted, are fatal to his theory he obviates by an arbitrary hypothesis. For instance, if his theory be true, the silurian strata cannot represent the dawn of life on the globe; yet Sir R. Murchison and his school declare they do, and ask how it is that, while they are so marvellously perfect, all the assumed lower fossiliferous strata have been destroyed. Mr. Darwin “can give no satisfactory answer” (p. 307). “The case at present must remain inexplicable; and may be truly urged as a valid argument against the views here entertained” (p. 308). Mr. Darwin, then, cannot prove that any one real species has ever had its origin from any other; much less can he prove that all genera and species together have descended from a single parent.

Mr. Darwin is perfectly conscious of many flaws in his argument. I will examine one fundamental fallacy of which he does not seem to be conscious. Any one can see that his hypothesis requires an *unlimited* power of progressive variation in the organism; that any law of “reversion,” or the return of varieties to their former type, would cast the greatest suspicion on his whole view, by giving plausibility to an old definition of species which has been accepted in France.* Sundry facts, such as the unexpected reappearance of obliterated peculiarities in breeds of birds and beasts, and the alleged return of domesticated animals, when turned wild, to their original type, have hitherto led naturalists to suppose that species, whatever may be the test of their being so, have only the power of oscillating between two limits, and not of

* “A species is a being furnished with organs, separate or united, by which it can perpetuate itself in space and time, with its own properties and qualities more or less developed in a certain *laxum*, having its *maxima* and *minima* determined by circumstances, but impossible to be transgressed without destruction to the organism.” The term *laxum*, or arc of vibration of a loosely suspended cord, strikes me as peculiarly happy.

developing in a line of endless divergence without return, and of losing for ever all their original properties and qualities. I cannot satisfy myself that Mr. Darwin has seen the weight of this objection. He fully recognises the tendency of varieties to revert to the original type of the species, especially when crossed. And he tries to prove that the horse, ass, zebra, quagga, and hemionus are all varieties descended from some single progenitor marked like a zebra (p. 167), by the fact of the hybrids of these animals so often having rudimentary marks of the kind. The law of variation, combined with the law of reversion, seems to point to the conclusion that variation is limited, and that whenever the limits are approached, the tendency is not to further variation, but to a return towards the original type; in other words, that variability is not indefinitely progressive, but oscillatory within definite limits. I should be diffident in advancing this objection against so accomplished a naturalist as Mr. Darwin, had I not observed in equally accomplished men the same tendency to rush to extreme conclusions in other branches of science. Astronomers supposed that the planetary orbits were ever accumulating their mutual disturbances, and diverging further and further from their original position, till they should reach a point where the balance would be upset, and a mighty catastrophe would naturally overwhelm the whole solar system. All this hypothesis was refuted by Lagrange, who demonstrated the stability of the orbital inclinations and eccentricities, and of the mean distances and periods of the planets; and thus proved that the movement is not one of perpetual divergence, but only an oscillation about a centre, and that the disturbances, when verging towards the threatened catastrophe, begin to reverse their action, and to restore the whole system to its original position, and thus guarantee its stability by an exquisitely contrived plan of compensation.* Some new Lagrange will one day refute Mr. Darwin, and deliver us from the mental catastrophe of being forced to believe ourselves to be only developed apes. Another analogous case may be found in chemistry. As Mr. Darwin believes that all organisms descend from one parent, so alchemists and chemists have believed that all elements are only various forms of one primordial matter. Sir Humphry Davy wrote in 1809, "Water is the basis of all the gases; and oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, ammonia, nitrous acid, &c., are merely electrical forms of water, which probably is the only matter without power, and capable, as it receives power or change in its electricity, of assuming the

* See Sir J. Herschell's *Popular Astronomy*, part ii. ch. xii. xiii.

various forms hitherto considered as elementary."* Liebig has painfully refuted a view lately popular, that certain elements, such as phosphorus, carbon, and lime, were secreted, as it were, and created by organic beings out of other elements. Mr. Darwin seems to incline to this view, when he adduces the nodules of phosphates and carbonates in strata below the silurian as evidence of the existence of organised life during their deposition. However consistent this opinion may be with his other theories, his faith in it is not calculated to give us any great confidence in the sobriety of his judgment.

It appears to me very remarkable that Mr. Darwin gives himself so little trouble to clear this difficulty. He contents himself with asserting, that "there would be great difficulty in proving" that domestic species, run wild, gradually, but certainly, revert to their aboriginal stocks. He holds it certain that, with care, we can preserve and improve our domestic breeds for an almost infinite number of generations; but adds, that "when under nature the conditions of life do change, variations and reversions of character probably do occur" (pp. 14, 15). In his discussion (p. 111) upon "divergence of character," he says nothing whatever as to the checks imposed by the counter law of reversion; and (p. 481) contents himself with summing up—"it cannot be proved that the amount of variation in the long course of ages is a limited quality." I must beg the attention of the reader to this logical figure. Horace tells us,

"Nil agit exemplum litem qui lite resolvit."†

He proves nothing who solves one difficulty by another. Mr. Darwin claims the utmost extent for his hypothesis, which he owns he cannot prove, of the infinite variability of the species, but refuses to admit that the law of reversion has one tittle more extent of application than it is already proved to possess; that is, he only makes out his case by enormous exaggeration of the principle which he selects for his patronage, and by denying to the compensating principle, whose existence and reality he admits, any thing more than bare facts demonstrate. He allows full play to his own imagination, while he requires his opponents to adhere strictly to proved facts.

But while I deny the truth of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis *in rerum natura*, I do not in the least disparage its utility in a scientific point of view. No "disciple of Bacon" would deny that a hypothesis may be useful without being true.

* Dr. Davy's *Life and Correspondence of Sir H. Davy*, p. 129. It is superfluous to say that this was not Sir Humphry's matured view.

† Serm. xi. iii. 103.

"Doctrina Democriti de atomis," says the father of modern science, "aut vera est, aut ad demonstrandum utiliter adhibetur" (Bacon, *Works*, vol. ix. p. 53, ed. 1826). The alchemists and Davy made their discoveries on the hypothesis of the unity of the matter that underlies all forms. Mr. Darwin's theory may lead to equally splendid results. It may be an excellent rule of classification; we may admit hypothetically that "the natural system is a genealogical arrangement, in which we have to discover the lines of natural descent by the most permanent characters, however slight their vital importance may be" (p. 479), for "we shall never probably disentangle the inextricable web of affinities between the members of any one class; but when we have a distinct object in view (to trace the descent), and do not look to some unknown plan of creation, we may hope to make sure but slow progress" (p. 434). It is precisely this *utility* for scientific purposes which is, in Mr. Darwin's view, the chief evidence of the *truth* of his theory, as appears by his summing up of the chapter on classification (xiii.): "These classes of facts (classification, morphology, embryology) seem to me to proclaim so plainly that the innumerable species, genera, and families of organic beings with which this world is peopled have all descended, each within its own class or group, from common parents, and have all been modified in the course of descent, that *I should without hesitation adopt this view, even if it were unsupported by other facts or arguments*" (p. 458). After this, I am not surprised to find him owning the *logical*, as opposed to the inductive, nature of his hypothesis,—"*there is no logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of perfection through natural selection*" (p. 204); or to see him appealing to scholastic testimony,—"*on my theory of natural selection, we can clearly understand the full meaning of that old canon in natural history, natura non facit saltum*" (p. 206, &c.). He clearly has yet to learn the scientific distinction between the *truth* and the *utility* of a hypothesis.

And if he exaggerates the value of his own theory, he depreciates with equal unfairness that of all others. Properly speaking, he recognises no theory but his own; he talks as if some extra-scientific, unknown, and arbitrary creationism was the only antagonist to his *natural selection*. He can only imagine "independent creation" as a series of arbitrary acts without order or plan. With Mr. Buckle, he seems to think that will is incompatible with law, order, or average; with Mr. Baden Powell, he supposes that because the "idea of creation is not from science,"* therefore it cannot be located in science,

* Third series of Essays, p. 250.

or assigned a place in the phenomena of which science takes account. This new order of metaphysicians refuse to allow that any thing which has physical consequences can be the result of a metaphysical or divine action; they cut the knot of the communion between spirit and matter by denying the existence, or at least the action, of spirit. If we concede this view, of course all evidence of plan in the succession of species is an argument against creation; with such an idea of creation, not only is the law of reversion, or the law of variability, inexplicable, but every other possible or impossible physical fact. A definition of creation is assumed which renders it impossible for the creationist to win; and then he is challenged to argue, and warned that he must argue solely on the data of physical science! Nothing exhibits the feebleness of Mr. Darwin's dialectical powers more vividly than his senseless challenges to those who hold the theory of creation to explain by it the various facts he adduces. When the fact is once admitted that a unity of plan runs through all creation, that all organised beings are formed on a scale graduated from a single type, and branching out into various developments, then I maintain that the appreciation of the fact is not in the least altered, whether we cut up the scale into various degrees, each occupied by a distinct kind of being, capable of genealogical variation within the limits of that degree (and perhaps a little beyond, so as to make provision for the interlacing of genera), or whether we give a unity to the genealogical tree, and actually deduce all beings from one common progenitor. Nor need the creationist be troubled with the facts of morphology, and the tendency of the family type to perpetuate itself even in organs that have become useless; this is only a proof that one plan runs through the scale. Morphological similarity need be no greater proof of identity of descent than morphological similarity of crystallisation in minerals need prove identity of their constituent elements. So with embryology. If the creation is built on a single type variously developed, if man is only the ultimate perfection of the animal kingdom, and if each creature is to be developed from the simplest germ to its highest perfection, it would be highly probable beforehand that the embryo of the most perfect organism must go through stages of similarity to the less perfect. If at one period of our existence we resemble worms, it is no reason that we were once worms; unless Mr. Darwin, after rejecting Christianity as mythological, will accept the revelation of the Samoan islanders, who will teach him how the goddess Tuli planted wild vines, and then pulled them up and threw them into heaps, where they corrupted, and

bred worms, into which Tuli sent spirits, and they became men and women.

I have said that Mr. Darwin's theory is to be divided into two parts, the mythological and the scientific. He seems to suppose that no one who does not hold his mythological hypothesis can admit his scientific facts, and the scientific laws which they imply. In the first place, then, the creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual "catastrophes." Creation is not a miraculous interference with the laws of nature, but the very institution of those laws. "In the institution of nature," says St. Augustine, "we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of nature."* Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion, they admitted without difficulty the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by *law*. They held that when God said, "let the waters produce," "let the earth produce," He conferred forces on the elements of earth and water which enabled them naturally to produce the various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to the elements throughout all time. After the flood, says St. Augustine, it was not necessary that animals should be conveyed to the oceanic islands, as the earth still retained the power of producing them. This power was held to be manifested daily in the "equivocal generation" of frogs, mice, and insects out of the ground by the rays of the sun, moon, and stars. "The word of God," says St. Basil,† "runs through creation, and operates from the beginning to the end of things. Nature, set in motion by this one *fiat*, continues her unchanging work of generation and dissolution, preserving the original type in the succession of kinds unto the end, producing horses from horses, and lions from lions. No lapse of time destroys or obscures the animal type; nature is as fresh as on the morning of her creation. The *fiat*, 'let the earth produce the living soul,' cleaves to the ground, and the earth never tires of obedience. Some creatures receive their being from parents; others are still seen to spring from the earth, as locusts after rain, and numberless kinds of insects, as well as mice and frogs. After rain in hot weather, the country about Thebes in Egypt is immediately full of field-mice; eels too are produced from mud, and not from eggs or other mode of

* "In primâ institutione naturæ non quæritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. ii. sup. Gen. ad lit. c. i." St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 67, art. 1 ad 3.

† Hexaem. Hom. ix. p. 81.

generation." The creationists could receive these or any other facts, or supposed facts, on what they considered good authority; they only demanded that these things should not be considered the results of chance, or the inherent powers of matter independent of God. St. Thomas blames Avicenna, not for considering these powers to be inherent in the elements, but to be inherent in them without reference to God's creation. "Avicenna held that all animals may be produced, without propagation, by a due mixture of the elements, even in the way of nature: but this cannot hold; *for nature is constant in her mode of operations*, and animals which spring from parents cannot naturally be produced in another way. The formative force resides either in the seed, when the beings are generated from seed, or in the celestial bodies, when the beings are generated from corruption. In either case, the material principle is either an element or something elemental; not that water or earth has in itself the power of producing all animals, as Avicenna held, but their capacity of being generated from elemental matter by virtue of seed or of the stars is derived from the powers originally conferred on the elements."* Roger Bacon asserts, on Avicenna's authority, a fact that would have been easily credited by Lamarck,—“According to Avicenna, nature obeys the thoughts of the soul; this he proves by the example of the hen, that was so proud of her victory over a cock, that spurs grew on her heels.”† Ecclesiastical writers quote Hippocrates, who asserts that certain Scythians had compressed their infants' heads till the conical form of skull had become hereditary. They also believe that monsters, more like beasts than human beings, may be born of women, and they assert the specific difference of these monsters from men by forbidding their baptism.‡ And they have no difficulty in recognising the various races of white and black men, of patriarchs who lived nearly a thousand years, and of giants like Og or Goliath, to be all descended from one Adam. Moreover they most fully recognised the truth that there are no leaps in nature; that the chain of life is connected by the most gradual differences. There is a remarkable passage, too long to quote, in the first chapter of Nemesis, Bishop of Emesa in the fourth century, *De Natura Hominis*; and Father Nieremberg, in the sixteenth century, writes of nature, “There is no gap, no interruption, no dispersion of forms; they are mutually connected, as link with link.”§ It is clear, then, that the doctrine of creation

* Sum. 1, q. 69, art. 2.

† Opus tertium, p. 96.

‡ *E. g.* see Tournely *De Baptismo*, q. 3, art. 3, § utrum monstrosi baptizari debeant.

§ *Historia Naturæ*, lib. iii.

does not prevent us from recognising as truths, not only the universal reign of law, but also the most strange origin for different races. If the ancient saints did not adopt the conclusions of modern science, it is not because they would have condemned them, but because they knew nothing about them; as Roger Bacon says, "No wonder if the ancient saints did not approve these sciences, for they did not know of their possibility. It is one thing not to approve, another to condemn."* On one point they were agreed, and that is, that the law of creation is no exceptional rule that acts by fits and starts, by catastrophes and miraculous interpositions; but an equable ever-present force, embracing all nature as the ocean embraces the land, and active throughout the whole duration of the world.

These quotations show that the believers in creation have a considerable *laxum* for the oscillations of scientific thought; and that however they may dissent from the mythological part of Mr. Darwin's theory, they can investigate and appreciate his facts and his inductions with as much consistency and freedom as the infidel can. If we bear this in mind, we shall perhaps avoid the great fault which Mr. Darwin has fallen into. Simply because a hypothesis is convenient for his classifications, and affords a plausible solution of a number of facts, he adopts it not merely as useful, but as true; and this, though it is as detrimental to other branches of science as it is useful to his own. If it destroys theology, natural and revealed, psychology, and metaphysics, what cares he? They must be reconstructed on his new basis. I must own that men on the other side have acted in a similar way. Simply for the benefit of an unauthoritaded interpretation of certain texts of Scripture, controversialists have exhibited a desire to silence and to crush whole branches of natural investigation. This they conceived was for the benefit of religion; and the "religious world" has been hitherto the chief offender in disregarding all other sciences for the imagined behoof of its own. Often enough it was merely a screen for the idleness, ignorance, and timidity, which sooner or later infect the adherents of established opinions, whether religious, political, and scientific, and drive them to discountenance and even to persecute any idea which seems to endanger their own, without any previous inquiry into its truth or its real bearing. Galileo is the tritest example of this tendency; a better one perhaps would be Kepler, who was at the same time persecuted for his astronomical opinions by the Lutheran pastors; for the Protestants of that day, being much more dry sticklers for

* *Opus tertium*, p. 26.

the letter of Scripture, were on that account much less indulgent to the free thought of science than the Catholics: but the truth is general for all subjects of thought. After any principle of natural science has found its way into popular opinion, and has become mixed up with belief, as soon as a naturalist controverts it, the first impulse of the public is to cry wolf, as if to protect the faith of the simple, but without pity or feeling for the difficulties and distresses of the learned. When geology first demonstrated that death had reigned in the animal kingdom for ages before Adam fell, popular religion was moved to its depths. Milton had declared that it was after the fall that "beasts with beasts 'gan war;"—to say that beast ate beast before Adam ate the apple was "flat burglary" in the judgment of many a well-meaning Dogberry of the religious world. Yet what had ever been the verdict of scientific theology? "To say," writes St. Thomas,* "that animals now fierce and carnivorous would have been gentle in that state (Paradise), is altogether irrational—*omnino irrationabile*." Truly I may repeat the sentiment of another great man of the age of St. Thomas: "The saints never condemned many an opinion which the moderns think ought to be condemned;"† though, as he continues, "there never was a time when novelties were not spoken against, even by holy and good men, wise in all other matters, except in those which they foolishly condemned."‡ It is a general law that the present time always reflects upon society the average mediocrity of all mankind; every timid old woman, every ignorant peasant, every half-educated pretender, contributes a share towards the stock of prejudices and opinions which represents the living popular mind. But time lets the worthless wither, and charitably casts a veil over the errors of the wise: their foolishness is forgotten; their reason still lives. The controversial powers of Bellarmine are not now judged of by his adventures with Galileo, nor those of St. Boniface by his condemnation of Virgilius. The untenable condemnations pronounced by the ancients are no longer remembered; their decisions have been sifted, and the clarified result comes down to us as calm pure reason. But with the moderns the case is different; he that cries loudest makes most noise, and the clear note of wisdom, which is destined alone to vibrate on in time, is for the present smothered in the bustle and noise of the multitude. Hence, though, as Friar Bacon complains, even holy men have ever joined the mob in condemning novel truths, yet on a large scale,

* Sum. 1, q. 96, art. 1 ad 2.

† Roger Bacon, Opus tertium, c. ix. p. 27.

‡ Ib. p. 28.

and in review, intolerance belongs only to the moderns, to the multitude that surrounds us. This is an evil which seems to me quite irremediable, though it is productive of the worst results. In the time of Roger Bacon, science was still faithful to the Church; but he foresaw, and wrote to the Pope to warn him, that if it were treated as Churchmen were even then beginning to treat it, a schism must ensue. In three centuries that schism was completed; and Christian controversialists gave a practical exemplification of the proverb, "A man can make even his own dog bite him." It is possible to tease our best friend till he turns upon us and rends us. There is a tendency in all religious bodies towards intolerance in all matters of opinion, towards an unwillingness to allow the few to hold sentiments which differ from those of the many; there is a tendency to force all thought into the mould of the average mediocrity. There could be no surer way of offending men of original views, or of tempting them to degrade opinions that are at first only novel or paradoxical into real and conscious attacks upon religion.

R. S.

MILL ON LIBERTY.

AGREEABLY to the plan proposed in page 75 of this volume, certain particular propositions contained in Mr. Mill's Essay have now to be examined.

The line of argument followed in the first part of this article tends, though by a different road, to the same general conclusion with that of the Essay, namely, that the *liberty* of thought and discussion should be entire. For it need hardly be said that if the lawfulness, at the present day, of coercion to the true faith be denied, the lawfulness of any coercion from it is denied *à fortiori*. That, indeed, could not at any time have been legitimate, according to the premises laid down, since the third condition of success could by no possibility be fulfilled in the case of the coercion of Catholics by Protestants. No Lutheran or Anglican, however convinced he might be of the truth of his own opinions, could deny the existence of a large external body, ready to extend its sympathy to any Catholics whom he might attempt to coerce, and to encourage them in at least moral resistance. Protestant coercion cannot, therefore, by the nature of things, attain to more than *political* success. But to maintain that discussion ought to be perfectly *free*, is quite a different proposition from main-

tainings, as Mr. Mill does, that it is essentially necessary to the profitable holding of any truth. Mr. Mill speaks as if human improvement were entirely dependent on the culture of the ratiocinative faculties. In his view, an opinion is profitless to the holder if believed merely because others believe it; unless we know the adversary's case, we do not properly and efficaciously know our own. This would be true, if it were granted that whatever opinions a person may hold are either false or but partially true; for then discussion would either bring out the falsehood, so inducing us to renounce it,—a decided gain,—or it would make us appreciate and mentally appropriate the complementary truth, which would be also a gain. But assume that the opinion is entirely true, and also that it relates to matters in which the deepest and most vital interests of the soul of man are concerned. The utmost that the exercise of the ratiocinative faculties can now effect, will be to induce the conviction that the balance of probability lies on the side of the opinion. For, from the nature of the case, since the opinion relates to matters removed from the criticism of the senses, or of any faculty judging according to sense, physical or scientific certainty of the truth of the opinion is unattainable. Take as an obvious instance the opinion of the immortality of the soul. But now, if the ratiocinative faculties be not appealed to, is the opinion therefore necessarily a sterile encumbrance on the mind, and a clog on its free working? Evidently not. There are other faculties,—the contemplative, the illustrative, the imaginative faculties, to say nothing of the sentiments and emotions,—which may be freely and largely exercised, while all the while the absolute truth of the opinion is assumed; and it cannot be denied that the exercise of these, no less than of the ratiocinative faculty, is calculated to deepen and enlarge the mind. Any one who understands what is meant by religious meditation will see at a glance the truth of what is here asserted, that a man's belief, though its grounds be not questioned, may be to him a vital and invaluable possession. He who, without questioning, has *realised* his opinion, holds it at last, not because it is the custom, not because others hold it, but because he has made it his own, and feels it by the testimony of his own consciousness to be true. Meditation upon it has brought out relations, before unperceived, with other truths; has presented it under various images, and illustrated it by various analogies; has seen it hold water under a wide range of circumstances, and tested its purifying and elevating influence upon many various natures.

The question of the abstract reasonableness of assuming

the truth of any proposition prior to proof cannot be here entered upon; that would involve a long discussion having little bearing on the immediate subject of this article. It is here assumed that it *is* reasonable to take certain propositions on faith antecedently to proof; and if that be granted, it has been shown, that the propositions *being* true, they are capable of being of incalculable value to the mind, although no discussion of their grounds be engaged in.

The illustration used by Mr. Mill, when treating of this supposed *necessity* of discussion, does not appear, when examined, to be strictly relevant. "The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity," he says (p. 66), "has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own." A mere advocate, in whom there existed no internal connection between the side of the case he supported and his own inner life, might reasonably do so; or again, if such connection did exist, the mastering of his adversary's case might be necessary, not for *his own* benefit, which is what Mr. Mill's argument requires, but to enable him to make a successful counter-impression on his hearers. An apter illustration may perhaps be found in the case of the possessor of a property whose title is impugned by a rival claimant. If perfectly satisfied of the soundness of his own title, he will give himself no trouble about the nature of his adversary's claim; nor will his *enjoyment* of the property be at all impaired by such neglect, but rather the contrary. This seems exactly a parallel case to that of the holder of some great religious truth, upon whom there rests no obligation to controversy; he enjoys and is nourished by that truth not one whit the less because there are many disputants abroad who suppose themselves to have demonstrated its untenableness. Mr. Mill must be well aware of all this; and when he speaks of the necessity of perpetually discussing all received opinions, it is evident that his secret meaning is, that those opinions are in a great measure *false*, and that unembarrassed and fearless discussion would disclose their falsehood. For if they were wholly or mainly *true*, he could not but allow that constant meditation upon them, rather than constant discussion of their grounds, should be recommended as the best means of again penetrating life and character with their spirit.

Again, to maintain that in the present state of society it is desirable that every man should be free to form and express what opinions he pleases, is a totally different thing from maintaining that opinions have no moral colour,—that whatever a man *has a right* to think and express (relatively to

society) he *is right* in thinking and expressing relatively to God and conscience. Mr. Mill seems to imply this doctrine of the moral neutrality of opinions in several passages of the Essay; nor, indeed, is he inconsistent in so doing, since he is an avowed upholder of the doctrine of philosophical necessity. In the second volume of his *System of Logic* (p. 480) he says:

“The doctrine called philosophical necessity is simply this: given the motives present to an individual’s mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting on him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event.”

To this doctrine Mr. Mill expresses his adherence. But if it be assented to, it is evident that there is no place for culpability to come in, either in character, action, or opinion. For “character and disposition” are partly born with us, partly formed by the mutual action and reaction between ourselves and the external world; “motives” are mainly supplied to us by our passions and desires. At the beginning of action, therefore, the contact of motive (which is of physical origin, and therefore not culpable) with the character (for which, as it was born with us, we are not then morally responsible) produces, according to this doctrine, inevitable results in conduct. This inevitable conduct inevitably tends to mould the character into a certain form; and so the process goes on; and as this doctrine of necessity denies the self-determining power of the will, there is no place, from the beginning to the end of a life’s actions, in which to insinuate any thing like culpability or moral turpitude. Opinions will of course follow the same rule. But those who believe in free-will in the sense in which the Church teaches it, in the sense in which Coleridge explains it in the *Aids to Reflection*, as a spiritual super-sensuous force in man, as a self-determining power, the existence of which justifies the solemn ceremonial of human justice, and authenticates the doctrine of a final judgment,—can never admit that man is not responsible for the regulation of his passions, and for the course which the formation of his character may take. And since our opinions are notoriously influenced in a high degree by our passions and our character, it follows that we are morally responsible for our opinions also. Let it not therefore be supposed that he who maintains the non-amenability of the individual to *society* for his opinions—provided their expression does not directly

tend to injure others—is in any way restricted from maintaining most emphatically his amenability for them to a higher tribunal.

The last and most vital question, upon which I should desire to express a wide divergence from the views of Mr. Mill, regards the estimate which he has formed of the Christian, or, as he would prefer to term it, theological morality. Mr. Mill considers (p. 92) that “the Christian system is no exception to the rule, that in an imperfect state of the human mind the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions.” It too, he thinks, is a half-truth, and requires to be supplemented by a morality derived from quite other sources than the New Testament. “Pagan self-assertion,” he says elsewhere, quoting from Sterling, “is one of the elements of human worth as well as Christian self-denial.” “Its ideal” (that of the Christian morality) “is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active, innocence rather than nobleness, abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good.”

There are few Christians of any denomination who would not dispute the accuracy of this description. If Mr. Mill had said, “*holiness* rather than nobleness,” he would have stated the Christian ideal correctly; but holiness is not a negative conception, and therefore the word would not suit his purpose. It is enough to refer to the parable of the talents, and to that of the barren fig-tree, for proof that the Founder of Christianity enforced the necessity of *active* goodness at least as strongly as any moral teacher whom the world has ever seen. But if by the expression “half-truth” it be meant that Christianity does not embrace within its scope a moral code adapted to all the various conditions and circumstances of human life, the proposition may be granted without the slightest prejudice to our maintaining that the Christian morality is divinely revealed. Be it remembered that morality is *natural* to man; its leading principles are impressed by the Creator, independently of a direct revelation, upon the conscience; and the natural reason is able to deduce from these original principles rules of conduct fitted to guide the individual in the emergencies which the conditions of life present. God does not *reveal* to His creatures that which the constitution with which He has endowed them enables them to discover for themselves; and hence it is no disparagement to the revealed morality of the Gospel to say that it is not a complete ethical code. Christianity reveals to us the true relation between man and God, and man’s destiny beyond the grave; the Christian morality accordingly is simply that part of morals

which teaches man so to pass through this life as to attain his true destiny in the next. In every moral principle which the Gospel proclaims there is a constant reference to a life to come,—to a scene where all partial or apparent wrong will be set right, and compared to which the concerns of the present life are mere vanity and futility. The distinguishing device of the Christian among other men is, *Credo vitam æternam*. He cannot prize this life and its so-called realities at a very high rate, who, taught by religion, steadily fixes his eyes on the one fact, that in a few short years his puny being will be swallowed up in the immensities and splendours of God. The Christian ethics, therefore, are designed for a being placed at the Christian stand-point. Their main principles are :

1. The deliberate preference of the heavenly to the earthly life, of the future to the present.

2. The principle of love or charity, prescribing a heavenly temper, the exact opposite of the selfishness which Mr. Mill charges upon Christian morality.

3. The regulation of the passions, by the aid of the light afforded by the first principle, and of the example of Christ.

4. Entire purity of thought and act, of mind and body.

5. Humility, consisting partly in a child-like reception of the revelation of God, partly in the imitation of the lowly and suffering life of Jesus.

This is the morality of the Christian as such : he can dispense with any other while thoroughly in his life realising this. One thing is *necessary* ; and multitudes of persons of either sex, in every age, have deliberately given up the world as an object of pursuit, in order that they might pursue the life eternal ; and have gone through life guided by this morality alone, without ever finding the want of any other, or repenting of the choice which they had made. The practical inconsistency which prevails among Christians, and which furnishes the ground for Mr. Mill's strictures, arises from this,—that many, who are thoroughly addicted to the pursuit of temporal good, *pretend* nevertheless to walk in conformity to this Christian morality, and to need no other ethical rules than those which the Gospel furnishes. It is as if Dives, in the midst of his money-getting, were to affect the detachment and mortification of Lazarus. It is indisputably true, as Mr. Mill says, that the Koran contains excellent moral precepts which are not found in the New Testament ; he might have added that Aristotle has yet more excellent maxims than the Koran. But what is the reason ? These maxims are all fitted to aid man in arriving at his *natural* ideal, namely, “ the

harmonious development of all his powers to a complete and consistent whole." As reason is capable of discovering this ideal, so it is capable of ascertaining the ethical principles which subserve to its attainment. The morality of the temporal life, in all its parts,—that of the public assembly, that of the bar, that of the counter, or that of the farm,—is capable of being ascertained by human reason unaided by revelation, and a large part of it has been so ascertained. So far, then, as an individual is bound, or inclined, to bear a part in the world's work,—so far as he cannot, or will not, give himself up wholly to God,—so far it is his duty to guide himself by the best and wisest ethical rules which he can find, from whatever source derived, applicable to that particular department of the temporal life in which his station is. The higher Christian morality which he possesses will often enable, nay compel, him to *revise* ethical judgments which have been arrived at independently of religion; but it will not serve him, in these worldly matters, as an exclusive code.

But when Mr. Mill speaks (pp. 88, 89) of the Christian morality as being, "not the work of Christ or the Apostles," but gradually built up by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries,"—when, again, he speaks of its having "received additions in the middle ages," which the Protestant sects merely cut off, substituting fresh additions of their own,—one cannot but wonder at so strange a distortion of the facts. That the leading principles of the Christian morality, as above defined, were taught by our Lord and His apostles, is so palpably true, is so easily established by a multitude of texts, that it were waste of words to go about to prove it; that the same principles were taught by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries is also notorious; it is equally certain that these are the main principles of Catholic morality at the present day. Mr. Mill ought to inform us what were the additional principles invented in the middle ages. Some such might be found, perhaps, by culling extracts from mediæval writers, after the fashion of Mosheim's citations from St. Eligius (see Newman on *Popular Protestantism*), but certainly in no other way. The separated bodies have, indeed, either impaired these original principles, or joined to them, as Mr. Mill says, "additions adapted to the character and tendencies" of each. By setting up the State as the supreme power in the Church, the Anglican body has impaired the testimony of its members to the first principle; many of them have had already, and will have again, to choose between the edict of Cæsar and the command of God; while their position as a separate body disposes them, in case of collision, to prefer

the former to the latter. The Methodists have added to the morality of Christ a kind of morbid self-inspection, which is perpetually asking itself the questions, "Am I right with God or not? is my inward state satisfactory? shall I be saved, or shall I be lost?" The Antinomian sects have, to say nothing of what they have added, abandoned the second and third principles,—purity and the regulation of the passions. Lastly, all have, in different ways and degrees, abandoned the principle of humility, and added various kinds and forms of pride. Dryden, it will be remembered, challenged Stillingfleet to name a single Protestant work on humility; and when his adversary produced one, it proved to be in the main a translation from a Catholic treatise.

The last chapter consists of "applications" of the general doctrine of the Essay, one of which only can here be noticed. Although not strictly belonging to the subject of the Essay, which is social liberty, not political enfranchisement, Mr. Mill has handled in this chapter the question as to the limits of the interference of government in the business of society. There is often a misuse of words here which leads to confusion of thought. English popular writers, when they hold up England as a pattern of political liberty to foreign nations, generally mean that we have a right to vote for a member of parliament, which they have not; a right to tax ourselves for local purposes, which they have not; together with many other privileges of the same kind. On the other hand, there are those who, revolted by the self-satisfied air with which these privileges are paraded, and detecting an ambiguity in the terms used, are apt to speak slightly of these supposed advantages. These persons say, "Why attach the name of liberty to functions which we are by no means impatient to exercise? If government officials will undertake the laying of our water-pipes, and the cleaning and lighting of our streets, we shall thank them for relieving us of a task which the wider knowledge and experience they can command enables them probably to execute better than ourselves. Certainly we shall not regard their interference as an invasion of our *liberty*. Nor, again, do we think it essential to our liberty that we should have a voice *valeat quantum* in the election of the members of the Legislature, in preference to any other mode of appointment. Continental experience proves that towns can be made beautiful and healthy as well, perhaps better, by a centralised than a localised administration. Nor does our vaunted parliamentary machine always work smoothly or profitably; it economises neither time nor money. What we understand by liberty is exactly what Mr. Mill under-

stands by it, namely, the power of managing our own life as we please; of reading what books we like; of unhampered locomotion; of cultivating and developing our own and our children's minds by the methods we think best, provided we do not trench upon the rights of others. If we think an institution wrong,—slavery, for instance,—we desire the liberty of publishing our thoughts without being tarred and feathered; if we prefer one style of religious worship to another, we would prefer to be free to practise it without constraint either from a government or from a mob. The charter of our civic rights may include all the fine openings for fussy self-importance that you describe, and perhaps many more; yet without the species of liberty we have insisted upon, we shall not be free in any sense that seems to us worth caring for."

A tendency to such reasoning as this is often perceivable on the part of the Catholic minority in England, and not unnaturally so. Local self-government and the representative system do not work favourably for English Catholics. Although they form more than one-twentieth of the population, they can command only one six hundred and fifty-fourth part of the parliamentary representation, and even that happens through a fortunate accident. The same is the case, as a general rule, with all municipal offices. Every where in England Catholics are in a minority; and minorities, being unrepresented under the present *régime*, cannot get their man elected, nor cause their voice to be more than imperfectly heard. The positive prejudice also which disqualifies Catholics, as such, in the general English mind for posts of honour and trust is still, though with diminished intensity, powerfully operative. It might seem, therefore, at first sight, to be our policy rather to aid in accumulating power in the hands of the government than in the maintenance and extension of the system of local management. Government officials, it may be said, are more or less accessible to reason; they are mostly raised by education above the sway of mere blind prejudice; if we can make out a clear case of hardship to them, they will redress it. But the blind unreasoning bigotry of the bulk of the English middle class is unimpressible and unassailable; to attempt to extract fair concessions from them, when the Pope is in the case, is, as Sir John Fortescue would say, to go "scheryng of hogges," with the old result of "moche cry and little wole."

All this is true; yet still Mr. Mill is probably right when he says, that the more narrowly government interference in local concerns can be circumscribed, the better. First, for

the sake of the great principle, that "though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education,—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal" (Essay, p. 196). Secondly, because Catholics have no cause to despair of being able ultimately to work round free institutions more to their advantage than they seem to be at present. Let them show themselves the equals of their Protestant fellow-citizens in public spirit, in intelligence sharpened by education, and in acquired knowledge,—in short, in the whole circle of the civic virtues and qualifications, and they may reckon on not being always excluded from posts of trust. This book itself, the weighty maxims of which are destined to leaven very extensively, if we mistake not, the general sentiments of society, will contribute to dissipate the intolerance which defeats their just claims. Thirdly, the precariousness of favours obtained by a minority from a government has to be considered. When we deal with our countrymen man to man, we know where we stand. We may be disliked and suspected at first; but if we can once get a footing, and satisfy them that we personally are a decent sort of people, and that our claims are just, we shall have gained a success which can never afterwards, unless through our own fault, be wrested from us. For all experience shows that rights thus gained are progressive, and that their expansion can only be arrested by external constraint; on the other hand, the concessions which a government has made to a minority in a time of quietness may be revoked in a time of excitement. Are examples needed? Look at the seeming prosperity of English Catholicity under the government of Charles I. before the year 1640, and again under James II. In each case the relief afforded by the government was given in defiance and in advance of the general sentiment of the nation, and was soon swept away beneath a torrent of penal inflictions; but to take advantage of more equal laws, and to disarm by sensible and spirited conduct the inveterate prejudices of individuals and of local coteries, is, *pro tanto*, to alter the general sentiment itself.

A.

Correspondence.

THE SIGNS OF MARTYRDOM IN THE CATACOMBS.

DEAR SIR,—As I observe that the article in your last Number, “On the Signs of Martyrdom in the Catacombs,” is not editorial, but communicated, I suppose you do not consider yourself altogether pledged to its opinions; if so, would you allow me, in some future Number, the privilege of finding fault with it, correcting what I believe to be its errors, and supplying its deficiencies? I say in some future Number, both because I am much occupied at this moment, and because at any time the remarks I have to make would run to too great a length to be at all admissible as Correspondence.—I am, dear sir, yours, &c.

J. S. N.*

ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

SIR,—I am extremely glad to find that your correspondent does not consider the philosophy of Gioberti identical with that of Italy, nor that its author is master of the field, or receives, as he says, exclusive favour and encouragement. But he adds, that that which *I* term the true Italian philosophy “extracts from nothing the idea of God and of creation.” This is strange indeed. Do you believe that I extract from nothing the idea of him and of his causality, when I infer from his article and letter, “Rosmini and Gioberti,” that a writer of the one and the other does exist, and that he is the individual in question?

In his first objection he supposes that “all living authorities,” &c. would occupy themselves with this subject. I know not; but if this were the case at all, they would say, I imagine, just what the scholastics said,—that “existences can be considered in a twofold manner: in *esse rei*, through the senses, or *viâ inventionis*; and in *esse veri*, or in abstract ideas, or *viâ judicii*.” Both methods ought to be employed; hence Cardinal Cajetan wisely comments on St. Thomas’s *Summa*, p. i. q. 48, a. 8: “Propterea in plurimos contingit labi errores, quia a superioribus inchoant iudicium, et ordinant doctrinas suas inconsultis sensibus.”

In his second objection he draws an erudite distinction between “*origo*” and “*exordium*,” and he says that Gioberti began with the senses: and therefore I reply, he ought not to have imagined that he included existences in the creative act; for existences, from the very fact that they act upon the senses, afford the mind most conclusive evidence that they really exist in themselves, in *esse rei*. Nor would it make for his argument if he considers Gioberti as the restorer of Italian Platonism.

* We need scarcely say that we shall be at any time most ready to admit the promised communication.—ED. R.

First, Plato never considered the creative act as the groundwork and source of philosophy.

Further, according to the opinion of many, he was not at all acquainted with the creative act. Marsilius Ficinus, who may be looked upon as the chief of Italo-Platonic philosophers, never established the creative act as the first starting-point whence philosophy is to be derived. The Platonics generally thought that the senses were sufficient for the question of fact, *an sit*; but they thought that the representations of the senses were insufficient to generate intelligible forms in the intellect; hence they had recourse to a principle distinct from the object of the senses, or to the exemplars of the object, and they affirmed that in the exemplars of objects we apprehend the intelligible forms of the object. St. Thomas explains this, p. i. q. 84, a. 4.

One famous Italian, who appears to have anticipated the Giobertian system, was Giambattista Vico, and there were a few others of the same school who were more or less suspected of pantheism, naturalism, fatalism, &c.

I thank your correspondent heartily for the light which he affords me on the text of St. Bonaventure; but that does not strengthen his point, for the holy doctor does not deny the doctrine expressed in the text quoted, but the conclusion which some derived therefrom, namely, that names deduced from creatures ought to be applied to God *translative* only. In his whole argument St. Bonaventure agrees with St. Thomas, p. i. q. 13, a. 1; wherein he says, "*Deus non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam, sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiæ et remotionis; sic igitur posset nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est.*"

And Petavius explains why it should be as St. Thomas says it is, *De Trin.*, lib. iv. cap. ix. n. 1: "*Cum ab humanis et creatis sint petita rebus omnia nomina, quibus ad divina declaranda humana imbecillitas utitur, necesse est, quantumvis illa selecta et exquisita capias, cum ad altiora ista transtuleris, quodam veluti inferiorum pulvere sordescere.*"

St. Thomas himself recognised a double source of the knowledge of God, p. i. q. 12, a. 13: "*Per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis quam per rationem naturalem;*" and he explains how this is the case. Mystics sometimes delight in that first kind of knowledge, but such knowledge cannot be established as the sole basis of all knowledge, nor be separated from the lower kind of knowledge without danger. Hence St. Thomas remarks that St. Austin did not consider vision, *in rationibus æternis*, as common to all men. St. Thomas, p. i. q. 84, a. 5, quotes the text of St. Austin: "*Rationalis anima non omnis et quæcumque, sed quæ sancta et pura fuerit, aperitur illi visioni idonea;*" and observe that St. Thomas limits this vision to the blessed.

Besides, this formula itself is of great importance to the faith,

because "*ens* (ὁ ὢν, הַיֵּהוּ, Exod. iii. 14) *creat existentias*" is nothing else but the expression of the first article of the Apostles' Creed. Indeed, this formula can be called the true "pinnacle" of knowledge. In it any one of its three terms is, as it were, an immense ocean, which expands before the reasoning and *believing* mind. Gioberti, in the zeal which he summoned up on behalf of the said formula, did not sufficiently guard against German transcendentalism. His hallucination takes place in the middle term of the formula, "*creat*;" hence at times he has lost the just criterion respecting the extremes.

Here I conclude. This is not a contest, but merely a friendly remark; let it be taken for what it is worth in the solution of the "healthy" doubts which your correspondent thinks you entertain: and in truth, a doubt, when it is not universal, and is not extended to the first principles which every man acknowledges, is worthy of the philosopher whom I truly respect in his person.

A. G.

BELGIAN POLITICS.

Brussels, Feb. 15th.

SIR,—Our Chambers have been sitting for the last three months, but nothing to signify has yet been done; the budget was voted almost without debate. There was no "king's speech," and so there was no field-day for the parties which divide both the Chambers and the country. Hitherto the ministers have commanded a majority, which they put through its facings like drill-sergeants. But the question is, Is the country with the majority? Ministers know well enough, and have thereupon completely changed their tactics. They rode into place upon the crest of a great wave of violent passions; their first business was to satisfy these passions; and the more the ministry showed its teeth to the Conservatives, the more it shocked the Catholics and restrained them from exercising the rights they most prized, so much the more was it applauded. But amongst the Liberals there are different shades of violence to be found, different estimations of the wisdom of making injustice towards their enemies their political principle. Accordingly a reaction soon came; and now the ministry no longer takes the initiative in proposing anti-Catholic measures; but it gives a hint to some member of the majority, who introduces a measure, and the ministers give a silent vote upon it; so the violent are satisfied, and the moderates are not too much shocked.

This ministerial "dodge" was made great play with in the affairs of the Louvain elections; but to elucidate this point, you must permit me to go some way back. The revolution of 1830 was in all respects a popular movement; then, and for some years after, the voters took a real interest in the elections. But this taste gradually grew stale, and then it became necessary to bring them to the poll by the attraction of dinners and drink. Matters soon got worse:

marked tickets, bribery, undue influence of landlords came into fashion. Every body owned that the Liberals were the great leaders of these doings. Then, when parties became more hostile, each side redoubled its efforts ; the expenses of dinners, carriages, and the like accumulated ; and, at last, an election in certain places cost a large sum of money.

Last June, when the elections for the Senate and Chamber of Representatives were to take place, the old Conservative electoral committee was in a state of collapse, and M. Van Bockel, a notary, and formerly burgomaster of Louvain, undertook the management of the election on the Conservative side. M. Van Bockel, though more than seventy years old, is one of the cleverest men in Belgium. M. Frère, the finance-minister, lately said of him (and M. Frère, after having been twice beaten by him, ought to know), "He is a man whom I cannot help respecting." His mind is clear, practical, quick in discriminating the possible from the impossible, accurate in estimating the value of the means that are suggested, excellent at organisation, constant in the midst of difficulties, never disquieted by minute objections, free both from timidity and rashness ; he is a real statesman in a notary's office.

The first question which he had to solve was, how to bring the peasants to the poll, and that at the least possible expense. He resolved to give them from five to ten francs a-piece, according to their distance from the town, to pay their journey and their loss of work, but at the same time to leave them free to vote for whom they pleased.

In former elections the Liberals had used violence to frighten the peasants and priests from the poll. M. Van Bockel, therefore, organised a guard of private special constables, all of them men of decision, and furnished with a card bearing the inscription "*Dieu, Roi, Constitution.*" The constables only received a franc a day during the election ; but five more were promised afterwards, provided no cause of complaint was given. The Liberals on their side took their measures, as I shall soon have to tell you. In the mean time matters proceeded very quietly, though the number of electors was very large, and all the Conservative candidates (two senators and four representatives) were returned. At first no complaint was made ; but while the Senate was occupied in verifying the elections, there came from Louvain a petition, with some twenty objections to the validity of all the returns. The ministry, which had probably suggested the petition, wished to refer it to a parliamentary committee, and made some other propositions that were quite unfair ; but it did not openly interfere more than it could help.

Nevertheless all the objections were traversed in the Conservative counter-petitions, and the whole country was soon convinced that the Liberal petition was completely false, with regard to all the facts of any importance. At that time no member of the Chambers considered the payment of the electors' expenses, or the organisation of special constables, to be any reason for setting aside the election.

The Senate took the first opportunity of admitting the two senators elect, while the majority of the Chamber of Representatives, under the influence of ministers, persisted in demanding an inquiry. They thought they should unearth all manner of abuses on the Catholic side, and thus make an occasion for changing the electoral law, the immediate effect of which would have been either to disfranchise, or to keep away from the poll, all the electors of the rural districts. The inquiry was therefore ordered, a commission appointed, and the president invested with all the powers of a judge of assize, of a public prosecutor, and of a police-magistrate; while the severest penalties were suspended over witnesses who would not appear or would not tell the truth. Of the five members of the commission, only the three Liberals were present at the first sitting: they resolved that the inquiry should only extend to the acts of the Conservatives; but the next day the protest of the two Conservative or Catholic members compelled them to extend the inquiry to all the events of the election. The commission sat for some months; and all that they could prove against the Catholics was, that they had paid the electors' expenses, and had organised a special body of constables; two facts which nobody had ever thought of denying. On the other hand, it was proved against the Liberals that they had not only paid the electors' expenses (though on a less liberal scale), but that they had had recourse to corrupt practices properly so called. They had employed promises and threats. The administrators of charitable funds had unduly influenced their dependents, &c. Though the commission was a secret one, all this leaked out into the newspapers, and the public had made up its mind before M. Defré read his report to the Chamber.

The report read the inquiry backwards; the clergy came in for the lion's share of abuse; the whole thing was a mere libel. In the debate which followed, M. B. Dumortier called it a libel unworthy of the Chamber; he was called to order by the president, but the country shared M. Dumortier's opinion. The protest of the minority of the commission, drawn up by M. Van Overloop, was soon afterwards presented. The whole report was refuted in this document, and at the same time the evidence taken by the commission was published, and the debate began.

For many a long year the Conservatives had never spoken so well. The report was shown up bit by bit, and the debaters of the left were put to silence. M. de Theux and M. Dechamps spoke like statesmen; M. B. Dumortier, the unwearied orator of the right, whom they call the Catholic zouave, gave the finishing stroke to the report, and discomfited the left by producing the evidence of a whole series of corrupt practices of the Liberals throughout the country. None of the ministers spoke during the debate. When it came to the vote, the left was too far committed to hold back: for five months the deputies of Louvain had been excluded from the Chamber; during their absence the fortifications of Antwerp, and an important law of public works, had been carried; the whole country

had been kept in suspense by the inquiry ; they had been awkward enough to make a left-handed report, and had spoken strongly in favour of setting aside the return, so they were obliged to vote for it. The right wished nothing better than that the left should succeed. It knew that its candidates were quite safe at Louvain, moreover the whole country was convinced that elections were nowhere more purely conducted than at Louvain. Injustice would only injure its authors, but the Louvain election was set aside.

As soon as the news was telegraphed to Louvain, M. Van Bockel instantly hired for the polling-day every carriage and every horse that was to be let at Louvain, Diest, and Tirlemont, and ordered dinners in all the hotels nearest to the hustings. At the same time he sent his agents through the villages, and in a few days was completely master of the situation. The ministers and all the officials stretched every nerve to insure success to their party. Among the Liberal candidates were the burgomasters of Louvain, Diest, and Tirlemont, who of course brought all their influence to bear. Both parties set up fresh newspapers ; every Belgian had a finger in the pie. The interests of religion proved strong enough to force the Liberal newspapers of Louvain to profess profound respect towards the clergy, the university of Louvain, and the Catholic religion. Next they had to go in against the fortification of Antwerp, which was always unpopular ; then they had to cast to the winds the whole ministerial policy ; the question of the Romagna, in which the Liberals take a side against the Pope, also played its part ; the demonstrations of May 1857, and the agitation against the convents, was a subject of reproach against the Liberals ; nothing was forgotten. In the district of Louvain neither man, woman, or child spoke of any thing but the election. The special constables were reorganised. Two hundred students of the university, among whom many belonged to the noblest families of Belgium, joined them. I cannot remember any agitation in the country like those two or three weeks at Louvain. The 19th of January was the polling-day ; such a number of votes was never polled before. Politics or amusement had drawn together their votaries from the most distant parts of the land. In spite of the frost the streets were full, but no disturbance took place, and, as was foreseen, the Conservative candidates were returned by a majority far more overwhelming than at first. As soon as the result was known, the telegraph-offices were blocked up with newsmongers, anxious to be the first to convey the intelligence. Many of the moderate Liberals were glad that the ministry were defeated ; and after the election the principal Conservatives of the Chamber gave a dinner, at Brussels, to M. Van Bockel, who made a very instructive speech about political contests. Ten men like him would soon change the face of affairs in Belgium.

But this electoral agitation must not lead you to suppose that politics have become more popular in Belgium. The Catholics only bestir themselves when the Liberals become unbearable. There can be no real political life when you cannot reckon on the future ; but

who could do this in Belgium? In the Congress of Paris they spoke of the abnormal state of Italy; every body now knows what that meant. They also spoke of the necessity of muzzling the Belgium press. When they held this language, they knew that either our constitution must be destroyed, or else some foreign power must come and do it. In the matter of Savoy, they have spoken of the natural frontiers of France. This question of frontiers is much clearer in the North than in the South. Moreover, the Belgian coal-mines, iron-foundries, and railroads; the port of Antwerp, the immense prosperity of the country, its taxes, which are not more than one-half or two-thirds per head those of France,—all these are temptations to a powerful neighbour. When once war breaks out between France and England, which we consider here to be rather adjourned than abandoned, our country will be once more invaded within eight-and-forty hours. With such an end in view, with the fear of having no country at all next year, with what spirit can we enter into politics?

And so every thing runs wild in our government. M. Tesch, the minister of justice, is also director of the Great Luxembourg Railway Company. This is a private concern to which government has guaranteed a minimum of interest; it is, moreover, a company in which frauds have been legally proved. Further, for many years it has never issued any regular accounts. The government inspector has protested against this proceeding, and against several others of the like kind. The newspapers and members of the Chamber have demanded that M. Tesch should take his choice of the place of minister of the government or of director of the railroad. M. Tesch declines to do any thing of the kind. On the contrary, he has got the directors of the railway to vote, that they will not pay the inspector for any more visits. Nevertheless, the inspector has not resigned; and the ministry dares not turn him out. So he does his work for nothing; but he has got the laugh on his side, and the ministry looks rather small.

Every nomination is a job. Belgians can no longer say, "the court makes decrees, but shows no favour." In many of our towns the only justice administered is a Liberal one. Lately, M. Tesch nominated one of his old colleagues in a provincial journal to be the government counsel in the Court of Appeal at Ghent; a nomination so scandalous, that even the Liberal newspapers cried out against it.

In all the dioceses of Belgium, addresses to the Pope have been signed. The Bishop of Ghent has established the St. Peter's pence, and reckons upon finding 300,000 subscribers in his diocese only.

When you have to write a history of the last year, you must not forget to look through the Belgian Catholic newspapers: they give all the best and strongest documents, and therefore have very little circulation in France. I do not know whether you are aware how the Pope's encyclical letter came here, and into France. After it had been printed at Rome, the Pope shut up all the printers for a few days in the Vatican; and in the mean time sent 2000 copies to the consul at Marseilles, who sent them as letters to the newspapers and

the Bishops. So Louis Napoleon's first acquaintance with it was through the *Univers*. After a telegram had informed the Pope that the letter had appeared in the French and Belgian newspapers, the printers were released, and the encyclical letter was communicated to the Cardinals and to the Romans.

Y. Z.

Literary Notices.

Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera quædam hactenus inedita. Vol. I., containing his *Opus tertium*, *Opus minus*, and *Compendium Philosophiæ*. Edited by J. S. Brewer, M.A. (London: Longman.) This is the fifteenth volume of the series of *Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages*, which is being published under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. In intrinsic worth, it is the most valuable of all; for it is the only book which has true literary merit, and whose author was really a great man.

Roger Bacon was born near Ilchester, in Dorsetshire, about 1214; his family was rich, and in the quarrels between the kings and the barons of the time, took the Royalist side, and impoverished itself in the king's service. Roger, however, took to letters; he was the friend of the great Robert Grosteste, Bishop of Lincoln, of whom he ever speaks with the greatest reverence, as the most learned ecclesiastic that had lived since the days of Pope Damasus. After Bacon had spent his patrimony of 2000*l.* on books and scientific apparatus, he entered the Franciscan order, whose rules forbade the publication of any thing not approved by the authorities of the order. For this reason, though he had been studying for forty years, he had as yet written nothing; but the fame of his learning at length reached the ears of Pope Clement IV., who sent him a letter, commanding him, notwithstanding any command of superiors or constitution of his order, to write out forthwith an account of his discoveries, and send it to Rome. Bacon instantly set about complying with the Pope's requisition; and within fifteen or eighteen months he had composed and carefully written out three large works, the *Opus majus*, *Opus minus*, and *Opus tertium*, intended to serve as three distinct introductions or prefaces to the encyclopædical work which he meditated, and a great part of which he lived to complete. Six of the seven books of the *Opus majus* were published by Dr. Jebb in 1733. No other large treatise of Bacon's was ever printed till this volume made its appearance. It contains the whole of the *Opus tertium*, or third of the prefaces; a considerable fragment of the *Opus minus*, or second preface; and a work entitled, *Compendium Studii Philosophiæ*, written in 1271.

These works of Bacon are all as much personal as philosophical; he is as much occupied in showing the futility of the learning of his

contemporaries as in establishing his own. His works all labour under the great fallacy of the age—that God and Nature were seen by one act of the soul, and therefore that it required as great purity of heart to understand mathematics as to comprehend practically the truths of morals. This fallacy branched into two great schools; one maintaining that the theologian's mind was so illuminated by the study of divinity, that he could, without a separate study, see into and unravel all the mysteries of nature; the other, that the study of nature, mathematics, languages, physics, and experimental science, was the necessary preliminary to the study of theology.

Bacon was a teacher of the second school; and his writings are immensely interesting, from their controversial character, and the insight which they furnish into the state of study in the thirteenth century. “The second great cause of error is, that for the last forty years certain students have arisen and dubbed themselves masters and doctors in theology and philosophy, when they have not yet acquired any thing properly. . . . These are boys without knowledge of themselves, or the world, or the learned tongues, Greek and Hebrew, who yet presume to study theology, which requires all human wisdom. . . . These are the boys of the two studying orders, like Albert, and Thomas, and the rest, who in general enter the order under twenty years of age, . . . sometimes when they are only ten, when it is impossible they should have any real knowledge. Nevertheless, immediately on their entrance, they are set to study theology; and from the very beginning of these orders the students have been all of this kind; and yet they have never procured any external instruction in philosophy, but have investigated it for themselves without a teacher, thus making themselves masters and doctors before they were disciples.”

Bacon, himself a Franciscan, blames his own order as much as that of the Dominicans, though he only mentions the Dominican teachers Albert the Great and St. Thomas, who were certainly no “boys” when this was written, in 1271. St. Thomas was born in 1226, went to study under Albert at Paris in 1245, and in 1248 was appointed joint professor with Albert at Cologne, being then twenty-two years of age. This, then, was an old grievance, meditated on for more than twenty years, and not removed even by the enormous reputation which St. Thomas had since acquired. The chief point for which Bacon blames him is, his complete ignorance of languages and natural science,—an ignorance which is unquestionable, but which we have been accustomed to excuse on the plea of the general ignorance of the times. This volume of Bacon's works completely disposes of that plea, and shows that the ridiculous mistakes of the scholastics on these points are due not to the times, but to themselves, and to the exclusiveness of the orders, which refused to recognise the utility of any science which was not represented within their own body. All Bacon's strictures may be illustrated from St. Thomas's published works. In his commentary on *Boethius de Consol. Phil.*, we find:—

"*Titulus*, so called from *Titan*, which means sun; for as the sun illumines the world, so does the title illumine the book."

His spelling is curious and most unscholarlike, though it illustrates the pronunciation of his day, and throws some light on modern words: thus, *logica* he spells *loyca*, showing how the *g* was guttural, and softened; *rhythma* he spells *rigma*, whence perhaps our word 'rigmarole.'

"Alcibiades was a most beautiful woman: she was taken to Aristotle by some of his scholars. The sage beheld her, and said, 'If men had lynx-eyes to see through opaque bodies, and could look beneath her skin, she would appear any thing but beautiful.'"

"*Solers* is either *solicitus* or *Solon in arte*;" and innumerable others. Bacon justly reprehends the scholastics for following such blind guides as Hugutio, Brito, and others, from whom St. Thomas took most of the above specimens of criticism, when they might just as easily follow Priscian and the more classical authors, who at least knew the languages which they pretended to teach. It is clear that the faults of the scholastics in physical science were mostly due to the low esteem in which they held it, or to their opinion that theology contained in itself all physical knowledge, and that divines were taught it by a superior process, and needed no study or instruction. Against this opinion, Bacon lays down the principle, "Though our knowledge is derived from three sources, authority, reason, and experience, yet authority does not really make us know a thing except it gives its reason: it does not give understanding, but belief; for we believe authority, but do not understand because of it. Nor can reason tell whether a conclusion is valid or sophistical, except we know that it is experimentally proved in practice." Hence Bacon laughed at the current ideas of the elements and the rest, which were built on authority, on bad translations, and on mere guess, and were not put to the test which alone can prove any thing in nature—the test of experiment.

But Bacon was too much in advance of his age: all the interest which it had to give to philosophy was devoted to metaphysics and theology; accuracy in philology or natural science was never desired. Bacon sometimes speaks, almost peevishly, about the utter neglect, and even the suspicion, into which he fell on account of it, and the contempt with which he regarded the *vulgus* and those who truckled to their judgments was unbounded. "The opinion of the vulgar is worthless. All wise men have contemned their ways. . . . Ignorance is shameful, and wisdom is good; therefore, to console themselves for their ignorance, men despise every thing that they do not know, for fear of seeming ignorant of any thing worth knowing; and they puff off whatever they know, or think they know, not caring whether they know it or not, but wishing to seem learned to the foolish mob, and hoping to conceal their ignorance. But no judge can pronounce in a cause which he does not understand, nor ought ignorance to be elevated to the seat of judgment; hence the error is enormous, to think that one may despise a subject because

he is ignorant of it. Nor do devilish persons blush to denounce to prelates, and princes, and people, all kinds of knowledge, which they hate because they have it not . . . imprisoned in their dark ignorance, they have no right to condemn the light of wisdom, in respect of which they are blind as moles and blear as bats, and like filthy swine covered over with the mud of ignorance . . . they do not dare to know, but take great pains to remain ignorant."

The *vulgus* of our own day is as deaf to metaphysical research as that of Bacon was to physical science: Bacon's great namesake has turned the tables, and has inaugurated an age in which spiritual science is as much despised as the knowledge of nature was before. But among religious people, where the tendencies of the thirteenth century still linger, there may be sometimes found the very same spirit which Bacon denounces, jealous of any attempt to harmonise faith with the discoveries of science, and ready on the least provocation to put down inquiries which seem at the first blush likely to shock the prejudices of those who believe.

The volume before us has been edited under difficulties; manuscripts well-nigh illegible had to be deciphered, and the blunders of ignorant copyists corrected. This is a kind of work which cannot be done in a hurry: emendations of false readings will not come at any one's bidding; they must be waited for and coaxed. Close application and working against time are sure to put this particular faculty to sleep. We are not, therefore, surprised to find some such slips as that at p. 400, where *cotidie* (quotidie), the reading of the Ms., has puzzled the editor, and has induced him to substitute *continue*, to the serious detriment of the sense. The treatise *Compendium Studii* contains several similar oversights. But where the editor has done his work so well, we are not in the least disposed to blame him for the few slight blemishes whose existence he shows by his preface that he suspects.

Lectures on Ancient and Modern History. By James Burton Robertson. (Catholic Publishing Company, 1859.) The Catholic University in Dublin is distinguished for nothing so much as for the universality which is displayed in the writings of its professors. A thorough acquaintance with the general literature of Europe is shown on almost every page of the *Atlantis*, and contrasts in a striking manner with the narrow tradition and the limited horizon of Oxford and Cambridge. Mr. Robertson has long since vindicated his claim to be considered a useful interpreter between ourselves and the Catholic mind of the Continent; and it is confirmed by this publication of various lectures mostly delivered before the students at Dublin, part of them relating to different points of ancient history, partly to the development of the modern state in France, Spain, and England. A course of historical lectures necessarily embraces but a very small part, and very little of the substance, of history. Their value consists either in the leading ideas, by which they teach students to consider the subject, or in giving them the taste and the habit of a scientific and critical method of study. As might be ex-

pected from the translator of Schlegel, the former is the plan which Mr. Robertson pursues. His lectures on antiquity are disconnected and incomplete, even in the narrow range over which they extend; and the author does not seem at home in the subject. The second part of the volume is devoted to the establishment of a definite political theory by the examples of modern history, in which he is greatly interested, and speaks with zeal and knowledge. The state, says Mr. Robertson, is indirectly of divine origin, not directly, like the family and the Church; and civil authority is not immediately ordained of God, but is the natural development of domestic authority. Consequently, the form in which it is naturally governed is the same as that by which the family is governed. "Royalty is the emanation of paternity," and the republic is either a corruption of monarchy, or a municipality detached from it. The ideal state is a monarchy in which the inferior orders are raised to a participation in power. This existed in the middle ages, but was injured by the exorbitant increase of the royal power, and has been partly preserved only in England by the revolution which confined the power of the king.

With this theory, which his lectures on modern history serve to illustrate, Mr. Robertson endeavours to make a compromise between what we should call the Christian notion of the state and political rationalism. In denying the directly divine origin of civil power, he has on his side the opinion of many of the older Catholic writers as well as the popular voice of the day. But whilst he differs with the latter in allowing too much for the influence of the divine will, we are compelled to differ with him because he does not allow enough. In our conviction the true view of the origin and nature of the state, and the only one which must not inevitably succumb to the revolutionary logic, is that which recognises in the state the same divine origin and the same ends as in the Church, which holds that it belongs as much to the primitive essence of a nation as its language, and that it unites men together by a moral, not like family and society, by a natural and sensible bond. With this exception, however, we admit Mr. Robertson's notion, that in the middle ages the ideal of a Christian state subsisted, though never realised. There never was a period in which men did not look backward, or in which the Church did not teach them to look forward, to a better time. It was the business of modern history further to develop the system to which the mediæval polity tended; and this it failed to do because of the inordinate growth, not, as our author says, of the power of the king only, but of the power of the state. State-absolutism, not royal absolutism, is the modern danger against which neither representative government nor democracy can defend us, and which revolution greatly aggravates. If we do not bear this in mind, we shall be led constantly astray by forms to overlook the substance, to confound freedom of speech with freedom of action, to think that right is safer against majorities than against tyrants, that liberty is permanently safer in Belgium, Piedmont, or the United States, than in France, Russia, or Naples.

We have dwelt upon the few points on which we differ with the political theory of our author, because we believe that he attaches more importance to it than to the historical illustrations by which he has worked it out. With respect to the latter, we will only recommend King Philip II. to his greater indulgence and, we would add, greater justice. We observe that the most violent attack upon him, Mr. Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, is not quoted by Mr. Robertson. We confidently request him to read it, and to read also the refutation of it by Mathias Koch.

Cantata on the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Words and Music by St. Alphonsus M. de Liguoro (composed in 1760). Arranged for the Organ or Pianoforte by the Chev. F. W. de Liguoro. (John Philp, 7 Orchard Street, London, 1860.) This piece of music is well worth noticing for its intrinsic excellence, as well as for the interest that must always attach to the by-works and the recreations of Saints. Without subscribing to the exaggerated and uncalled-for declaration of the publisher, that the *Stabat* of Pergolesi is not equal to this admirable composition of St. Alphonsus, we may safely say that, though it is rather tedious, and somewhat overburdened with repetitions, it is both a graceful and learned composition, and in melodiousness certainly above the average musical compositions of the period—just one year after the death of Sebastian Bach.

St. Alphonsus probably designed this composition to be sung in church. Its accompaniment of violin *obligato*, and the passionate melodies given to the *Redentore* and the *anima* as they address each other as *O cara*, and *mio Tesor, mio bene*, afford a striking refutation of all those who think that Saints can only sing Gregorian. St. Alphonsus evidently wished to keep sacred music up to the level of secular; and in these times we cannot at all fancy that he would countenance the musical puritanism that is attempting to banish from church intricate and melodious music and female voices—the only voices that can execute this music with precision.

One word to the publisher. In days when we can buy all Beethoven's or Mozart's sonatas for a guinea, it is rather bold to charge half-a-guinea for twenty-two pages of music, printed precisely in the same cheap way, not over-correctly, and with so little judgment, that a whole page (p. 4) is taken up with about three chords; while on another (p. 9), intricate passages are so crowded, that it would be difficult to read them, even if there was no note misplaced. We are told, also, that the Ms. of the Cantata, with autographic corrections, was found in the Royal Library of the British Museum. No hint is given us of the nature of the proof that the music is really that of St. Alphonsus, or that the corrections are really in his handwriting. All these things are serious faults in an editor, and should be corrected if Mr. Philp intends to proceed with his selection of "classical music of the school of Scarlatti." But with all these drawbacks, we must thank both editor and publisher for a very interesting addition to our stock of good ecclesiastical music.

Contemporary Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

Catholic Affairs.

SOME scandal was excited, towards the end of December, in Ireland, by the appointment of a Catholic M.P. to be junior counsel on circuit to the department of Woods and Forests. The cause of independent opposition seemed to be compromised by this defection on the part of a gentleman who was understood to belong to that party. To those who desire political independence in Catholic public men it is of less vital interest, for we know some who have held office with real advantage to the whole body, and who have not hesitated to sacrifice office when they thought their fellow-Catholics had cause to complain of the government. The question attaches to the constituencies as much as to the representatives. When voters seek government patronage through their members, they cannot be surprised if their members sometimes seek the same for themselves. Burke has a lesson for both parties. "A patronage-dispensing member of parliament may, while he betrays every valuable interest of the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian-angel to his borough;" and again, "It is better if a member were not to be influenced. But of all modes of influence, a place under government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds it, and by far the most safe to the country. I would not shut out that sort of influence which is open and visible, which is connected with the dignity and service of the state, when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumerable methods of clandestine corruption which are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as these means of corruption and the disposition to be corrupted have existence amongst us" (*Works*, 301, 322).

The demonstrations in Ireland in favour of the Pope have been kept up with unabated vigour; there has been no lay address in that part of the kingdom precisely answering to that of the English Catholics; but an address to Lord Palmerston was signed by some leading men, which affirmed the expediency of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, in order that he may be "free to exercise his spiritual authority over Catholics of all nations, unfettered by the feeling of dependence on any particular state;"—asserted that the Pope, if left to himself, would carry out the reforms of which the beginning of his reign afforded so bright a promise, and that it was therefore unjust to attribute the alleged misgovernment of his States to him; and which finally asked Lord Palmerston and the ministry, in consideration of the numerical strength of the Catholic body, and the influence which they should justly exercise on the councils of England, "to promote, or concur in such settlement of the affairs of Italy as, while it provides for the liberties of the Italian people, will secure the integrity, independence, and neutrality of the Holy See." Serious objections might perhaps be raised against some parts of this document, though not against the substance of it. Its general defence was taken up by the Archbishop of Dublin. "United in principle and object," says Dr. Cullen, "and more cannot reasonably be expected, we must, in the employment of means to effect our purpose, leave room for, and wisely tolerate difference of opinion." As to the objection that Catholics ought not to address themselves to Lord Palmerston at all, the Archbishop observes, "It would be most desirable that no Protestant statesman should be allowed to interfere in the matters which so nearly concern our religion. But, unhappily, if a Congress be held, not only English Protestants, but Greek schismatics and

Prussian evangelicals, will consider it their right to vote on the various questions now pending. . . . If this be the case, why not remind the Prime Minister of England that he will lose the confidence of several millions of her Majesty's subjects if he takes any part against the rights of the Pope, and consequently that it is expedient for him to support the independence, integrity, and neutrality of the dominions of the Pope." This remark is the more weighty, because it is to these non-Catholic states that the Pope owed the restoration of the Legations at the Congress of Vienna, and it is to them that he must yet have recourse as the upholders of legitimacy against the revolutionary principles which prevail in all the Catholic states of southern Europe. The Archbishop then declares, that for the management of Catholic affairs the Tories are as objectionable as the Whigs. "I doubt very much whether we have any thing to expect from the party which has for its leaders most bitter opponents of Catholicity, and rests in Ireland for its support on the Orange lodges of this country. While Lord Derby proclaims the Pope's territory a plague-spot, and Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Disraeli call for its dismemberment, and Lord Ellenborough subscribes money for the purchase of a million of muskets to arm the rebels of the Pope's States, I must confess that I find myself embarrassed to make a choice between the aid of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, and I cannot but pray that his Holiness may be preserved from the affectionate care and protection of both parties."

The chief meetings of Catholics in England have been those of Newcastle-on-Tyne, Jan. 23, when 6000 persons assembled, and were addressed by Father Suffield and many of our northern notables; and that of Birmingham, Feb. 14, when 7000 persons were present. The Bishop made a very careful statement of the progress of events in Italy, which is well worth reading. One sentence will, we think, appear open to criticism. The Pope, he says, "imposes respect on his subjects, and gives them happiness. Is not this the sublime end of all government? And

why do men enter into the strife of political life, but because they think they have not got these blessings? To enter into political strife when happiness is given, is to destroy that happiness." The fact we believe to be, that as men are better governed, they become better instructed, have more leisure, and, as a consequence, desire more ardently to exercise the higher functions of the mind. But as the philosopher witnesses, man is a political being, and his most absorbing and interesting earthly pursuit is exactly "the strife of political life," which is only the perfect development of social life. If it were true that the subjects of the Pope are *ex vi termini* deprived of political action, that would be an invincible argument against the maintenance of the temporal power. The speech of Bishop Ullathorne is, however, decidedly the most elaborate argument that the great controversy has called forth in England, and will do good and permanent service if published separately. We hope, if that is done, that some inaccuracies of statement will be removed which would seriously impair its authority.

Feb. 14. Mr. Spooner renewed his usual motion against the Maynooth grant, which was negatived without any debate. The short discussion which took place on this occasion was remarkable, because the veteran performer announced that it would probably be his last appearance in the character which has made him famous, and because it appears that he is not to go without leaving behind him a worthy successor in the person of his disciple, Mr. Long. Indeed we do not doubt that there are in the country five hundred as good as he. But the difference between Mr. Spooner and his follower is, that the latter took higher ground than is now customary with no-popery leaders. Generally speaking, it is disloyalty of the Irish Catholics, the teaching at Maynooth, the doubt Catholics are supposed to entertain as to the legitimacy of the royal family, which have furnished an argument which was powerful in Elizabeth's reign. It is not so much for the sake of the Established Church as of the State, that Maynooth ought to be deprived of its supplies; not because Catho-

licism is, in the words of Lord Derby, religiously corrupt, but because it is politically dangerous. Now the argument that every government must profess some religion, and cannot be expected to support other religions, afforded much firmer ground for attacks on the Maynooth grant, and was founded on a principle which most Catholic governments have followed. But this consideration has lost much of its power in the political world, and now it is the fear of Ultramontanism that predominates among men who see the jealousy with which, in other countries, the Church is often regarded; who know that in many Catholic states her freedom has been taken from her, the limits and manner of her teaching have been prescribed to her, whilst her hands have been fettered and her mouth gagged in order that her natural influence might not stand in the way of systems of policy. The example of Catholic countries undoubtedly confirms these men in their idea that Catholicism is essentially opposed to good government, but may be abridged and adapted to suit even Protestant views. It must be confessed that the existence on one side of a party which forgets the things that are Cæsar's, provokes on the other side an oblivion of the things that are God's. Abroad, the freedom of the Church has often been curtailed for the sake, not of another religion, but of the State. Now in a free country the faith of the minority is secure, and this is a test of a country which tends towards freedom. In Prussia the Church enjoys greater liberty than she possessed before the Concordat in Austria. It is instructive for the political character of the two states to compare the decrees relative to Protestants issued last year by the infidel government of France with the Protestant Patent in Austria, where, since the Concordat, the Protestants have obtained concessions and securities for which the Catholics of this country are still vainly struggling.

Finance.

The estimates for the navy are increased, not only by the necessity of keeping on a level with the growing force of foreign countries, but by the

necessity of going on with the total reconstruction of our fleet, which steam has made necessary, and which is still far from being completed. "It behoves us," said Lord Paget in bringing in the naval estimates, "immediately to set to work to regain that superiority of which the introduction of steam has temporarily deprived us." The strength of our fleet is directly determined by that of the fleets of the other maritime powers, France and Russia. These are now ostensibly our only formidable competitors. In the old war we had many other enemies to encounter at sea. In the year 1800, we had captured 25 ships of the line, and 64 frigates and sloops from the Dutch; 8 ships of the line, 67 frigates and sloops from the Spaniards; besides 45 ships of the line, and 275 other men-of-war from the French. Afterwards, 17 ships of the line were taken or destroyed at Trafalgar; and in 1807 we seized the Danish fleet, consisting of 18 ships of the line, and 15 frigates. In this way our maritime supremacy was obtained, and three naval powers permanently destroyed. But France has formed a new fleet, which is still untried, but which is, in numbers and armament, extremely powerful. Their force is as follows: ships of the line afloat, 32; building, 5; frigates afloat, 34; building, 13; corvettes afloat, 17; building, 2; gunboats afloat, 39; building, 29; including all other men-of-war, 244 steam-ships afloat, and 61 building. Among the latter are five iron-cased ships. Most of those which are building might be launched in a few weeks; and although the greater part of those afloat are in reserve, still every one of those 244 vessels could be manned and sent to sea in a very few weeks. At the same time the Russians are making great efforts to improve their navy. In this they are eagerly and efficiently assisted by the Americans, who build many of their ships, and most of their machinery, and who have a political as well as a commercial object in so assisting them. At the close of the late war, an English traveller met a party of American engineers and contractors in the Baltic, and heard them declare that the Russian navy would be in a few years

the first in the world. The secret of its increase, and in great part of its efficiency, lies in the league with the Americans. It now consists of the following force : ships of the line afloat, 9 ; building, 9 ; frigates afloat 18 ; building, 3 ; corvettes afloat, 10 ; building, 11 ; gunboats afloat, 112 ; building, 25 ; all other men-of-war included, 187 steam-vessels afloat, and 48 building.

The present naval force of England amounts to 48 line-of-battle ships afloat, of which 28 are steamers, and 11 building, two of which are to be launched within the next two months, and eight more within the year. Frigates, 34 afloat, 9 building or converting ; corvettes, 16 afloat, 5 building ; sloops, 80 afloat, and 15 building ; gunboats, 169 afloat, 23 building ; besides 4 iron-cased ships, two of 6000 tons and two of 3368 tons each. In all, 68 men-of-war of 40,000 tons in the aggregate ; and 18,800 horse-power, at 55*l.* 15*s.* each horse-power, all to be added to the fleet in the ensuing year. The crews are to be increased by 11,700 men and boys. All the ships in commission are fully manned, and there is no difficulty in getting men. But the naval reserve scheme, which it was hoped would give a force of 30,000 men, has not been successful, as the seamen are afraid that if they volunteer for the reserve they will be employed at once on active service. At present the total force of seamen and marines afloat and for the coast-guard service is 85,500. There are 55 men-of-war, but no ships of the line, in China.

The army for India amounts this year to 92,490 men, and the home army to 143,362 ; in all, 235,852. The actual increase over last year is only 6,456. By far the smallest, and far the most expensive of all the great armies.

On Friday, February 17, in moving the army estimates, Mr. Sidney Herbert described as follows the relative proportion of the army to the whole population in different countries : "In England, with a population of 28,000,000, you have an army of 220,000, being a force in proportion to your population of one to 128 persons. In France, with a population of 36,000,000, you have an army of 378,000 men, which, mind you,

is the number taken from the estimates, that hardly ever agree with the number actually borne on the army. That is one in 95. In Russia, with a population of 65,000,000, the army numbers 900,000, which is one in 72. In Austria, with a population of 40,000,000, there is an army of 587,000, or one in 68. In Prussia, with a population of 17,000,000, there is an army of 211,000, or one in 80. In Spain, with a population of 17,000,000, there is an army of 142,000, or one in 119. That comparison, it will be seen, puts England lowest in proportion of troops to the population."

The total outlay upon the two arms for the ensuing year is 29,700,000*l.*, being an increase of 3,618,000*l.* on the vote of last year, and very nearly double the vote of 1852.

This great increase of expenditure, due partly to the state of European politics, partly to the China war, aggravated by a loss of revenue from the treaty of commerce with France, had to be provided for in the Budget, which was introduced in a speech of four hours, on 10th February—a day memorable in the annals of finance. The expenditure is estimated at 70,100,000*l.*, and the income stood at 60,700,000*l.*, leaving a deficit of 9,400,000*l.* The Chinese war causes an excess of 1,170,000*l.* in the war estimates, and the French treaty produces a deficiency in the customs of 640,000*l.* In addition to this, a further extensive measure is proposed for the alteration of the customs' duties.

Mr. Gladstone said, "We propose to abolish, entirely and immediately, the duty on butter, which yields 95,000*l.* ; the duty on tallow, which yields 87,000*l.* ; the duty on cheese, which yields 44,000*l.* ; on oranges and lemons, yielding 32,000*l.* ; on eggs, 22,000*l.* ; on nuts, 12,000*l.* ; on nutmegs, 11,000*l.* ; paper, 10,000*l.* ; liquorice, 9000*l.* ; dates, 7000*l.* ; and various other minor articles, the total of these abolitions amounting to 382,000*l.* I propose likewise a reduction of duties upon five articles of great importance, one of which strikes at the principal differential duty, except those which we have killed by the French treaty—namely, the duty on timber. I propose to

reduce the duty on timber from 7*s.* 6*d.* and 15*s.* to the colonial rate of 1*s.* and 2*s.* There will be a relief of 400,000*l.* to the consumer, but a considerable recovery by increased consumption. The next article, the duty on which I propose to reduce, with the approval of the House, is the duty on currants. There is no article of greater importance to the mass of the community. All those of the labouring classes who are in good circumstances are large consumers of currants. The duty on currants ought to have been reduced many years ago; but it was impossible, in consequence of the almost entire failure of the crop, which made it impracticable to act upon the consumption by the reduction of the duty. The duty on currants is now 15*s.* 9*d.*; we propose to reduce it to 7*s.* per cwt., which will involve a loss of 170,000*l.* This, however, will be compensated by increased consumption. We propose to reduce the duty on raisins from 10*s.* to 7*s.*; on figs, from 10*s.* to 7*s.* I also propose to reduce a duty, with regard to which I shall have to give a further explanation—the duty on hops. I propose to reduce the duty on hops from 45*s.* to 14*s.* The total amount of these reductions will be 650,000*l.* and the abolitions 382,000*l.* There will be a small article of blacking, which will be postponed, making a gross loss of 1,035,000*l.*, but the increase of consumption will only entail a total loss, as estimated, of 910,000*l.*”

The abolition of the excise duty on paper will involve a loss to the revenue of 1,000,000*l.* It was defended as follows: “Above all, let me say the great advantage of this change, in my opinion, and in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, is, that you will promote a diffused demand, and a demand for rural labour; that you will not merely stimulate the process of massing people in great centres of industry, but the demand for labour all over the country. Where there are streams, where there are villages, where there is pure and good air, and tolerable access, there are the places where the paper manufacture delights to rest itself.”

The portion of the Budget relating

to remission or loss of payments is summed up thus: “The number of articles subject to customs’ duties in 1842 was 1052; in 1845, 1163 articles; for I must remind the House that the first operation of the reform of the tariff was to multiply the number of articles, in consequence of an increase of the headings under which they were specified. In 1853, the number of articles was 466; in 1859, 419. After the changes now proposed are adopted, without allowing for a few subdivisions, such as the specification of two or three classes of sugar, the whole number of articles remaining on the tariff will be 48. There are three classes of articles, including in all 15, such as sugar, tea, tobacco, wine, coffee, timber, raisins, &c., which are in reality the only articles that will be retained on the tariff for purposes of revenue. Besides those 15 articles, there are 29 which, though yielding revenue, are only retained on special grounds. Thus five articles are retained on account of countervailing duties on domestic articles, and 24 on account of their resemblance to one or other of the 15 articles I have adverted to. We could not, for example, admit eau-de-Cologne free of duty while there is a duty on brandy. It thus follows that your customs’ revenue will be derived substantially from 15 articles. That is a result which I hope custom-house reformers will be of opinion justifies the changes we have made. There will be a relief from indirect taxation of about 4,000,000*l.* Out of that, 1,000,000*l.* paper duty will go directly to stimulate the demand for rural labour; 1,800,000*l.*, or the greater part of 2,000,000*l.*, under the French treaty, will in every instance strike at differential duties, and will be the means of removing from the tariff its greatest, perhaps its only remaining deformities. There will be on the British tariff, after the adoption of these changes, nothing whatever in the nature of protective or differential duties, unless you apply that name to the small charges which will be levied upon timber and corn, which amount in general, perhaps, to about 3 per cent. With that limited exception you will have a final disappearance of all protective

and differential duties, and the consumer will know that every shilling he pays will go to the revenue, and not to the domestic as against the foreign producer. You will have a great extension and increase of trade, you will have a remission of the principal restraints upon travellers, and a great reduction in the expenses of the customs and excise departments."

To meet all this, the government proposed, 1st, a penny taxation, levying upon all goods imported and exported, by way of registration due, a duty of one penny a package. This will produce 300,000*l.* a year.

2d. Bonding, 120,000*l.*

3d. A duty on chicory, 90,000*l.*, being a total of 510,000*l.* additional in customs.

4th. Items of inland revenue, altogether 386,000*l.*

5th. Saving on customs and inland revenue establishments, 86,000*l.*

6th. Resumption of malt and hop credits, 1,400,000*l.*

7th. The income-tax will be renewed at a rate only higher by one penny than that which it would be necessary under any circumstances to propose—viz. at 10*d.* in the pound. The assessment will be 10*d.* in the pound on incomes above 150*l.*, and 7*d.* in the pound below that amount.

The total estimated income will thus be 70,564,000*l.*, giving a surplus of 464,000*l.*

Mr. Gladstone concluded with the following peroration: "There were times of old when sovereigns made progress through the land, and when, at the proclamation of their heralds, they caused to be scattered heaps of coin among the people. That may have been a goodly spectacle; but it is also a goodly spectacle, in the altered spirit and circumstances of our times, when a sovereign is enabled, through the wisdom of her great council assembled in parliament, again to scatter blessings among the people in the shape of wise and prudent laws, which do not sap in any respect the foundations of duty, but which strike away the shackles from the arm of industry, which give new incentive and new reward to toil, and which win more and more for the Throne and for the institutions of the country the grati-

tude, the confidence, and the love of a united people. Let me even say to those who are justly anxious on the subject of our national defences, that that which stirs the flame of patriotism in men, that which binds them together, that which gives them increased confidence in their rulers, that which makes them feel and know that they are treated justly, and that we who represent them are labouring incessantly and earnestly for their good—is in itself no small, no feeble, and no transitory part of national defence."

Perhaps the most remarkable circumstance about the speech of Mr. Gladstone was, his complaint of the readiness with which such a heavy Budget is borne by the people. Lord Castlereagh, he said, had complained of the ignorant impatience of taxation shown by the English people; but he was rather inclined to complain of their ignorant patience of taxation. These words indicate the inconsistent character of the Budget. The principal item in it is the commercial treaty, which is to prove and to secure the continuation of intimate relations of friendship with France. But if we are on such friendly terms with France, it is hard to say why our army and navy are to cost near 30,000,000*l.* The unpleasant task of explaining these reasons was left to the representatives of the Admiralty and of the War Office.

When it is remembered that the treaty was negotiated by an advocate of perpetual peace, and that its chief approver and defender at home is a statesman who shares in no degree the popular feelings of fear or of hatred towards the Emperor of the French, it is hardly unnatural to suppose that certain articles, which place England at a great disadvantage with respect to war, were designed for the purpose of imposing the policy of those men on the country, by making it all but impossible to go to war.

The Treaty of Commerce with France.

The immediate loss to the revenue from the Treaty with France obliges the government to impose the additional income-tax. The statesmen,

who are friends and admirers of the French government, describe it as having been concluded primarily for political reasons. Mr. Gladstone describes it as follows: "I know that this treaty may be said to bear a political character. The commercial relations of England with France have always borne a political character. What is the history of the system of prohibitions on the one side and on the other which grew up between this country and France? It was simply this: that finding yourselves in political estrangement from her at the time of the Revolution, you followed up and confirmed that estrangement both on the one side and the other by a system of prohibitory duties. And I do not deny that it was effectual for its end. I don't mean for its economical end. Economically, it may possibly have been ruinous to both countries; but for its political end, it was effectual. And because it was effectual, I call upon you to legislate now by the reverse of that process. And if you desire to knit together in amity those two great nations whose conflicts have often shaken the world, undo for your purpose that which your fathers did for their purpose, and pursue with equal consistency an end that is more beneficial. Sir, there was once a time when close relations of amity were established between the governments of England and France. It was in the reign of the later Stuarts, and it marks a dark spot in our annals, because it was a union formed in a spirit of domineering ambition on the one side, and of base and vile subserviency on the other. But that, sir, was not a union of the nations; it was a union of the governments. This is not to be a union of the governments; it is to be a union of the nations (*cheers*); and I confidently say again, as I have already ventured to say in this house, that there never can be a union between the nations of England and France, except a union beneficial to the world, because directly either the one or the other begins to harbour schemes of selfish aggrandisement (*Opposition cheers*), that moment the jealousy of its neighbour will powerfully react; and the very fact of their being in harmony will of itself be the most conclusive proof that neither of

them can meditate any thing which is dangerous to Europe."

The same day Lord John Russell said: "When the hon. gentleman asks whether the rejection of this treaty is to be followed by a possible disturbance of the friendly relations between this country and France, I must tell him our argument is, that the tendency of the treaty is to promote friendly relations between the two governments. We believe it would work gradually, but surely, in improving those relations, and that the benefits both countries would derive from an exchange of each other's productions and manufactures would form such bonds of amity, that it would be found more difficult to create ill-feeling between them than had been the case in past times."

In the autumn, Mr. Cobden, going to Paris on his own affairs, was assured by government that they would be glad to effect an arrangement by which commerce should be facilitated between the two countries. It was some time before any thing came of it.

1. Dec. 23. Lord Cowley writes to Lord John Russell: "Your Lordship has no doubt been informed that confidential communications have been going on for some weeks past between Mr. Cobden, on the one hand, and M. Rouher, the Minister of Commerce, on the other. . . . Count Walewski having requested to see me, I waited upon his Excellency yesterday. Count Walewski said, that neither the Emperor nor himself had overlooked the advantages which might result to the two countries by increased commercial facilities, as nothing would tend more to allay the irritation which unfortunately prevailed on both sides of the Channel." The confidential communications only obtained an official character about the time of the appearance of the pamphlet, *Le Pape et le Congrès*. Lord John Russell's published answer is dated Jan. 17th, 1860; what confidential or official communications were exchanged in the interval, respecting Italian affairs, must remain in obscurity. Lord John says: "But over and above these considerations, they attach a high social and political value to the conclusion of a

commercial treaty with France. Its general tendency would be to lay broad and deep foundations in common interest and in friendly intercourse for the confirmation of the amicable relations that so happily exist between the two countries; and while thus making a provision for the future, which would progressively become more and more solid and efficacious; its significance at the present moment, when the condition of some parts of the Continent is critical, would be at once understood, and would powerfully reassure the public mind in the various countries of Europe.

On this account her Majesty's government are prepared to entertain a negotiation on such a footing as will, they trust, give promise not only of a favourable, but of a speedy issue."

The Treaty was signed at Paris, January 23d, and ratified February 4th, 1860. The chief provisions are as follows:

I. H. M. the Emperor of the French engages, that on the following articles of British production and manufacture, imported from the United Kingdom into France, the duties shall in no case exceed 30 per cent *ad valorem*, the two additional decimes included.

Refined sugar. Iron forged in lumps or prisms. Soap. Stoneware. Earthenware. China and porcelain-ware. Glass, crystal, mirrors, and plate-glass. Cotton yarn. Worsted and woollen yarn. Yarns of flax and hemp. Cotton manufactures, and all worsted and woollen manufactures. Cloth list. Silk manufactures. Manufactures of flax and hemp. Mixed manufactures of every description. Hosiery. Haberdashery and small wares. Articles of clothing, wholly or in part made up. Prepared skins. Articles of every sort manufactured from leather or skins. Plated articles. Cutlery. Metal wares. Pig and cast iron of every description, without distinction of weight. Bar and wrought iron, with the exception of the kinds specified in Article XVII. Steel. Machinery, tools, and mechanical instruments. Brandies and spirits, including those not distilled from wine, cherries, molasses, or rice. Ships and boats, &c. &c. &c.

II. His Imperial Majesty engages

to reduce the import duties in France on British coal and coke to the amount of 15c. for the hundred kilogrammes, with the addition of the two decimes.

His Majesty the Emperor also engages, within four years from the date of the ratification of the present treaty, to establish upon the importation of coal and coke by land and by sea a uniform duty, which shall not exceed that which is fixed by the preceding paragraph.

III. It is understood that the rates of duty mentioned in the preceding articles are independent of the differential duties in favour of French shipping, with which duties they shall not interfere.

IV. The duties *ad valorem* stipulated in the present treaty shall be calculated on the value at the place of production or fabrication of the object imported, with the addition of the cost of transport, insurance, and commission, necessary for the importation into France as far as the port of discharge.

For the levying of these duties the importer shall make a written declaration at the Custom-house, stating the value and description of the goods imported. If the Custom-house authorities shall be of opinion that the declared value is insufficient, they shall be at liberty to take the goods on paying to the importer the price declared, with an addition of 5 per cent.

This payment, together with the restitution of any duty which may have been levied upon such goods, shall be made within the 15 days following the declaration.

V. Her Britannic Majesty engages to recommend to Parliament to enable her to abolish the duties of importation on the following articles:

Arms. Jewels. Toys. Corks. Embroideries and needlework. Brass and bronze manufactures, and bronzed metal. Gloves, stockings, socks, and other articles of cotton or linen, wholly or in part made up. Leather manufactures. Lace manufactured of cotton, wool, silk, or linen. Manufactures of iron and steel. Machinery and mechanical instruments, tools, and other instruments. Cutlery, and other articles of steel, iron, or cast-iron. Millinery and artificial flowers. Raw fruits. Gloves and

other leathern articles of clothing. Oils. Musical instruments. Worsted and woollen shawls, plain, printed, or patterned. Coverlids, woollen gloves, and other worsted and woollen manufactures. Handkerchiefs and other manufactures of linen and hemp. Perfumery. Cabinet-ware, carved work, and turnery. Clocks, watches, and opera-glasses. Manufactures of lead. China and porcelain-ware. Stone and earthen-ware. Grapes. Manufactures of silk, or of silk mixed with any other materials, of whatever description they may be, &c. &c. &c.

Articles not enumerated in the tariff, now paying an *ad-valorem* duty of 10 per cent; subject, however, to such measures of precaution as the protection of the public revenue may require, against the introduction of materials liable to custom or excise duties, in the composition of articles admitted duty free in virtue of the present paragraph.

VI. Her Britannic Majesty engages also to propose to parliament that the duties on the importation of French wine be at once reduced to a rate not exceeding 3s. a gallon, and that from the 1st of April 1861, the duties on importation shall be regulated as follows:

1. On wine containing less than 15 degrees of proof spirit, verified by Sykes's hydrometer, the duty shall not exceed 1s. a gallon.

2. On wine containing from 15 to 26 degrees, the duty shall not exceed 1s. 6d. a gallon.

3. On wine containing from 26 to 40 degrees, the duty shall not exceed 2s. a gallon.

4. On wine in bottles, the duty shall not exceed 2s. a gallon.

5. Wine shall not be imported at any other ports than those which shall be named for that purpose before the present treaty shall come into force, her Britannic Majesty reserving to herself the right of substituting other ports for those which shall have been originally named, or of increasing the number of them.

The duty fixed upon the importation of wine at ports other than those named, shall be 2s. a gallon.

VII. Her Britannic Majesty promises to recommend to parliament to admit into the United Kingdom mer-

chandise imported from France at a rate of duty equal to the excise duty which is or shall be imposed upon articles of the same description in the United Kingdom. At the same time the duty chargeable upon the importation of such merchandise may be augmented by such a sum as shall be an equivalent for the expenses which the system of excise may entail upon the British producer.

VIII. In accordance with the preceding Article, her Britannic Majesty undertakes to recommend to parliament the admission into the United Kingdom of brandies and spirits imported from France at a duty exactly equal to the excise duty levied upon home-made spirits, with the addition of a surtax of 2d. a gallon, which will make the actual duty payable on French brandies and spirits 8s. 2d. the gallon.

Her Britannic Majesty further undertakes to recommend to parliament the admission of gold and silver plate imported from France at a duty equal to the stamp or excise duty which is charged on British gold and silver plate.

IX. It is understood between the two high contracting powers, that if one of them thinks it necessary to establish an excise tax or inland duty upon any article of home production or manufacture which is comprised among the preceding enumerated articles, the foreign imported article of the same description may be immediately liable to an equivalent duty on importation.

It is equally understood between the high contracting powers, that in case the British government should deem it necessary to increase the excise duties levied upon home-made spirits, the duties on the importation of wines may be modified in the following manner:

"For every increase of 1s. per gallon of spirits on the excise duty there may be on wines which pay 1s. 6d. duty an augmentation not exceeding 1½d. per gallon; and on wines which pay 2s. an augmentation not exceeding 2½d. per gallon.

X. The two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the power of levying upon all articles mentioned in the present treaty, or upon any other article, landing or shipping

dues, in order to pay the expenses of all necessary establishments at the ports of importation and exportation.

But in all that relates to local treatment, the dues and charges in the ports, basins, docks, roadsteads, harbours, and rivers of the two countries, the privileges, favours, or advantages which are or shall be granted to national vessels generally, or to the goods imported or exported in them, shall be equally granted to the vessels of the other country, and to the goods imported or exported in them.

XI. The two high contracting Powers engage not to prohibit the exportation of coal, and to levy no duty upon such exportation.

XII. The subjects of one of the two high contracting Powers shall in the dominions of the other enjoy the same protection as native subjects in regard to the rights of property in trade-marks and in patterns of every description.

XIII. The *ad-valorem* duties established within the limits fixed by the preceding articles shall be converted into specific duties by a supplementary convention, which shall be concluded before the 1st of July 1860. The medium prices during the six months preceding the date of the present treaty shall be taken as the basis for this conversion.

Duties shall, however, be levied in conformity with the bases above established :

1. In the event of this supplementary convention not having come into force before the expiration of the period fixed for the execution by France of the present treaty.

2. Upon those articles the specific duties on which shall not have been settled by common consent.

XIV. The present Treaty shall be binding for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland so soon as the necessary legislative sanction shall have been given by parliament, with the reserve made in Article VI. respecting wines.

Further, her Britannic Majesty reserves to herself the power of retaining, upon special grounds, and by way of exception, during a period not exceeding two years, dating from the 1st of April 1860, half of the du-

ties on those articles the free admission of which is stipulated by the present treaty.

This reserve, however, does not apply to articles of silk manufacture.

XV. The engagements contracted by his Majesty the Emperor of the French shall be fulfilled, and the tariffs previously indicated as payable on British goods and manufactures shall be applied, within the following periods:

1. For coal and coke, from the 1st of July 1860.

2. For bar and pig iron, and for steel of the kinds which are not subject to prohibition, from the 1st of October 1860.

3. For worked metals, machines, tools, and mechanical instruments of all sorts, within a period which shall not exceed the 31st of December 1860.

4. For yarns and manufactures in flax and hemp, from the 1st of June 1861.

5. And for all other articles, from the 1st of October 1861.

XVI. His Majesty the Emperor of the French engages that the *ad-valorem* duties payable on the importation into France of merchandise of British production and manufacture, shall not exceed a *maximum* of 25 per cent, from the 1st of October 1864.

XIX. Each of the two high contracting Powers engages to confer on the other any favour, privilege, or reduction in the tariff of duties of importation on the articles mentioned in the present Treaty which the said Power may concede to any third Power. They further engage not to enforce one against the other any prohibition of importation or exportation which shall not at the same time be applicable to all other nations.

XXI. The present Treaty shall remain in force for the space of ten years, to date from the day of the exchange of ratifications; and in case neither of the high contracting Powers shall have notified to the other, twelve months before the expiration of the said period of ten years, the intention to put an end to its operation, the Treaty shall continue in force for another year, and so on from year to year until the expiration of a year, counting from the day on which one or other of the

high contracting Powers shall have announced its intention to put an end to it.

The high contracting Powers reserve to themselves the right to in-

troduce by common consent into this Treaty any modification which is not opposed to its spirit and principles, and the utility of which shall have been shown by experience.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Under this head we must confine ourselves to the subject which engrosses the attention of Europe, the dispute between the Pope and the Emperor. Our last chronicle of current events closed at a time when all things had been arranged for the meeting of a Congress to settle the affairs of Italy, but on the very eve of an event which balked the general expectation. The Roman government had assented to the Congress, when, December 19th, the Paris and London newspapers announced that an official pamphlet was about to appear, describing the views of the Emperor respecting the settlement in Italy.

1. *December 22.* The pamphlet *Le Pape et le Congrès* was published anonymously, appearing in the *Times* in English, and in the *Cologne Gazette* in German, on the morning of the day on which it was published at Paris.

The writer begins by stating that "between those who, detesting the temporal power of the Pope, loudly invoke his fall, and those who, looking upon that power as an article of faith, will not allow it to be touched, there is place for a less exclusive opinion in one sense or the other."

This opinion he proceeds to define. The Pope must be absolutely independent of every other power. He once had the misfortune to become dependent, not, as has been erroneously supposed, on France, but on Germany; and the experiment can never be repeated.

"In a religious point of view, it is essential that the Pope should be a sovereign. In a political point of view, it is necessary that the head of 200,000,000 of Catholics should not be dependent on any one, not be subservient to any power; and that the august hand which sways the souls, free from all trammels,

"should be able to soar above all human passions. . . . At a former period, a successor of St. Peter had the misfortune to allow his authority to be absorbed in the '*Holy German Empire.*' Europe was deeply shaken by it, and that disturbance of its moral and political equilibrium lasted for nearly three centuries."

But the Church is interested only in his independence, and in the possession of as much territory as is necessary to secure it. The size of the territory is immaterial, provided the purpose is attained; indeed, it is better for the Church that it should be as small as possible, for the functions of the State being in contradiction with the obligations of the Church, the Papal government cannot accomplish both, and cannot be either good or popular.

"How can the Pope be at the same time pontiff and king? How can the man of the Gospel, who forgives, be the man of the law, who punishes? How can the head of the Church, who excommunicates heretics, be the head of the State, who protects freedom of conscience? Such is the problem to be solved. Doubtless the problem is difficult. There is, in some measure, antagonism between the prince and the pontiff confounded in the same personification. The pontiff is bound by principles of divine order which he cannot discard. The prince has to respond to the claims of society, which he cannot disown. . . . If we were to seek for the solution of this problem in the customary forms of the government of peoples, we should not find it. There does not exist in the world a constitution of a nature to conciliate exigencies so diverse. It is neither by monarchy nor by liberty that this end can be ob-

"tained. The power of the Pope
"can only be a paternal power; he
"must rather resemble a family than
"a State. Thus, not only is it not
"necessary that his territory should
"be of large extent, but we think
"that it is even essential that it
"should be limited. The smaller the
"territory, the greater will be the
"sovereign. . . .

"A great State implies certain re-
"quirements which it is impossible
"for the Pope to satisfy. A great
"State would like to follow up the
"politics of the day, to perfect its
"institutions, participate in the ge-
"neral movement of ideas, take ad-
"vantage of the transformations of
"the age, of the conquests of science,
"of the progress of the human mind.
"He cannot do it. The laws will be
"shackled by dogmas. His autho-
"rity will be paralysed by traditions.
"His patriotism will be condemned
"by faith."

An ecclesiastical State cannot be
great and prosperous by the same
means as another State. Now, the
larger the territory, the greater are
the demands on the central power,
and the inclination to be involved in
the interests and passions of other
countries, and to be carried along by
currents which prevail elsewhere,—
demands and inclinations with which
the Pope cannot comply.

"Thus, then, the temporal power
"of the Pope is necessary and legi-
"timate; but it is incompatible with
"a State of any extent. It is only
"possible if exempt from all the or-
"dinary conditions of power; that
"is to say, from every thing that
"constitutes its activity, its develop-
"ment, its progress. It must exist
"without an army, without a par-
"liament, so to say, without a code
"of laws or a court of justice."

Since, therefore, all the legitimate
claims of a great State necessarily re-
main without their fulfilment where
the Pope is the ruler, the larger the
number of his subjects, the greater
are the amount and the reasons of
discontent, and the greater, therefore,
the danger. To be a subject of the
Pope, then, great sacrifices of all ter-
ritorial advantages are required; and
it is a privilege which few can be ex-
pected to purchase at that price ex-
cept the people of Rome itself. The

Romans will be easily induced to pay
the needful penalty, because, having
been formerly great in arms and re-
nown, their chief enjoyment must
naturally be to cultivate the memo-
ries and ruins of their faded great-
ness, and to revel in the pride of
being a Roman citizen. Fallen as
they are, it is more fitting and con-
soling for them not to form a State at
all; but to be placed in an honour-
able and exceptional seclusion, in-
stead of constituting one of the least
and weakest powers.

"Rome belongs, then, to the Head
"of the Church. Should she slip
"away from that august power, she
"would at once lose all her *prestige*;
"Rome, with a tribune, orators, writ-
"ers, a secular government, and a
"prince at the Vatican, would be
"nothing more than a town. Liberty
"would disinherit her. After hav-
"ing given laws to the whole world,
"she can only retain her greatness
"by commanding souls. The Ro-
"man Senate has no other compen-
"sation worthy of it but the Vati-
"can. . . .

"In short, there will be a people
"in Europe who will be ruled less
"by a king than by a father, and
"whose rights will be guaranteed
"rather by the heart of the sove-
"reign than by the authority of the
"laws and institutions. This people
"will have no national representa-
"tion, no army, no press, no magis-
"tracy. The whole of its political
"existence will be limited to its mu-
"nicipal organisation. Beyond that
"narrow circle it will have no other
"resource than contemplation, the
"arts, the study of ruins (*la culture*
"*des ruines*), and prayer. It will
"be for ever disinherited of that no-
"ble portion of activity which in
"every country is the stimulus of
"patriotism, and the legitimate ex-
"ercise of the faculties of the mind
"of superior characters. Under the
"government of the Sovereign Pon-
"tiff there can be no aspiration either
"to the glory of the soldier or the
"triumphs of the orator or of the
"statesman. . . . These considera-
"tions have surely some value, and,
"after all, under such a system, with
"such advantages, and with the
"chance of having great Popes, such
"as history records, it will always

"be an honour to call oneself a Roman citizen—*civis Romanus*."

The Roman citizen will be exempt from taxation, because he cannot be expected to supply what is required for the supreme government of the Church, and the splendour of the court of Rome; which it is the interest and the duty of all Catholic governments to preserve.

"It is for the Catholic powers to provide the means which concern them all by a large tribute paid to the Holy Father."

In a few words:

"Necessity of maintaining the temporal power of the Pope;

"Necessity of divesting it as much as possible of all the responsibilities incumbent upon a government, and of placing the Head of the Church in a sphere where his spiritual authority can neither be shackled nor compromised by his political authority;

"Necessity, to achieve this, of restricting instead of extending his territory, and of diminishing rather than increasing the number of his subjects;

"Necessity of giving to the population of these states, thus deprived of the advantages of a political existence, compensations by a paternal and economical administration;—

"Such is the substance of what we have endeavoured to demonstrate."

This plan is not only admirably suited to the interests of religion and of the present subjects of the Pope, but it happens just now to be the only practicable solution of the Roman question. For a portion of the Papal States are in revolt; the moral influence of France has failed to induce them to submit; they cannot therefore be brought back except by force. Now the use of force is inconsistent with the sacred and peaceful character of the Pontiff; and, moreover, there is nobody who can possibly exercise it in his behalf. France interferes in the affairs of other states only to abet subjects in their resistance to their sovereigns, not to defend the rights of princes. Austria has often made the duty of upholding legitimate rights a means of extending her influence in Italy; but

France will prevent her from using that pretext now to recover an authority which it was the purpose of the Italian war to destroy.

"A pontifical army ought not to be more than an emblem of public order. When enemies are to be fought, either at home or abroad, it is not for the Head of the Church to draw the sword. Blood shed in his name seems an insult to Divine mercy, which he represents; when he raises his hand it ought to be to bless, and not to strike.

"Let us go still further, and ask who will be charged with this restoration by force? Would it be France? Would it be Austria?

"France! But she cannot do it. A Catholic nation, she would never consent to strike so serious a blow at the moral power of Catholicism. A liberal nation, she could not compel a people to submit to a government which their will rejects.

"As regards compelling peoples, France is not used to such work. When she meddled in their affairs it was to enfranchise them, and not to oppress them. Under Louis XVI. we went to the new world to help it to achieve its nationality. Belgium and the Danubian Principalities are indebted to us for their political existence. It is not the Emperor who could prove unfaithful to these generous traditions.

"The domination of Austria in Italy is at an end. This is the grand result of our campaign, consecrated by the peace of Villafranca.

"France, then, cannot intervene for the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Pope in the Romagna, and she cannot allow Austria to have recourse to force to compel the populations, when she rejects its employment on her own account."

Nothing, therefore, remains but that the same authority which gave the Romagna to the Pope should take it away,—namely, a European Congress. Indeed it is peculiarly right that it should do so, because when the Congress of Vienna determined that the Pope was to have

the Legations they were not in his power, and the Congress had to decree a change in the existing order of things. In decreeing the separation, a new Congress would in fact make good the error of the old, by simply sanctioning events which have already happened, and recognising a situation that actually exists. This is a far smaller exercise of power, inasmuch as facts are more sacred than rights. If this were not, the Pope might even advance a legitimate claim upon Avignon, which is a palpable *reductio ad absurdum* of the argument drawn from moral rights and obligations.

"The Congress of Paris has full power to alter what was settled by the Congress of Vienna. Europe, combined at Vienna in 1815, gave the Romagna to the Pope; Europe, combined at Paris in 1860, may decide otherwise in regard to it.

"And, let it be observed, the last decision, should it be contrary to that of 1815, would not bear the same character as the first. In 1815, the Powers disposed of the people of Romagna; in 1860, if they are not placed under the authority of the Pope, the Powers of Europe only formally record a *fait accompli*.

"Now, either the territory of the Church, as some maintain, is an inalienable and indivisible patrimony that may not be touched, in which case the sovereignty over the Department of Vaucluse ought to be restored to the Pope, or else this territory is, like all others, liable to changes; and then it is permitted to pious, but independent, minds to discuss its more or less extent."

It is well known that the conclusion is, that the Pope must make up his mind to surrender not only the territory which has rebelled, but a large portion that has remained faithful, in obedience to the decision of the Congress; and the author of the pamphlet is very sorry he cannot help him. But he is a sincere Catholic, and whoever is not persuaded by his arguments is either a fool or a knave.

"We believe there is another course that may be taken. First,

"we wish that the Congress should recognise, as an essential principle of European order, the necessity of the temporal power of the Pope. That is for us the chief point. The principle here appears to us to have more value than the territorial possession, more or less extensive, that will be its natural consequence. As for this territory itself, the city of Rome includes all that is most important in it; the rest is only secondary. The city of Rome and the Patrimony of St. Peter must be guaranteed to the Sovereign Pontiff by the great Powers, with a considerable revenue, that the Catholic States will pay, as a tribute of respect and protection to the Head of the Church. An Italian militia, chosen from the *élite* of the Federal army, should assure the tranquillity and inviolability of the Holy See. Municipal liberties, as extensive as possible, should release the Papal Government from all the details of administration, and thus give a share of public local life to those who are disinherited of political activity. Finally, every complication, every idea of war and of revolt, must be for ever banished from the territory governed by the Pope, that it may be said, where reigns the Vicar of Christ, there also reign well-being, concord, and peace.

"It is a great calamity, which we deplore from the bottom of our hearts; but it is also a great danger, which it is the duty of all—men of the world and religious men alike—to lessen, for the good of the Church as for the interests of Europe. The Holy See is placed on a volcano, and the Pontiff, who is charged by God to maintain peace in the world, is himself constantly threatened with a revolution. He, the august representative of the highest moral authority on earth, can only maintain himself by the protection of foreign armies. These military occupations only protect him by compromising him. They excite against him all the susceptibilities of the national feeling. They prove that he cannot rely on the love and respect of his people. It is a deplorable position, that

"only blindness and imprudence
"can wish to prolong, but which
"enlightened and respectful attach-
"ment requires should be changed
"as soon as possible. The change
"is both necessary and urgent, and
"only the declared enemies or blind
"friends of the Papacy can resist it."

It is impossible not to see the perfidy and absurdity of these arguments; but it would be dangerous to overlook the elements of truth which they contain. It is perfectly true that extent of territory does not add to the security of independence, and that a very much smaller territory might possibly be just as effective. It is also true that so long as a portion of the inhabitants are disaffected, the dominion over the disaffected portion is a source, not of freedom, but of dependence, to the Papal authority. Nor would any restoration by force of arms establish a peaceful dominion; whilst the causes which have produced these troubles, and which cannot be removed by the influence of the Powers or by political reforms, continue active. Even the argument founded on the incompatibility of the Catholic system with that of the modern state is right, though it is a *petitio principii* to say that therefore the Church must give way. Between all these premises and the conclusions they are made to prepare there is no connection whatever. All notions of right and wrong in politics are disregarded. In the former pamphlet a fictitious code was set up and appealed to against the claims of Austria. Now, the chief consideration is assumed to be the interests of the Church, and very little ingenuity is displayed in arguing upon them. The artifice of preparing the future destruction of the Papal authority over Rome itself, by elaborately citing reasons so absurd for its continuance, is simply stupid, because it is so transparent, and betrays more of the imperial designs than there was any occasion to expose, and such as must make additional enemies and cannot increase the number of friends.

Altogether, the pamphlet is inferior in literary ability to that which bore the name of La Guéronnière, and to the acknowledged writings of the

Emperor. As a rabbi and a Christian convert helped Mohammed to write the Koran, so it is said that a priest was taken into the councils of the author in order to instruct him in the style of argument that would be acceptable with a party among Catholics. The name of this theological adviser has not been kept a secret; and, whether the story is true or not, it seems probable enough. Although no sovereign was ever so communicative as the Emperor Napoleon, or ever gave the world so many confidential and official notifications of his views, it has been common to call him inscrutable. During the last few months it has become plain, that what was taken for inflexibility of purpose was no more than immobility of intellect; that it was not the power of clinging to his ideas and resolutions, but the want of power of adapting them to facts, and profiting by the lessons of experience, which gave an apparent continuity and consistency to his policy. The new pamphlet is not a development of former ideas, but in contradiction with the intentions which the Emperor has repeatedly expressed, from the time when he was President down to his letter to the King of Sardinia. Pius IX. has openly declared, what it was easy to suppose, that he has in his possession professions and assurances of the Emperor directly at variance with the advice given in the pamphlet. This is to us rather an explanation of the weakness of his argument than a proof of his perfidy. Those professions were, in all likelihood, sincere, so far as the professions of a man can be called sincere, who makes engagements which he knows he may be unable to fulfil, and who breaks them in consequence of obstacles which every body foresaw when he made them. All that he has spoken and written concerning the Papacy proves that he wished to see the government carried on by laymen, with French institutions, but nothing shows that he wished to depose the Pope. That is not the lesson taught by the precepts and the fate of the first Napoleon. In the *Idées Napoléoniennes* there is nothing said as to the policy to be pursued towards the Holy See, but the designs and views of Napoleon I. are clear enough.

From the time of his first Italian campaigns, he refused to obey the orders of the Directory; who, at the instigation of the theophilanthropist La Reveillière Lepaux, desired and directed the deposition of the Pope, and effected it when Bonaparte was in Egypt. And when, ten years later, at the close of his last victorious campaign, he confirmed the unauthorised proceedings of his subordinates, by whom Pius VII. had been made a captive, it is known that he did it reluctantly. For he wished not to degrade the Holy See, but to make it an instrument of his power; and his last advice to his family was, that they should endeavour to recover themselves through the court of Rome. At St. Helena he said: "Le Catholicisme me conservait le Pape; et avec mon influence et nos forces en Italie, je ne désespérais pas, tôt ou tard, par un moyen ou par un autre, de finir par avoir à moi la direction de ce Pape; et dès-lors quelle influence! Quel levier d'opinion sur le reste du monde!"* On another occasion he said: "Si je garde Rome pour mon fils, je donnerai Notre Dame au Pape. Mais Paris alors sera élevé si haut dans l'admiration des hommes, que le cathédrale deviendra naturellement celle du monde Catholique."†

The late pamphlet is to us a proof that the present Emperor has at last abandoned his fixed policy, and began to trim his sails according to the wind. It is the first time that he has shown that he understood another saying of his prototype—"I was not mad enough to wish to twist events after my own design, but, on the contrary, I adapted my design to the position of events."‡ Deluded by the great services which a party of the French Catholics had continued to render him for more than ten years, he had hoped that the Church would still be his instrument. He has been obliged to make up his mind to have her for his enemy, not from any hostility on his part to religion, or from the resistance of Catholicism to the oppression of France, but simply in consequence of his Italian policy. Having attacked the Austrian in-

fluence in Italy, he could not stop half-way, or recognise the rights of the weak, after trampling on the rights of the strong. His position is so false that his logic cannot be made to appear plausible; and we are persuaded that it is in spite of his own hopes and wishes, that he has so grievously belied the prophecy of a court poet in 1852:

"Artes ingenuæ, labor et commercia rerum
Torporem quatiunt, causa agitante nova;
Ipsaque Relligio veneranda a sede Quirini
Demissum extollit bis recreata caput; . .
Promeritas grates, Princeps invicte, repen-
dunt
Europæ gentes ob benefacta tibi."

2. On the evening when the pamphlet was published, the Emperor and Empress went to see a new piece given for the first time at the Theatre of the Porte St. Martin, called *La Tireuse de Cartes*; and the piece, which was greatly applauded, turned to account the Mortara case, in order to heap odium on the Church. The author of the play, and likewise the immediate author of the pamphlet, is the Emperor's private secretary, M. Mocquard.

3. *December 24.* It was discussed at a council of Ministers whether the pamphlet should be disowned. It was decided that the *Moniteur* should ignore its existence.

Dec. 25. It had been communicated to the Roman government simultaneously with its publication in Paris, and Cardinal Antonelli immediately declared that the Pope could not be represented at the Congress unless satisfactory explanations were given concerning it. Count Walewski assured the nuncio and the Austrian ambassador, that whilst he was minister, it could never be the programme of the French government.

Dec. 28. Russia declared, that if the pamphlet was to be considered to express the views of France, she should not appear at the Congress. It is also said that the Russian government at the same time made certain advances to the Holy See, including an offer of a sum of money. Nevertheless, the old policy of the Emperor Nicholas has been revived against the Catholics, and the sanguine expectations entertained by Haxthausen, and by the Russian Jesuits in France, respecting the in-

* *Mémoires de St. Hélène*, v. 326.

† *Souvenirs du Comte de Narbonne*, 171.

‡ *Idées Napoléoniennes*, 134.

tentions of Alexander II. have been deceived.

4. A new council of ministers was held, in consequence of the protests which had been received. Count Walewski insisted on the necessity of officially repudiating the pamphlet, and he was supported by Count Morny. It was determined not to do it; and it was expected that Walewski would resign in favour of Count Persigny, and that a closer alliance with England would be made to replace the good understanding with the Catholics. The same night, the French envoys at foreign courts were informed by telegraph that the Congress was indefinitely postponed, because "communications relative to the Roman States, interchanged between the government of the Emperor, the cabinet of Vienna, and the Pontifical court, have not as yet led to completely satisfactory explanations."

The reasons are more fully given by Lord Cowley, four days later:

"Your lordship will have been informed by the French Chargé d'Affaires in London that the projected meeting of the Congress on Italian affairs has been indefinitely postponed.

"A pamphlet published in Paris under the title of *Le Pape et le Congrès*, which has created too much stir in the political world not to have attracted your lordship's attention, is the indirect cause of the postponement. The Austrian government, it appears, requires an engagement on the part of the French government neither to bring before the Congress themselves the measures of which the pamphlet is the advocate, nor to support them if brought forward by others

"The French government hesitate at entering into any such engagement; and Austria, in consequence, declines appearing at the Congress, that is, she declares that she will not assist at a Congress in which the Pope is not represented; and it would seem that, although nothing official has as yet been received from Rome, the intention of the Pope is to require the engagement to which I have alluded above before he will send a plenipotentiary to Paris."

5. December 31. The Emperor Na-

poleon wrote to the Pope in reply to a letter of December 2, urging nearly the same views as in the pamphlet, and especially the surrender of the revolted provinces

"One of my greatest anxieties, both during and since the war, has been the situation of the States of the Church; and truly, among the powerful reasons which induced me to make peace so promptly must be reckoned the fear of seeing the revolution acquire every day greater proportions. Facts have an inexorable logic, and in spite of my devotion to the Holy See, in spite of the presence of my troops at Rome, I could not escape from being implicated to a certain extent in the effects of the national movement excited in Italy by the struggle against Austria.

"As soon as peace was concluded, I hastened to write to your Holiness, and to submit to you the ideas best adapted, in my opinion, to bring about the pacification of the Romagnas; and I still think that if at that time your Holiness had consented to an administrative separation of those provinces and to the nomination of a lay governor, they would have returned to your authority. Unhappily that did not take place, and I have found myself powerless to arrest the establishment of the new régime. My efforts have had no further result than to prevent the insurrection from spreading, and the resignation of Garibaldi has preserved the Marches of Ancona from certain invasion.

"Now the Congress is going to assemble. The Powers could not disregard the incontestable rights of the Holy See over the Legations; nevertheless, it is probable that they will be in favour of not having recourse to violence in order to bring them to submission. For, if that submission were obtained by the aid of foreign troops, another long-continued military occupation of the Legations would be necessary. Such an occupation would foster the hatreds and the animosities of a great portion of the Italian people, as well as the jealousy of the great powers; it would, in fact, perpetuate a state of irritation, of uneasiness, and of fear.

"What, then, remains to be done; for it is clear that this uncertainty

cannot last for ever? After a serious examination of the difficulties and the dangers which the different combinations presented, I say it with sincere regret, and however painful the solution may be, what seems to me most in accordance with the true interests of the Holy See, would be to make a sacrifice of the revolted provinces. If the Holy Father, for the repose of Europe, were to renounce those provinces which for the last fifty years have caused so much embarrassment to his government, and were in exchange to demand from the powers that they should guarantee him possession of the remainder, I do not doubt of the immediate restoration of order. Then the Holy Father would assure to grateful Italy peace during long years, and to the Holy See the peaceful possession of the States of the Church."

6. *January 1, 1860.* Before this letter could reach Rome, the French general waited on the Pope to present his congratulations on New Year's Day. He said:

"During the past year great events have transpired. Placed here by orders of our valiant Emperor, and as a manifest proof of his religious respect for your Holiness, we have not been able to share in the honours and glory of the battle-field. We had nothing, we could have nothing, to console us but the constant remembrance that, whilst we were near you and serving your Holiness, we were on the field of honour—the field of Catholicity."

The Pope replied in Italian:

"Prostrating ourselves at the feet of that God who was and is and shall be for ever, we beseech Him in the humility of our heart to cause His graces and His light to descend abundantly upon the august head of your army and nation, that by the guidance of that light he may be able to tread securely his difficult path, and may yet perceive the falsehood of certain principles which have appeared lately in a little book, which may be said to be a signal monument of hypocrisy and an ignoble tissue of contradictions. We hope that, by the aid of that light,—we will rather say we are convinced that, by the aid of that light,—he will condemn the

principles contained in that work; and we are the more convinced of it, inasmuch as we have in our possession several documents which his Majesty has in time past had the goodness to send to us [*possediamo alcuni pezzi che tempo addietro la maestà sua ebbe la bontà di farci avere*] which are a real condemnation of those principles. And it is in this conviction that we implore God to pour His blessings upon the Emperor, upon his august consort, upon the imperial prince, and upon the whole of France."

7. On the same day, at Paris, the Emperor replied as follows to an address of extraordinary brevity, made to him by the nuncio, at the head of the diplomatic body: "I thank the diplomatic body for the good wishes it has addressed to me on the advent of the new year, and I am especially happy this time to have the opportunity of reminding its representatives, that since my accession to power, I have always professed the most profound respect for recognised rights. Be, then, assured that the constant aim of my efforts will be to reëstablish everywhere, insomuch as depends upon me, confidence and peace."

8. *January 4.* Count Walewski, whose organ, the *Pays*, had admitted on the 2d the official character of the pamphlet, after explaining to the representatives of France abroad the reasons which prevent the Congress from assembling, is removed from the Foreign Office, and succeeded by M. de Thouvenel, the French ambassador at Constantinople. This change was understood as a proof that the Emperor was determined to go all lengths against the Holy See.

9. *Jan. 5.* A letter was written by the Emperor to the Minister of Commerce, announcing peaceful reforms in industry, agriculture, and commerce, as a consequence of the certainty of the continuation of peace in Europe. This letter is a result of the negotiations with Mr. Cobden, which were drawing to a close; and its appearance at the very moment of the retirement of the minister who was supposed to be most hostile to England, proves how completely the desire of the English alliance had

prevailed. The most important passages are the following.

"For a long time this truth has been proclaimed, that the means of exchange must be multiplied to render commerce flourishing; that without competition industry remains stationary and maintains high prices, which are opposed to the progress of consumption; that without a prosperous industry, which develops capital, agriculture itself remains in infancy. Every thing, therefore, is bound up in the successive development of the elements of public prosperity. But the essential question is, to ascertain within what limits the State ought to favour these diverse interests, and what order of preference it ought to grant to each.

"Thus, before developing our foreign commerce by the exchange of produce, it is necessary to improve our agriculture, and to liberate our industry from all internal impediments which place it in conditions of inferiority. At the present day, not only are our great enterprises impeded by a host of restrictive regulations, but even the welfare of those who work is far from having attained the development which it has attained in a neighbouring country. There is, therefore, only a general system of good political economy which can, by creating a national wealth, spread comfort among the working classes.

"To encourage industrial productions, you must liberate from every tax all raw material indispensable to industry, and allow it, exceptionally and at a moderate rate, as has already been done for agriculture and drainage, the funds necessary to perfect its material.

"The encouragement to commerce by the multiplication of the means of exchange will then follow as a natural consequence of the preceding measures. The successive reduction of the duty on articles of great consumption will then be a necessity, as also the substitution of protecting duties for the prohibitive system which limits our commercial relations.

"By these measures agriculture will find a market for its produce; industry, set free from internal impediments, assisted by the government, and stimulated by competition,

will compete advantageously with foreign produce, and our commerce, instead of languishing, will receive a new impulse.

"Thus, to resume:—Suppression of the duty on wool and cotton;

Successive reduction on sugar and coffee;

An energetic improvement in the means of communication;

Reduction of canal dues, consequently general reduction on the means of conveyance;

Loans to agriculture and industry;

Considerable works of public utility;

Suppression of prohibitions;

Treaties of commerce with foreign powers;—

"Such are the general bases of the programme to which I beg of you to call the attention of your colleagues, who will have to prepare, without delay, the projects of law destined to realise them. It will obtain, I am fully convinced, the patriotic support of the Senate and of the Legislative Body, jealous of inaugurating with me a new era of peace, and of assuring its benefits to France."

10. *January 8.* A letter of this date from the Pope to the Emperor was subsequently published, the authenticity of which has not been proved, but which there are no internal reasons to reject. The most important part of it is as follows:

"The Vatican, Jan. 8.

"SIRE,—I have received the letter your Majesty has had the kindness to write to me, and I reply thereto straightforwardly and, as the phrase is, with my heart open to you. First of all, I do not dissemble the difficult position of your Majesty, which you yourself do not hide from me, and which I see in all its gravity. Your Majesty might get out of that position by some decisive step, which perhaps is repugnant to you; and it is precisely because you find yourself in such a position, that you again counsel me, for the peace of Europe, to give up the insurgent provinces, assuring me that the Powers will guarantee to the Pope those that remain.

"A scheme of that nature presents insurmountable difficulties; and it is sufficient, to be convinced of it,

to reflect on my situation, on my sacred character, and on the rights of the Holy See, which are not those of a dynasty, but of all Catholics. The difficulties are insurmountable, because I cannot give up what does not belong to me, and because I see very well that the victory it is wished to give to the revolutionists of the Legations will serve for a pretext and encouragement to native and foreign revolutionists in the other provinces to play the same game, seeing the success of the first. When I say 'revolutionists,' I mean the least considerable and most audacious portion of the populations.

"The Powers, you say, will guarantee the rest; but in the serious and extraordinary cases that may be foreseen, looking at the numerous aids the inhabitants receive from abroad, will it be possible for the Powers to employ force in an effective manner? If that is not done, your Majesty will be persuaded, as I am, that usurpers of other's lands, and revolutionists, are invincible, as long as you use towards them only the power of reasoning.

"Besides, however that may be, I am obliged openly to declare to your Majesty, that I cannot give up the Legations without violating the solemn oaths that bind me, without producing mischief and a shock in the other provinces, without doing wrong and shame to all Catholics, without weakening the rights not only of the sovereigns of Italy unjustly despoiled of their dominions, but also those of the sovereigns of the whole Christian world, who could not look on with indifference at the destruction of certain principles."

11. *January 14.* At this time the English government, responding to the appeal of the Emperor to get him out of his difficulties, and feeling, says Lord John Russell, "that it was a very serious thing that the Italians, who had hitherto been waiting in expectation that Italian affairs would be solved by the Congress, should have no regular government, and no apparent means of terminating the condition of uncertainty in which they were placed, made propositions to the governments of France and Austria with a view to the definitive

solution of the Italian question." These proposals were, in substance, that France and Austria should engage not to intervene by force in the affairs of Italy, unless with the express consent of the other great Powers. That the French armies should, at a proper time and with proper precautions, entirely evacuate Italy; that the Austrians should be left to settle as they pleased the internal affairs of Venetia; and that Sardinia should not send troops into central Italy until the four States had, by a new vote, decided upon annexation. France was, however, the only Power that returned a favourable answer.

12. *January 17.* Count Cavour returned once more to the head of affairs in Sardinia, and issued, ten days later, a circular, of which the following is an extract.

"The postponement of the Congress, the publication of the pamphlet, the letter to the Pope, and the reconciliation between France and England, are four incidents (the least of which would have been sufficient to precipitate a solution) which have rendered longer delay impossible in the settlement of pending questions. Amply commented on by the press of Europe, they have succeeded in convincing every serious mind:—1. That the idea of a restoration must be renounced, as the realisation of it is no more possible at Bologna and Parma than at Florence and Modena; 2. That the sole solution possible consists in the legal admission of the annexation already established, in fact, in Æmilia as well as in Tuscany; and 3. That the Italian populations, after having long waited in vain for Europe to put their affairs in order on the basis of the principles of non-intervention and of respect for the popular wishes, have the duty of proceeding to establish their governments themselves.

"Such is the signification given in Italy to the facts I have just stated, and such is also, which constitutes another circumstance of equal gravity, the interpretation given to them by the most important organs of the European press. The most influential journals of France, England, and Germany give expression to the same ideas, advise the same measures, and

express the same convictions. In such a state of things the populations of Central Italy have determined to arrive at a solution, and to seize on the favourable moment for carrying the annexation into complete and definite execution. It is with that view that the governments of the said provinces have adopted the electoral law of Sardinia, and are preparing to proceed to the election of deputies.

"The King's government has hitherto employed all its moral influences to induce the governments and populations of Central Italy to wait for the judgment of Europe. At present, owing to the uncertainty attending the meeting of the Congress, and in consequence of the facts above mentioned, his Majesty's government has no longer the power of arresting the natural and inevitable course of events."

13. *January 19.* The Holy Father issued an encyclical letter upon the present state of affairs, and the policy of the Emperor of the French. He says :

"From every part of the Catholic world we have received almost innumerable letters, both from ecclesiastics and from laymen of every rank, degree, and condition, some of them signed by hundreds of thousands of Catholics, in which they clearly declare their filial devotion and veneration towards us and this chair of Peter ; and, vehemently denouncing the rebellion and outrages committed in some of our provinces, protest that the patrimony of St. Peter must be preserved whole and entire and inviolate, and must be defended against every wrong. . . . In his letter, the exalted Emperor, after reminding us of certain advice which he had lately offered to us concerning the rebel provinces of our Pontifical dominion, recommends us to consent to renounce the possession of these provinces, it being his opinion that by these means only can the present troubles be healed.

"Every one of you, venerable brethren, clearly understands that the thought of our most grave duty made it impossible for us to remain silent when we received a letter of this kind. Wherefore, without delay, we hastened to write back to the

said Emperor, freely and openly declaring, in the apostolic freedom of our soul, that in nowise could we consent to his advice, because, regard being had to our dignity and that of this Holy See, to our sacred character and the rights of the said See, which belong, not to the succession of any royal family, but to all Catholics, it was attended by insurmountable difficulties. Also, at the same time, we declared that we could not yield up that which was not ours ; and that we clearly understood that the victory which he wished us to grant to the rebels of the *Æmilia* would be a spur to the native and foreign disturbers of the other provinces to make the like attempts when they saw the success attained by the rebels. And, among other things, we declared to the said Emperor that we could not abdicate the said provinces of our Pontifical dominion in the *Æmilia* without violating the solemn oaths by which we are bound—without giving rise to complaints and disturbances in our other provinces—without doing a wrong to all Catholics,—and, in fine, without weakening the rights, not only of those Italian sovereigns who have been unjustly deprived of their dominions, but of all the sovereigns of all Christendom, who could not see with indifference certain most pernicious principles introduced. . . . And we did not omit to point out to the said Emperor that his first epistle, addressed to us before the Italian war, and which brought us consolation and not affliction, was of a wholly different kind from his last letter."

Thus, whilst the French Emperor urges the necessity of giving up a large portion of the Roman States, on the ground that it would be expedient for religion, the Pope grounds his refusal upon the rights of a legitimate throne.

14. *January 29.* The *Univers* was suppressed in consequence of the publication of the encyclical letter. Ever since the Italian war it was in opposition ; and from the time when the temporal power was in jeopardy, by the fault of the Emperor, it has vigorously and incessantly attacked his policy. It has been continued under the title of the *Monde*. The time has not arrived to write its epi-

taph, and we are the less tempted to do so, because it would lead us far beyond the scope of our political narrative, into systems of theology, philosophy, and history, of which the *Univers* was only the mouthpiece in the domain of politics.

The present controversy, it must be remembered, is simply a question of right and wrong, in which it is idle to urge upon our adversaries the interests of the Church or the duties of Catholics. False notions of right and wrong inspire those adversaries, and incapacitate the defenders of the Holy See.

The temporal power of the Pope is in danger because the Austrians have been driven out of Lombardy; and the Austrians were attacked in Lombardy in consequence of the aggressive alliance formed between two revolutionary powers. The revolutionary foundation of the French and Sardinian states determined their foreign policy, which has resulted in the present troubles of the Pope. His friends are not those who have cried loudest, but those who cried soonest. The responsibility for his present affliction lies with those who had no voice to condemn the system of the French empire and of the Piedmontese constitution, and with those who saw no wrong in the Italian war. The abandonment of the Pope by the French Emperor is a natural and consistent consequence of the invasion of Lombardy and Tuscany; it is simply a continuation, not an aggravation of his previous crime. The Legations belonged to the Holy See by the same right by which Lombardy was Austrian. After Villafranca, no such claim could avail any more.

15. The Roman nobles presented, to the number of 134 out of 160, an address of loyalty and attachment to the Holy Father, the substance of which was,—that they were deeply grieved by the efforts of the revolutionary press to represent the people as discontented, and the Papal government as insupportable; and that they therefore protested before Europe their fidelity to the Pope as their religious and civil prince, and gathered themselves round his throne to show how they hated the malicious and disloyal attacks made against

him, and how much they desired the integrity of his sovereignty. They therefore offered their whole selves as some consolation to the Pope in his affliction, and to show that it was not from any want of loyalty, but only from a desire not to complicate matters, that they had not made any previous demonstration. They concluded: "Accept, Holy Father, Pontiff, and King, this energetic protest, and the unlimited devotion which the nobles of Rome offer in reverence to your sceptre no less than to your pastoral staff."

16. *January 24.* The Queen opened Parliament with a speech, of which the following passages are the most important.

"At the close of the last session I informed you that overtures had been made to me to ascertain whether, if a conference should be held by the great Powers of Europe, for the purpose of settling arrangements connected with the present state and future condition of Italy, a plenipotentiary would be sent by me to assist at such a conference. I have since received a formal invitation to send a plenipotentiary to a congress to consist of the representatives of the eight Powers who were parties to the Treaties of Vienna; the objects being stated to be, to receive communication of the treaties concluded at Zurich, and to deliberate, associating with the above-mentioned Powers the Courts of Rome, of Sardinia, and of the Two Sicilies, on the means best adapted for the pacification of Italy, and for placing its prosperity on a solid and durable basis. I accepted the invitation; but at the same time I made known that I should steadfastly maintain the principle, that no external force should be employed to impose upon the people of Italy any particular government or constitution.

"Circumstances have arisen which have led to a postponement of the Congress, without any day having been fixed for its meeting; but, whether in congress or separate negotiation, I shall endeavour to obtain for the people of Italy freedom from foreign interference by force of arms in their internal concerns.

"Papers on this subject will soon be laid before you.

"I am in communication with the Emperor of the French with a view to extend the commercial intercourse between the two countries, and thus to draw still closer the bonds of friendly alliance between them.

"An unauthorised proceeding by an officer of the United States in regard to the Island of San Juan, between Vancouver's Island and the mainland, might have led to a serious collision between my forces and those of the United States. Such collision, however, has been prevented by the judicious forbearance of my naval and civil officers on the spot, and by the equitable and conciliatory provisional arrangement proposed on this matter by the government of the United States.

"I trust that the question of boundary, out of which this affair has arisen, may be amicably settled in a manner conformable with the just rights of the two countries, as defined by the first Article of the Treaty of 1846.

"The last embers of disturbance in my East-Indian dominions have been extinguished: my Viceroy has made a peaceful progress through the districts which had been the principal scene of disorder; and, by a judicious combination of firmness and generosity, my authority has been every where solidly and, I trust, permanently established.

"The attention of the government in India has been directed to the development of the internal resources of the country; and I am glad to inform you that an improvement has taken place in its financial prospects.

"My Lords and Gentlemen,—I have accepted, with gratification and pride, the extensive offers of voluntary service which I have received from my subjects. This manifestation of public spirit has added an important element to our system of national defence.

"Measures will be laid before you for amending the laws which regulate the representation of the people in Parliament, and for placing that representation upon a broader and firmer basis."

The opinions of several leading statesmen were expressed in the first discussions. Lord Derby said: "If there is one principle more recognised

than another in this country, it is, that any state has an undoubted right to settle its own internal affairs, whether with regard to the constitution it may wish to have, or the dynasty it may desire to establish, and that without the intervention of any foreign country. When I say this, I am only stating what is the feeling of every Englishman. Italy should achieve her freedom by her own unaided efforts. As to the state of things in Rome, the Emperor said, that if the Pope would give up the revolted provinces, he should be guaranteed by the other Powers in his other possessions. I will not enter into the question of the temporal power of the Pope. But has the Pope been independent for the last fifteen years? yet the necessity of his independence is urged as a reason for keeping up his temporal power. Now this country can look upon the Sovereign Pontiff in no other light than it would look upon any other sovereign whatever, and the same principles must be applied to him as to other sovereigns as between himself and his subjects. Viewed in this light, his dynasty is capable of being overthrown; the constitution of his kingdom may be modified by the free will of his subjects, and no foreign Power has the right to interfere with the action of the Pope and his subjects. They are free to choose their own government and their own constitution, and that constitution must be established of their own free will, and under no foreign influence, domination, or interference. . . . I ask the Government, who professedly desire that the Italian States should settle their affairs for themselves, on what ground one French army at the present moment occupies Lombardy, and another French army occupies Rome?"

Lord Stratford said, that in the debate which had taken place he had heard nothing inconsistent with the language which a great assembly like this was entitled, and was, indeed, bound to use. It seemed to him, that just in proportion as they were called upon to do every thing which might prevent the country from being plunged into war, so it became a more urgent duty on the part of Parliament to express a strong opinion when principles were enunciated

which struck at the roots of all international obligations and of all international confidence. On such an occasion surely it was in the province of this House and of Parliament to meet such principles by a counter-declaration, which should operate upon other countries, and perhaps thereby be the means of checking designs which it would be necessary to oppose even at the hazard of war.

In the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston described the ministerial policy. "We make no secret that it is our intention in Congress to assert the principle, that it is right the people of Italy should be left to settle their own affairs; that the people of Italy should be left, by their own will, opinion, and energy, to settle the question of government between themselves and their rulers, or between themselves and their allies, neighbouring states. We anticipate a majority of the Powers will differ with us, and we decline. . . . All that we want is, that the Italians should be left to judge of their own interests—to shape their future arrangements according to their own opinions of that which was most likely to contribute to their happiness, and most in unison with their feelings and opinions. I am sure our policy is consonant to the wishes of the people. It is founded upon the same principle as that on which the throne of this country now rests; and therefore in advocating it I feel that the Government are backed and supported by the feelings of the people at large, by the historical traditions of our own country, and by the principles on which that constitution is founded under which we are so happy as to live."

17. From the time when it became evident that, except by a direct intervention, it would be impossible to prevent the annexation of Central Italy to Sardinia, the annexation of Savoy to France began again to be spoken of. Early last year, the question had been entertained both on the part of the Emperor of the French, as some return for the gift which he proposed to make of all Austrian Italy, and on the part of the Catholic party

in Savoy, who were anxious to escape the intolerant liberalism of the Sardinian government. In the presence of the great hopes and promises with which Count Cavour was then occupied, it was not easy to reject these terms. When, however, peace was restored, he was no longer minister; and in announcing the conclusion of peace, Lord John Russell announced also that there was no intention of taking Savoy. In the House of Commons, the latter intimation alone was received with cheers. Further communications, however, with the French government on the subject were less satisfactory. For a time the scheme was dormant, and its active revival coincided nearly with the return of Count Cavour to office. France was now able to urge that she had as good as performed her promise. If not all Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, yet half of it, and half of Central Italy, had been acquired by Sardinia. The cession of Savoy was but a small equivalent, but one to which the Emperor clung. So early as 1849, during the second war with Austria, the French agents in Italy were instructed to endeavour to prevent the formation of a powerful Italian state on the frontiers of France. With this view of self-defence, the Emperor proposed an Italian confederation, encouraged by the example of Germany, which, being a confederation, is a very harmless neighbour. The Alps protect Italy, but are no protection to France, so long as Savoy is Italian. The road from Chambéry to Grenoble, skirting the mountains of the Grande Chartreuse, is open; and this the Emperor considers dangerous when Savoy belongs to a powerful state. But if it becomes French, Italy will be without protection on the side of France, as it is without protection on the side of Austria, and must become more subject than ever to foreign influence, and be more than ever the scene and object of their rivalry. Meantime the Catholics are less zealous in the cause, from the change in the Emperor's policy towards the Holy See.

